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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, August 1, 2013

Tom Friedman

“Every so often you read a news article so revealing…[and] say ‘…That story was the warning sign.”” So begins Tom Friedman’s unfortunate return to writing about China.

In Wednesday’s “Revenge of the Mistress,”  Friedman feebly attempts to argue that China has reached a turning point on official corruption and that turning point has been the online blitz of one “jilted mistress” of the deputy director at the State Administration of Archives.  For Friedman, this 26 year old woman, Ji Yingnan, and her online posts and photos of their lavish life together – a life she thought was forever until she found out that the man was married with a kid – are important in exposing the corruption that is prevalent in China.  For Friedman, she is the whistleblower that could change the course of China and potentially of the world. 

But Friedman’s article completely misses the mark and paints a picture of China that doesn’t really exist. 

First, a jilted mistress as a whistleblower?  Really?  Do you really think that the popularity of her blog posts is a result of an never-before-exposed seeping anger against official corruption?  Or is it more perhaps the lurid details of an affair that went wrong?  Are the excesses she exposes really that unknown to the Chinese public?

No.  The lavishness of government officials has been reported on by the domestic Chinese media for at least the past year.  What Ji “exposes” are facts that are already well known.  The Chinese public knows that graft and corruption is very much a part of their leadership’s lives.  China’s new President Xi Jinping has openly called for the end of corruption among government officials, implicitly admitting to the fact that corruption is wide-spread. 

While certain aspects of the leadership’s wealth – such as the wealth amassed by former Premier Wen Jiabao’s family and reported by David Barboza in the N.Y. Times – have been kept a secret, the lavish spending and mistresses of some government officials has been reported.  And Ji’s post  in no way rises to the damning level of Barboza’s well-documented accumulation of wealth through government ties.  Unlike Barboza’s series of articles which were censored in China, Ji’s posts are still on the internet and she is even receiving media attention.  The reason: because she is not a threat to the ruling elite or necessarily their ways.  She is not a whistleblower; she is not a game-changer; she is a woman scorned. 

But the bigger fault of Friedman’s analysis is his complete ignorance of the fact that since May, the Chinese government has waged a crackdown on anti-corruption activists, petitioners and lawyers, detaining more than 30 individuals for their anti-corruption campaigns.  Most of these activists have been freed.  But most recently, the Chinese government has detained  well-known rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong who has called for greater government transparency and accountability of officials and their families’ assets. 

To ignore the work of these activists and the largely illegal crackdown on their activism (Xu was denied access to his lawyers in contravention of the Lawyers Law and the new Criminal Procedure Law) does a disservice to explaining what is really going on in China.  To claim that a “jilted mistress” is a civil society actor misinterprets what civil society is.   Likely Ji doesn’t have a “cause” other than herself.  The detained activists, their cause is to better Chinese society and have the government follow a rule of law.

Friedman naively calls on civil society actors to find allies within the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)  and convince them that cracking down on corruption is in their best interest.  As if these activists – sitting in their detention cells – hadn’t already thought of that.  While the CCP is not a monolith and there are some reformers within the government, it’s still not an open group of people.  It’s not like some reformer in the CCP is going to invite Xu Zhiyong out for a beer summit and get his take on things.  And what’s Xu suppose to do, write a letter about ending corruption?  In China, that’s what gets you detained.

Courtesy of China Human Rights Defenders, chrdnet.com

Finally, Friedman’s article ends by focusing on how corruption in the Chinese government doesn’t just destabilize China, but given our intertwined relationship, the United States as well.  But this is too simplistic of an analysis.  Certainly what happens in China impacts the U.S.  But would ending corruption solve everything?  Would that change the fact that the Chinese government ties its currency to the U.S. dollar?  Would that result in better air quality standards in China?  Largely no. 

What would have a bigger impact would be a rule of law.  Corruption goes unchecked because there isn’t an independent prosecutor to check local government officials.   Air quality in China is horrible because environmental regulations are not enforced and the people have no independent courts in which to bring their case.  Corruption is merely a symptom of the underlying disregard for a rule of law. 

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, June 3, 2013

Twenty-five years is a silver anniversary; fifty a golden and seventy-five, a diamond jubilee.  But 24 years?  There is nothing in particular to mark a 24th anniversary – no special color, no special symbol, little attention in the press.

On Tuesday, the world will mark this nondescript 24th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre.  The 20 year old idealistic college students who called for greater equality and believed in their government back in 1989, those kids will turn 44.  The parents who had to bring home a dead son or daughter, they will have to face another lonely anniversary of remembering.

But their remembrance will be in silence.  The Chinese government does not mark the passing of its violent crackdown on thousands of unarmed, college students on the night of June 3, 1989 and doesn’t allow its state-controlled press or its people to do so either.  The American author William Faulkner once wrote “The past is never dead.  It’s not even past.”  But in China, that’s just not true of the Tiananmen Square massacre.  Since 1989, the Chinese government has effectively expunged the events of that night from society’s collective memory, especially among the young.  Today, it is not uncommon to find college students – students the same age as those killed in 1989 – who know little or nothing of the event, who have never heard of the “Goddess of Democracy,” and have no clue about the bravery of their countrymen in attempting to form a more perfect country.

Unfortunately, the Tiananmen Square massacre is not the only part of China’s past that has been forgotten.  Take the Cultural Revolution.  From

Some of the dead discovered on June 4, 1989

1966 to 1976, China, at the behest of Mao Zedong, descended into chaos.  Various factions of high school and college age Red Guards were in charge, parents, teachers and intellectuals were publicly ridiculed, some tortured and the unfortunate ones killed.

Today’s youth do know about the Cultural Revolution but only the white-washed version.  Walk into any hip shop on the cute street of Nanluoguxiang in Beijing and it will be filled with kitsch Cultural Revolution memorabilia.  Red Guard hats and armbands, t-shirts with puns of popular Cultural Revolution slogans on them, Mao wristwatches.  All of these are bought with gusto by Beijing’s youth.  But while certain aspects of the Cultural Revolution are allowed to be discussed, the seamier parts – the hundreds to thousands of people killed (either by their own hand or by overzealous Red Guards) and a generation of dreams shattered because of insane policies of the government – are largely unknown to the young.

Every society and every culture has parts of its past it would prefer not to remember.  The United States, with its sordid treatment of various ethnic groups throughout its history, is no stranger to forgetfulness.  The 1862 mass execution of 38 Dakota Indian men for war crimes is known by very few.  In fact the specifics of our treatment of Native Americans is rarely taught in school.  It’s not uncommon for a high school lessons on the United States’ treatment of Native Americans to – sadly – be concluded with a showing of Dances with Wolves.

Tank Man – A man, celebrated throughout the rest of the world but not in China.

Although historical forgetfulness is never good, there is a difference between a people deciding to forget their past and a government that gives their people no choice.  A people should be allowed to acknowledge those actions it deems significant to its culture.  For the United States, many of the marches, protests, and bravery of ordinary Americans during the civil rights movement have come to be celebrated, even those events that at the time that seemed pernicious.

But for China, the people have not been given that opportunity.  The Chinese people have not been allowed to celebrate their fellow countrymen and women who, during one spring season believed in a better country and who in one night lost their lives at the hands of their own government.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, January 2, 2013

While I like the Godfather movies as much as the next person, it’s always strange when personal vendettas make it onto the world stage.  But that is what appears to have happened on Monday when the Chinese government failed to renew New York Times reporter, Chris Buckley’s journalist visa before it expired on December 31, 2012.

Although the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains mum* as to the precise reason why it failed to renew Buckley’s visa – which he had been attempting to renew since October – most in the Western media suspect that it is pay back for the New York Times’ series on the enormous sums of wealth and key investments acquired by Premier Wen Jiabao’s family.

In China Wen is very much known as a man of the people – his mother was a teacher and his father a pig farmer and as a result, the people actually like him.  Unlike the other aloof leaders who rarely if ever smile for the cameras, the Chinese people feel a bond with “Grandpa Wen.”  During public crises – natural disasters, train wrecks –  Wen is the man the government sends to relate, and more importantly, to calm an angry public.  In many ways, Wen’s image is important to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule.

But on October 25, 2012, the New York Times questioned the veracity of that image.  David Barboza, the Times’ Shanghai bureau chief, reported

How can you not love this guy??? Premier Wen Jiabao

that since emerging on the national stage in 1998, Wen’s humble roots fell by the wayside,  at least in terms of his family’s myriad books of business.  While none of the wealth is directly held by Wen, Barboza detailed the estimated $2.7 billion held by members of Wen’s immediate family.

The Chinese government did not take kindly to the article, blocking the New York Times website (which almost three months later remains blocked) and stating that Barboza’s article “smears China and has ulterior motives.”

A month later – on November 24, 2012 – the Times published Barboza’s second damming article on Wen.  The piece documented and insinuated Wen’s role in preventing the legally-mandated break-up of one of his family’s key holdings – Ping An Insurance.   Evidently, the Times did not heed the Chinese government’s rather public warnings.  Is the failure to renew Buckley’s journalist visa payback?

This would not be the first time the Chinese government has used the visa process to punish foreign journalist.  In the past year, visa renewal troubles have become an increasing problem for foreign reporters in China.  In July, China Law & Policy ran a three-part series on this problem (Part 1 here; Part 2 here; Part 3 here), noting that in 2012 a third of members surveyed by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China had difficulty renewing visas.  The majority of those journalists believed – or in some cases were told – that their difficulty was a result of specific reporting.

In May, Al Jazeera’s correspondent, Melissa Chan, who had covered many of China’s sensitive topics, was expelled from China after the government closed the Al Jazeera Beijing Bureau.  In September, Andrew Higgins, the Washington Post’s China chief who had been waiting in Hong Kong for accreditation from Beijing for the past three years, finally left his post and took a job covering Europe for the Times.  And since March 2012, Philip Pan, author of the amazing Out of Mao’s Shadow which details the growing inequalities in China, has been waiting for accreditation from Beijing.   If Higgins’ situation is a guide, Pan should not hold his breath.

Fortunately for the Western public, this attempted censorship has not hurt China coverage.  Hard-hitting stories are still being covered even with the continued visa harassment.

NY Times Reporter, Chris Buckley

But the question remains, will this get worse?  Four reporters in one year alone – Chan, Higgins, Pan and Buckley – have been permanently impacted by the Chinese government’s revengeful visa policies.  Will the Chinese step-up the use of this tool?  Will eventually all New York Times reporters find themselves in Buckley’s boat?

In a country like China, where the domestic media is controlled and censored by the government, the foreign press offers an alternative – and at times more real – perspective of what is happening in China.  This doesn’t just benefit the Western audience but also benefits the Chinese public.  The stories that foreign reporters cover are stories that the Chinese people want to tell and cannot currently tell their own press.

Additionally, given the increasing fluency in English of the Chinese youth, some of them are reading these articles.  On my last visit to China, a Chinese law school student lamented about the recent blocking of the New York Times website and his inability to know what is happening in China.

Finally, some of the exposés that are originally covered by the foreign media are eventually picked up by the Chinese press and produce change.  Melissa Chan filmed her report on China’s black jails in April 2009; in November 2009, a Chinese magazine ran a similar expose.  Last month, a court in Beijing heard a case brought by victims of black jails, signaling perhaps the Chinese government’s willingness to eliminate abusive black jails (in China courts will only hear cases pertaining to certain issues if the government or the Party permits it).

In the United States, the media has often been viewed as the fourth branch of government – the media provides an important level of transparency to our political system.  In a one-party authoritarian country, that transparency can only be provided by the foreign press.  The United States spends millions of dollars of “rule of law” and democracy projects in China.  But supporting the work of foreign correspondents in China, at least verbally, is equally as important a tool to achieve those goals.  As we noted in our July series, it is imperative that the U.S. government publicly address and admonish the Chinese government’s attempt to censor the foreign press through the visa renewal process.

U.S. government officials often lament that with China, there must be closed-door diplomacy; the Chinese take “face” very seriously.  But to the extent that the U.S. government has been conducting this type of diplomacy concerning foreign reporters in China, here’s a news flash – it’s not working.  Things are only getting worse for foreign reporters and as a result, for the Chinese public.  In Melissa Chan’s case, the State Department, through a press person, just said that it was “disappointed” with what happened.  If ever you wanted to give the Chinese government a signal to continue to harass foreign reporters, such a tepid response was likely it.  As a result, it’s vital that a high-up official at the State Department publicly comment on what is happening to Buckley, Pan and countless other foreign reporters in China.  It’s time the U.S. government to publicly articulate one of our key values – that a free press, here a free foreign press, is an important human rights issue.

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* On January 3, 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs broke its silence stating that Chris Buckley’s visa application is still under consideration.  See news report here.  Actually addressing this a good thing for sure, but there will be no step forward until Buckley’s visa is renewed and Philip Pan is finally accredited.  Pressure on the Chinese government should not stop just because of this statement.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, July 23, 2012

Seeing Red in China, a blog that often posts translations of Chinese activists’ work, has just posted two must read translations (see hereand

Beds in a vacant black jail - Caijing investigation.

here).

Both concern the recent abduction and detention of Song Ze, a volunteer attorney at the Open Constitution Initiative.  Like most recent college graduates, Song Ze is an idealist young man who wants to use his education to better society.  That is what brought him to the Open Constitution Intiative and helped him to become an advocate to those petitioners illegally subjected to one of China’s black jails.  As Xu Zhiyong recollects in his essay exclusively written for Seeing Red in China, Song Ze’s advocacy brought him to the cries of Hu Yufu, an 80 year old petitioner desperate for medical attention but denied access to a hospital by his jailers.  Hu Yufu died only a few days after Song Ze first heard his story.  Relying on China’s rule of law, Song Ze assisted the family in bringing a lawsuit against the local Party for their father’s death.

As with all stories where a young idealist lawyer relies on the Chinese government’s promises of rule of law, it was that advocacy that caused Song Ze to be abducted and detained for “provoking disturbances.”  As recounted by his lawyer, Liang Xiaojun, Song Ze has been detained beyond the 37 days allowed by law and has yet to be charged or arrested.  Liang’s account demonstrates a criminal justice system that still has a long way to go before it follows its own laws.  Even citation to the law does not matter:

The officer in charge of the case was there. Upon hearing my request to meet Song Ze, he asked who had sent me and how, while recording information about me on a notepad. Then he left the room with the approval form. When he returned shortly, he told me the lieutenant, whose signature was required, was unavailable, and I couldn’t meet Song Ze on that day. He told me to come back tomorrow.

I argued that, according to China’s Lawyers Law, meeting with client required no approval. He said, the new criminal procedure law wouldn’t take effect until next year, and it was good for a lawyer to obtain approval

Song Ze’s current whereabouts are now unknown.  As Liang points out in his essay, this has become permissible under Article 73 of China’s amended Criminal Procedure Law.  Liang suspects that “residential surveillance” in an undisclosed location will become the tool of choice of the police so as to avoid even the limited protections afforded criminal defendants.

Xu Zhiyong and Liang Xiaojun‘s essays not only reflect the absurdity of China’s legal system where the police do as they please, but they also reveal what is becoming a battle for China’s future.  When the heavy hand of the Party falls on a young, idealistic volunteer, the Chinese Communist Party sends a strong warning signal to China’s other Song Zes: your idealism could silence you and cause you to become a case in and of yourself.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, July 18, 2012

Part 3 of a three part series on the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act & foreign journalists in China
(Click here for Part 1; click here for Part 2)

There is a chance that passage of the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act could result in China granting visas to U.S. government journalist, but that possibility is slim.  The effects of passage of the Act mentioned in Part 1 – the eradication of the Chinese press in the U.S., an all out visa war, and greater suppression of freedom of the press – are much more likely and not positive.  But the U.S. does not have to sit back and just watch the Chinese government harass and censor their journalists.  Below are some less extreme alternatives that the U.S. government can conduct to express its displeasure with the Chinese government and perhaps change the current situation.

Alternative #1: Raise the Issue When it Happens

The U.S government’s tepid response to Melissa Chan’s unlawful expulsion was a missed opportunity to underscore the U.S.’ commitment to freedom of the press to the Chinese government.  The Chinese Media Reciprocity Act is not necessary if the U.S. government publicly stresses that this is an important issue.  While some may argue that private diplomacy and comments work better with China, the current Administration has publicly censure China when its behavior bucks international human right standards.  As recently as last Tuesday, while on a trip to Mongolia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly criticized China for its lack of freedom for its own people.

Similarly, if freedom of the press means something, after Melissa Chan’s expulsion, the U.S. State Department should have issued an official statement from a high ranking official reprimanding China for unlawfully using the visa process to censor foreign journalist coverage.  Perhaps such a statement would have given Beijing pause and might cause it to change from its current course of conduct.  But a mere statement of “disappoint” permits Beijing to continue harassing foreign journalists and interfering with their coverage by threatening to deny visa renewals.  Rhetoric can make a difference or at the very least serve as a signaling device to Beijing that this is an important issue that the U.S. government is not going to take lightly.

Alternative #2: List the Harassment of U.S. Journalists on its Website

The Foreign Correspondent Club of China (“FCCC”) previously posted their members’ incidents reports and the yearly surveys on their website.  But since February 2011, the FCCC is no longer posting the reports or the surveys because of increasing pressure from the Chinese government.  As Peter Ford, president of the FCCC, told China Law & Policy, the FCCC removed mention of the incident reports because “the [Chinese] Foreign Ministry threatened the FCCC president and other officers with unspecified ‘serious consequences’ if the club continued to make public statements that the government regarded as political. To ensure the club’s continued existence we have since limited our public statements to particularly egregious violations of our journalistic rights and freedoms, such as physical injuries sustained by foreign reporters at police hands and Melissa Chan’s expulsion.”

Ambassador to China Gary Locke - can he help protect US journalists?

The public availability of the incident reports provided an important look into the treatment of foreign journalists in China, including their visa issues.  But with the Chinese government’s censorship of the FCCC, that important information is no longer available and it becomes difficult to know the current situation in Beijing.

But the U.S. Embassy in Beijing can serve this function by posting U.S. journalists’ incident reports.  At the very least, they can list the issues that U.S. journalists are having with the visa process serving two purposes: informing its citizens about the j-visa process and highlighting to the Chinese government that this is a serious matter that the Embassy plans to monitor.  The U.S. Embassy in Beijing does something similar for air pollution; the Embassy has a page dedicated to listing air quality reports every hour.  This webpage has  irked the Chinese government since the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection hosts a similar webpage but usually with more positive air quality numbers, making apparent that someone is not telling the truth.  There is no reason why the same can’t be done with U.S. journalists in China.

Alternative #3: Deny a Visa

But another reason why the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act is not necessary – and another tool that can be used to protect our journalists in Beijing – is that the U.S. can deny visas under current law.  The Immigration and Nationality Act provides the executive branch with a list of circumstances, which at times are very vague, where the government can deny a visa.  Section 212(a)(3)(C) allows the State Department to deny a visa if there are adverse foreign policy concerns: “An alien whose entry or proposed activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States is inadmissible.”  Within the courts, the executive branch is given almost exclusive deference in immigration and visa decisions.  See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).

If rhetoric does not work with the Chinese government, the U.S. government can threaten to deny a visa to a single Chinese reporter.  This might do the trick without damaging freedom of the press too much.  In “The Visa Dimension of Diplomacy,” Prof. Kevin D. Stringer analyzed the use of visas as a diplomatic tool.  Although Stringer is not keen on the denial of a visa as a sanctioning tool, he does note that on occasion it has produced positive results.  After India unexpectedly conducted nuclear tests in 1998, the U.S. denied a visa to Dr. R. Chidambaram, the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, who had come to the U.S. multiple times before.

The denial was symbolic but had a larger psychological impact on Indians on work visas or those who wanted to send their children to a U.S. college.; would their visas be denied as well?  How far would the U.S. go?

Similarly, the U.S. government could threaten to deny – or just not process – a visa to a key Chinese reporter.  In February 2012, to much fanfare in China, the Chinese government launched CCTV America, based in Washington, D.C.  A threat to deny a visa to one of their top reporters or directors could put the Chinese on notice that the U.S. is not going to stand for the harassment of U.S. reporters abroad.  Similar to the 1998 India situation, given the large number of political elites’ children who attend college in America, a single visa denial could have a similar psychological impact on influential elites in China.

The U.S. does not have to pass the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act, but it does need to communicate its displeasure with the way foreign correspondents are treated in China.  There are other avenues to do that but one thing is clear, the U.S. government must start raising this issue otherwise things will only continue to deteriorate as it has for the past three years.

To see Part 1, click here; to see Part 2, click here

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, July 16, 2012

Part 2 in a three part series on the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act & foreign journalists in China
(For Part 1, click here)

Putting aside the shrill rhetoric surrounding the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act and the fact that it only deals with the harassment of a small segment of U.S. journalists in China (the VOA and RFA reporters), the Act does draw attention to an increasingly problematic issue: the Chinese governments harassment of foreign journalists through the visa process.  It also raises the question: what should the U.S. government be doing about this harassment?

The Visa Renewal Process for Foreign Journalists – a Censoring Tool?

In the past two years, the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (“FCCC”) has documented an increasing number of incidents where the Chinese government threatens not to renew a visa or  unnecessarily delays the visa renewal process.  In China, a journalist visa (“j-visa) is only for a year and must be renewed every December.  What should be a routine event has turned into an anxiety-ridden occasion.  In 2011, the FCCC started focusing on the difficulties some of its members experienced in renewing their visas.  A 2011 FCCC  survey reported that 27 foreign journalists waited four months for a visa renewal.  According to Peter Ford, president of the FCCC, the FCCC considers waiting more than three months for a visa for a permanent correspondent excessive (for a temporary correspondent the FCCC believes it should only be a 30 day wait).  Thirteen journalists waited six months for a visa; and for three, their visa applications have been pending since 2009.

For 2012, the numbers have only gotten worse.  In the FCCC’s  2012 survey, released on May 31, close to a third of all respondents (36 out of 111 respondents) reported difficulty with renewing their j-visas or obtaining visas for new colleagues.[1]  Furthermore, the FCCC’s 2012 survey found that 21 of these reporters were told or believed that their visa difficulties were a direct result of their China coverage, demonstrating the Chinese government’s attempt to censor foreign correspondents by threatening their j-visa.  Peter Ford, president of the FCCC, told China Law & Policy that he doesn’t think that these threats and the continued harassment has had a chilling effect on foreign reporters’ China coverage.

It’s true that great and hard-hitting stories still make their way to our shores and maybe we just haven’t hit that tipping point.  But if China increases its pressure on foreign journalists, at what point will they crack and soften their stories?  A loss of a visa, especially for freelance journalists, could easily mean a loss of one’s livelihood.

A Foreign Correspondent Expelled from China: Becoming More than Just a Visa Problem

This past May, the Chinese government took the bold step of kicking out a foreign journalist: Melissa Chan, a U.S. citizen and long-time Al Jazeera English correspondent in Beijing.  The reason for Chan’s expulsion from China?  We don’t know.  The Chinese government has elected not to share that information.  But most speculate that it was a result of the Chinese government’s displeasure with Al Jazeera’s documentary of Chinese forced labor camps, a documentary that Chan played no role in filming and it was produced out of Al Jazeera’s London bureau.  Likely though, Chan’s hard-hitting coverage of official corruption, government land grabs, black jails and other sensitive topics didn’t help her case.  Prior to her expulsion, Chan was already being harassed:  her visa was not renewed for another year, instead she was on three short-term visas, probably to keep her on a “tight leash.”

Al Jazeera English China correspondant, Melissa Chan (photo from Al Jazeera)

Is Chan’s treatment a bell weather for other reporters?  Soon after Chan’s departure, Ford, as then president-elect of the FCCC was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the body which, in conjunction with the Ministry of Public Security, oversees foreign  journalists) and was reassured that Chan’s case was “sui generis.” “I was assured by a Ministry official that Melissa’s case was specific to her and other correspondents had nothing to fear.”  But as Ford went on to muse, the official’s statement only provided so much solace to the remaining correspondents in China; as long as the Chinese government continues to be mum on those specifics and persists in using the visa process as a censorship tool, other foreign correspondents don’t know if they have crossed that line that Chan crossed until they actually cross it.

As discussed in Part 1 of this series, one reason to oppose the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act is a belief in freedom of the press.  One would think that the U.S. government would have a particular interest in guaranteeing that journalists around the world – especially foreign journalists abroad – are left unharassed and are free to report their stories.  But the U.S.’ reaction to the expulsion of one of its citizens questions this commitment.  In a single press briefing, Department of State deputy spokesperson, Mark C. Toner, expressed the Department’s “disappointment:” “I would just say that we’re disappointed in the Chinese Government – in how the Chinese Government decided not to renew her accreditation.  To our knowledge, she operated and reported in accordance with Chinese law, including regulations that permit foreign journalists to operate freely in China.”

True Chan was not working for a U.S. media organization and instead was working for Al Jazeera, and her expulsion came soon after the difficult negotiation on Chen Guangcheng, but regardless, one would think that the U.S. government, the stalwart of press freedom, would have been more than just “disappointed.”  Even if the U.S. government did not want to raise the issue of an Al Jazeera reporter, it could have used Chan’s expulsion to highlight the case of Andrew Higgins, one of the Washington Post’s China correspondent who since 2009 has been waiting for a j-visa to enter China.

If freedom of the press is so important, how can we just sit back and watch the Chinese government toy with and try to influence any U.S. reporter, even one working for private news outlets?  What can the U.S. do to try to change this situation in China?

To be concluded in Part 3

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, July 12, 2012

Part 1 of a three part series on the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act & foreign journalists in China

Last month, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on the “Chinese Media Reciprocity Act” (H.R. 2899), a bill introduced last fall by Representative Dana Rohrabacher of California.   The Act attempts to combat China’s restrictive visa policies for U.S. government-employed journalists.  Instead of issuing journalist visas to most if not all Chinese journalists in the U.S., the Act would require that the number of visas issued to Chinese government journalists be identical to the number of visas that China issues to U.S. government reporters.

In reality, the impact of the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act is anything but reciprocal.  The U.S. has two government-sponsored news agencies in (or trying to get in) China: Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA); the remaining U.S. journalists in China work for private media outlets.  China on the other hand, with its state-owned media, has 13government-run agencies and over 800 media personnel working in the U.S.  If passed, within 30 days, the State Department would be required to revoke the number of visas issued to Chinese journalists to equal the number of visas issued to American government journalists in China which currently stands at 2.  The Act would all but eliminate a Chinese media presence in the U.S.

Given its extreme and inflexible nature, the Act shouldn’t be passed.  But it does highlight a truly important issue: the harassment, censorship and expulsion of foreign journalists from China and raises the issue of what the U.S government should do about it.

The Act has many problems.  First, it solely focuses on China, giving it the air of a Chinese Exclusion Act.  China is not the only country which denies foreign journalists visas – a quick review of the worst countries for journalists on Reporters Without Borders’ website reveals that Burma, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Eritrea similarly deny foreign journalists visas.  But this Act is exclusively about China.

Rep. Dana Rohrabacher

Second, the rhetoric by the Act’s proponents leads one to believe that they are more motivated by a Cold War mentality than a true concern about U.S. journalists’ access in China.   Rep. Rohrabacher’s testimony in support of the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act is filled with red herrings concerning Confucius Institutes, billboards in Times Square, and the Chinese purchase of AMC movie theaters (in order to flood the US with Chinese propaganda films).  Testimony by John Lenczowski focused more on Russian spies in the US Embassy in Moscow during the Cold War than the actual treatment of U.S. journalists in China today.

Third, passage of the Act could lead to even worse retaliation by China.  China repeatedly harasses the two VOA reporters in China (see Nick Zahn’s testimony, p. 5-6) and it has consistently denied visas to RFA reporters.  Perhaps the most famous incident was when the Chinese government rescinded the RFA reporters’ visas only days before they were to accompany President Clinton on his 1998 trip to China.

But other major media outlets, like the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, NPR, and CNN, just to name a few, have reporters on the ground in China doing some hard hitting reporting.  Yes these reporters are also often harassed and are often forced to wait months for a visa or are threatened by the Chinese security apparatus that visa renewal will be denied (one of the Washington Post’s China reporters – Andrew Higgins – has been waiting for a visa since 2009, forced to report from Hong Kong).   But in general, most reporters are able to renew their visas and solid reporting from China is able to make it to our shores.  But some, like the Committee to Protect Journalists, warn that passage of the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act could lead to an all out visa war, resulting in China denying a greater number of visas and exacerbating an already tense situation for foreign journalists there.

Finally and perhaps most importantly, is this who we want to be?  A free and vibrant press has been a central tenet of the United States; it was crucial to the success of the American Revolution, is encapsulated within the First Amendment, and is rarely if ever abridged.  As Americans, we understand that the press is a building block to creating a government truly accountable to its people; unfettered press access is an important goal in and of itself.

In recent years, China has seen some developments in a more professionalized and freer press.  Yes, the Chinese press still has to take its most of its cues from the Chinese government, but there has been some development in more real reporting (see Susan Shirk’s Changing Media, Changing China).  But by essentially eradicating the Chinese press from U.S. shores, the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act undermines our goals of this burgeoning freedom of the press in China.  Even the reporters harassed by the Chinese government do not agree with such actions.  Peter Ford, president of the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (“FCCC”), told China Law & Policy that they “do not support efforts to restrict press freedom in one country in an effort to improve press freedom in another.  We remain committed to freedom of the press.”

But all the attention surrounding the Act raises the issue of Beijing’s treatment of foreign journalists.  Is there anything the U.S. can do to change what appears to be the Chinese government’s increased harassment of foreign journalists?

Continued in Part 2

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, June 27, 2012

Meg Davis

This year Asia Catalyst celebrates its fifth anniversary.  If you have never heard of Asia Catalyst, then you are missing out on this tiny but powerful U.S-based NGO doing work in China.  Founded and headed by Sara L.M. Davis, aka “Meg”, a former China researcher at Human Rights Watch, Asia Catalyst is doing what others might think is unsexy work, but in reality is perhaps the most necessary work: assisting Chinese grassroots NGOs with developing the skills and best practices to become effective organizations.

Asia Catalyst is one of the few groups on the ground in China making civil society a reality.  By training China’s nascent grassroots NGOs in the nitty-gritty of running a non-profit, Asia Catalyst guarantees that Chinese civil society will have a strong foundation upon which it can successfully grow.  Asia Catalyst also teaches the tools necessary to effectively advocate both on the domestic and international levels.

China Law & Policy sat down with Meg Davis to discuss Asia Catalyst’s work with NGOs, its recently co-authored report with Beijing’s Korekata AIDS Law Center about the HIV/AIDS blood disaster, and what the future holds for civil society, rule of law and Asia Catalyst.

For those also impressed by its work and interested in supporting it, donations can be made here. For its Fifth Anniversary Campaign, Asia Catalyst’s Board of Directors has generously offered to match all individual gifts donated in 2012 (up to $8,000).

Click here to listen to the interview with Asia Catalyst founder & executive director, Meg Davis, or read the entire transcript below.
Length: 19 minutes (audio will open in a separate browser)

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[01:06] EL: Thank you for joining us today Meg.  So five years ago, what inspired you to create Asia Catalyst? 

[01:13] MD:  It was really kind of an exciting moment in the development of Chinese civil society.  You were starting to see a lot of small groups springing up around the country to address health issues and environmental issues.  These were groups that were started by charismatic individuals who had a clear vision for the future, but maybe hadn’t worked at a non-profit before or had just worked at a similar kind of grassroots start-up.  It was the fact that I had worked with some of these folks at Human Rights Watch in my capacity as a researcher there that led me to have relationships with them.  When I left Human Rights Watch they didn’t really let me leave; they kind of followed along and said ‘can you look at this grant proposal,’ ‘can you help me to meet with this UN person,’ ‘I’m at risk of arrest, can I sleep on your sofa for a week.’ So there was a lot of that kind of stuff that eventually led to the development of Asia Catalyst.

[02:07] EL:  Just in terms of the grassroots situation in China, you keep referring to these NGOs that you work with as “grassroots NGOs.”  Can you perhaps just explain a little bit more about the NGO structure in China and how these “grassroots NGOs” that you help fit into that structure?

[02:25] MD: Grassroots is really an English appropriation of a Chinese term – caogen.  A lot of the groups we work refer to themselves as “caogen,” as grassroots groups.  It’s their way of saying they are independent.  In China, you can only really register at this stage as a non-profit, if you have, in most parts of the country, a sponsoring government institution.  For groups that do policy advocacy, no sensible government official is going to stick their necks out and sponsor one of these groups to get registered.  Some of them are unregistered and a lot of them are registered as businesses, as commercial enterprises.

[03:03] EL:  If these groups are unregistered with the government, how do they develop the skills? If you’re not there to help them, how would they develop the skills to become a professional and effective organization without you if they are kind of in the shadows?

[03:18] MD: Some groups that are more established are getting support from capacity building organizations that do exist in China.  There aren’t many people who are offering what we provide to these very small start-ups which is really one-on-one tailored coaching.  A lot of the groups we work with are founded by people with very limited education so we’re developing tools that don’t require a very sophisticated vocabulary that they can use to do strategic planning, budgeting, staff management, they can do basic qualitative research without a sophisticated background.

[03:51] EL:   In terms of Asia Catalyst’s focus, you’re focusing right now on which types of grassroots NGOs?  I imagine there are a lot of grassroots NGOs [in China], which are you focusing on?

[04:01] MD:  There are more every year.  We mostly work with groups involved in health and legal rights.  That includes groups working on HIV/AIDS, some marginalized communities including lesbian and gay groups, sex workers, drug users, people living with HIV.  But we’re starting also to work with groups that work on disability rights and with groups working on pollution and other kinds of health-related issues.

[04:26] EL: What caused you five years ago just to focus on health rights groups?

PSA in China to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS

[04:31] MD: It was an area of growth and I think it’s also an area where forward-thinking, progressive government officials can easily engage.  If you go to them and say ‘we want to support human rights groups that are working on democracy promotion or censorship issues,’ that’s hard for someone who is a devout believer in Communist Party ideals to support.  But someone who is a socialist can get behind health rights because it is really is not that far removed.

[04:58] EL: So today, five years in, how many organizations in China does Asia Catalyst currently partner with and how does Asia Catalyst find its partners? 

[05:07] MD:  Currently this year we’re working with about 17 organizations around the country.  They’re from all over the place; from northeast China to all the way down to Yunnan and southeast China as well.

[05:18] We find most of our partners through online, open applications and we do this because when I was starting Asia Catalyst, there was a growing number of NGOs but there was a very small number that had international partners or international funding and we really wanted to cast a wider net and get groups that maybe not everybody had heard about.  I think we are starting to do that.

[05:39] EL: So just to follow up on that.  That’s one of the things that I find exciting about Asia Catalyst is this open call for applications.  I know you have a report on your website about how you put out an open call and that people can just come in.  I know most US-based organizations do partner with Chinese organizations that have been recommended through other people, so a lot of the same organizations are getting support internationally.  Sometimes some of those organizations – the US organizations – believe that it that these organizations are more reliable.  But by opening your application process to the public, do you feel that you risk spending resources on grassroots NGOs that might not be as reliable and that might just disappear.  What has your experience been?

[06:30] MD: It’s actually…our experience is the opposite.  Our experience is that some people who become, frankly, kind of donor favorites don’t necessarily have very strong infrastructure, don’t have a core team, don’t have a strategic plan or a solid budget, don’t necessarily have strong financial controls.  So by throwing the application process completely open, it’s a little bit more democratic, it’s a little bit more in line with the ideals that we espouse of transparency and accountability, and it means that groups, any groups that applies for one of our programs has to go through a process of being vetted which is quite intensive and a little bit painful for them.  They have to submit a lot of materials, they have to go through multiple interviews, they have to provide references, and in that way we try to identify groups that have certain fundamentals and one of those is a core team.  It’s easy to have one person who is very charismatic [as a] founder but that doesn’t necessarily mean that there is an organization behind them.  We’ve learned that the hard way.  So that’s one of the things that we try to identify through our intake process.

[07:33] EL: After you have done the intake and you find an organization that has been vetted, what kind of services does Asia Catalyst provide to help develop them?

[07:41] MD: The way our program is structured now, the first kind of level of engagement is through our non-profit leadership cohort which is a year-long program where 10 health rights group get intensive training in budgeting, strategic planning, and volunteer management.  Out of that, we pick two people who will continue on for a second year who will then become training assistants with a small stipend.  At the end of the second year, if they pass a certification exam, they can start their own cohort using our curriculum.

[08:15] Groups that go through the cohort then become eligible to get other kinds of assistance and sometimes that means leveraging our own donor connections to introduce them to donors, sometimes that means helping them come to international conferences.  So it can mean a variety of different possible partnerships.

[08:29] EL:  I also know that you guys have this survival skills guide.  Is that accessible to Chinese NGOs in Chinese on the web?

[08:39] MD: It is.  It’s available in English and in Chinese.  We’ve circulated hard copies through our networks in China and we’ve also made it available for free download.  That’s actually the most popular thing we developed is that tool kit which uses tools we developed with groups over the past years.

[08:53] EL: And that’s accessible to all grassroots organizations in China?

[08:55] MD: Absolutely.  Any of them.  And also our human rights curriculum which we’re still in the process of developing with Chinese and Thai partners which is called “Know It, Prove It, Change It” and is a three part curriculum series on how to analyze human rights issues, how to document them and how to conduct advocacy around them.

[09:15] EL: And then the organizations that you work with in China, I know you have this philosophy of “pay it forward” where they’re supposed to help others.  Can you just talk more about that and how you make sure that happens.

[09:25] MD:  That was something that came out of our initial partnership with the Korekata AIDS Law Center in Beijing.  After we had worked with them for a couple of years and they were ready to become independent, we asked them for some input into our strategic plan and they said, ‘How about a pay it forward element where we would then help another organization with some element of their work?’  So some of the groups that we work with now that have had a little bit more experience, we ask them to assist with some of the other organizations whether it is advising on a project or giving them a little workshop or something else.

[09:56] EL: So then they are creating a real civil society where other organizations in China teach other organizations.

[10:00] MD:  That’s the hope.

[10:02] EL:  That’s cool.  So I just want to also now turn to some of the substantive work that Asia Catalyst has published and co-authored, specifically, the March 2012 report that Asia Catalyst co-authored with Korekata AIDS Law Center entitled “China’s Blood Disaster: The Way Forward.”  Can you just give our listeners a little bit of background on the report, what role Asia Catalyst played in drafting the report and how Korekata was able to obtain the information for that report?

[10:33] MD: Sure.  I think as most people who follow China at all know, in the 1990s tens of thousands of people contracted HIV through a state-sponsored, for-profit blood collection scheme in which people were encouraged to sell their blood in ways that were unsafe and that spread tainted blood to whole villages of people. [Hospital blood supplies became contaminated, spreading HIV to more people.]

[10:54] Ten, fifteen years further down the line, a lot of those people are struggling with HIV and are still trying to get compensation and still trying to get some acknowledgement of what happened to them and their families.  Some of them suffered just overwhelming losses.  It’s really the largest blood disaster in the history of AIDS.  China has had one, and certainly the US, Canada, France, Japan, every country has had a blood disaster but China dwarfs the others by several orders of magnitude.

[11:23] So activists and people living with HIV  in China have been pushing, through petitioning and through lawsuits, to try and get compensation.  The weak legal system in China has made it difficult for them.  But in the past year or so we got some signals from UNAIDS that the government might be willing to engage on this issue and to address this vast need by creating a national compensation plan.

[11:47]  We were asked by UNAIDS to work with Korekata AIDS Law Center as they conducted research to document some of the cases.  It’s not possible to document all of them when you’re a tiny, little NGO, but to gather some of the cases from different parts of the areas that were affected and to show what some of the challenges were with obtaining compensation.

[12:06]  So Korekata conducted several dozen interviews, they got very rich testimony from people in very remote villages.  I worked with them in training them on how to do the research and then how to analyze the data.  We had a week of eating dumplings around a table and arguing about how a compensation fund should be managed which was one of the most fun things I’ve ever done.  Imagine trying to make policy for a country of 1.2 billion.  If you’re not someone already doing it it’s a challenging task.  Based on that, Korekata drafted a report which we translated into English and was submitted to the UNAIDS and to what’s called the Red Ribbon Forum, a national platform for dialogue on HIV/AIDS policy.

[12:49] EL: When you say the Red Ribbon Forum is a national platform, is that a national platform within China?

[12:55] MD:  It is.  It’s unique actually and they have kept it a little bit quiet.  Basically as far as I know it is the first platform in which the government and NGOs engage in a dialogue about human rights, and it’s about human rights and HIV/AIDS.

[13:09] EL: And just in terms when you say the government and NGOs, including these grassroots NGOs that are kind of in the shadows?

[13:17] MD:  That’s right.  Absolutely.  It’s grassroots NGOs and it’s the Ministry of Health.  And when I say dialogue it is often Ministry of Health officials giving a speech and then NGOs giving a speech.  So it’s not really a very hands-on, face-to-face discussion a lot of the time.  But it is a first to have them in the same room and talking to each other

[13:36] Out of that there was a working group [led by Professor Qiu Rrenzong] that then created proposals that went to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference which met in March, [and then to the National People’s Congress, and was submitted up from there.]  So there is a proposal now for a national compensation fund that is in that process.  So we’ll see.

[13:54] EL:So this report has basically gone to the high levels of the Chinese government and hopefully has some kind of impact?

The Toll of the Disaster: AIDS orphans in China

[14:00] MD: Yes.  I have written a lot of human rights reports in China and that’s the first one.

[14:04] EL: And in terms of the report, outside of the Chinese government, I know you received coverage with the South China Morning Post, but domestically, has the report received any media coverage in China or is this issue still a little bit too sensitive.  I guess, how is the media handling the report and then just the issue in general?

[14:22] MD:  We did what is called a soft launch, so we didn’t send it out to all our press contacts and Korekata also did not because it was the “Liang Hui,” the “Two Sessions Period” which is often politically sensitive.  So we opted to do something that was a little bit more low key and just send it to a few key people we knew were interested in the issue and that would cover it.  So there was a beautiful article by Paul Mooney in South China Morning Post, the British Medical Journal and then as it happened, the Shenzhen CDC, Center for Disease Control, also reported on it.

[14:52] EL:  Wow, so this is having a lot of impact then.  In terms of the report itself, when I read through it, what I thought was the most interesting as a attorney was just the difficulty that many of these people have in getting into the court system in order to compensation cases. So you can just explain to our audience how these cases are kept out of court?

[15:18] MD:  Sure.  What’s happened in Henan province is that courts have flat-out refused to accept cases.  So a lawyer will approach the court, say that he wants or she wants to submit a case for consideration and the court clerk will just take it and then bring it back to him and say ‘sorry we cannot accept this case because it relates to HIV AIDS.’  In Henan, courts are saying that they have been issued an order from on-high not to handle any cases relating to HIV AIDS of any kind.

For AIDS compensation cases, the courthouse doors are always locked

[15:49] EL:  Have you ever seen this actual order?

[15:52] MD:  No one has seen it.  No one has ever seen this order.

[15:55] EL:  And Henan is kind of the epicenter of the crisis?

[15:57] MD:  Henan is the one that’s the hardest hit province in the whole region. [In other provinces, courts sometimes accept cases, but plaintiffs then face many procedural barriers to getting a judgment. In a few cases, people have gotten judgments but then never succeeded in getting them implemented.]

[16:01] EL:  So what I thought actually was really interesting is that in your report you actually had a list of 26 HIV/AIDS compensation settlements where you document whether it was an out of court settlement or an in-court settlement or a court judgment.  There were actually 6 cases where it was either a court-mediated settlement or a court judgment and they actually had the highest awards when I compared it to others.  And even in one of them, what I thought was interesting, the one out of Heilongjiang ordered over $30,000 for emotionally damages. 

[16:38] MD:  Heilongjiang is a good [place] to be a victim of a bad thing.

[16:42] EL:   Why are some courts taking these cases, or do you not know?

[16:47] MD: So Heilongjiang was very early on.  It’s a northeastern province in China, very sparsely populated, there was not a big blood disaster there.  So some provinces like Henan, it is tens of thousands of people.  Heilongjiang it may be a few thousands or it may be less, we don’t really know.  And so, I think what’s happening is that early on some provinces said ‘Fine, no problem, let’s address this.’  But other provinces said ‘We are going to open the flood gates and we cannot cope with this.’  And that’s part of the reason why we are calling for a national compensation fund.

[17:21] EL: Because you’re seeing such a disparity between provinces?

[17:24] MD: Yes, it’s deeply unfair.

[17:25] EL: Do you know….I mean, it was kind of unique, I mean as an attorney, seeing a judge give out a huge amount of money for emotional harm is even unique in the United States, let alone in China.  Do you have any idea why?

[17:39] MD:  I don’t and no one has been able to reach the lawyer in that case, so we don’t know all the details.  That was a case that happened fairly early on also.  So it gave a lot of people false hope I think in other places.

[17:52] EL:  In terms of new cases, I know that you had reported…Asia Catalyst had reported on its blog that there’s been a new case that a court has actually accepted about HIV/AIDS and privacy.  Do you think this is a result of publicizing the issue more?  What do you think is happening there?

[18:07] MD:  I don’t…I mean, I don’t know.  There have been a few attempts to litigate on discrimination and this was actually sort of like a discrimination case.  I think there is starting to be a little bit more awareness and more courts are accepting cases related to discrimination.  And privacy issues are probably an easier sell.  But the blood disaster remains very, very hard to litigate on.

Asia Catalyst in Action

[18:33] EL:  So it sounds like that in a short amount of time Asia Catalyst has been able to assist a good number of grassroots NGOs achieve justice for some of society’s most vulnerable.  What do you see for the next 5 years?

[18:44] MD:  Well, we are continuing to build on our work in China.  Some of the groups that come out of the cohort, we will be working with them to help them conduct their own research and do advocacy and hopefully building a system that will then self-perpetuate where people who come out of our program start to train others and it scales up and becomes really something that is locally managed .  We are also beginning to look at Myanmar and other countries in Southeast Asia to see whether we can take the tools and experience we have from China and make them work in other locations as well.  So we will see how that develops.

[19:16] EL: Okay, well that’s very exciting, it’s exciting times for Asia Catalyst and thank you for joining us today Meg.

[19:21] MD: Thank you so much.

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To learn more about Asia Catalyst events or to support its work, please visit Asia Catalyst’s website at www.asiacatalyst.org.  For its Fifth Anniversary Campaign, Asia Catalyst’s Board of Directors has generously offered to match all individual gifts donated in 2012 (up to $8,000).

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, June 3, 2012

“For the great majority of young mainland Chinese, the events of the Tiananmen Massacre have never entered their consciousness; they have never seen the photographs and news reports about it, and even fewer have their family or teachers ever explained it to them. They have not forgotten it; they have never known anything about it.”

So ends Chan Koonchung’s The Fat Years, an allegorical novel set in the near-future Beijing, where China is the only prosperous nation left after the great global economic meltdown of 2008. Most of its citizens are happy – unnaturally so – and fully satisfied with the materialism of their new lives.

But there is a small group of misfits- led by Fang Caodi – that is searching for a missing month from 2008 where martial law was imposed so that the government could bring on the fat years. All remnants of that month have been erased from society’s collective memory: newspapers published during that month no longer exist and no one ever speaks of it. It’s as if it never occurred. Fang and his posse go all over the country, trying to find any evidence of that missing month and trying to find more people like them: people who remember. They find almost no one but then hatch a plan to kidnap a high level government official and interrogate him. They find out about a government intent on guaranteeing that the mistakes of its pass are forgotten and only China’s glorious future is remembered.

Make no mistake, Chan is not talking about a missing month in 2008. What Chan is discussing are the seven weeks that led up to the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen massacre, where martial law was imposed, high-level Chinese officials ordered the army to open fire on its own people, and hundreds of unarmed student protestors were estimated to have been killed.

On Monday the world will mark the 23rd anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre. But Mainland China will not. Every year, the anniversary of Tiananmen, known as Liu Si in Chinese, is forgotten on mainland China, unless you count the Chinese government’s stepped up security of Tiananmen Square and random detention of activists as a commemorating event.

Around June 1, 1989, over a million students converge on Beijing's Tiananmen Square

For 23 years, there has been no public mention of the Tiananmen massacre and aside from hushed whispers among older Chinese, in particular the Tiananmen Mothers who bravely try to keep the murder of their children alive, there is little private discussion of the event. The Chinese government’s 23 years of silence concerning Tiananmen isn’t just denial. It’s been a concerted and fairly effective effort to erase Tiananmen, and the government’s bloody actions on the night of June 3, 1989, from China’s collective memory.

Mainland Chinese born after 1989 largely do not know anything about the events surrounding those seven weeks 23 years ago nor the bloody repression on the night of June 3 into the early morning hours of June 4. To the extent that they have heard anything about it – from a professor who might have supported the students in 1989 or from a family member who was there – their recollections are muddied at best.

Chan’s The Fat Years is a warning: that the Chinese must not forget the past; that they must continue to remember. But that warning is mixed with the reality that perhaps some Chinese do want to forget, especially the young. Compared to 1989, times have never been better. Why rock the boat? Why be bothered with your parent’s history?  And that is Chan’s second note of caution to the Chinese: do not be lulled into acceptance by materialism.

But those messages will not be heard in China.  In keeping with their efforts to annihilate Tiananmen from collective memory,the Chinese government has banned The Fat Years. In the introduction to the English translation, Julia Lovell notes that the book has still

A rickshaw driver ferries two dying students on he morning of June 4, 1989

made its way around dissident circles in Beijing. But dissidents in Beijing are a small, insular group; the vast majority of Chinese will remain unaware.  The fact that today’s dissidents and rights activists still remember Tiananmen is one weakness in the Chinese government’s goal and might explain the two-year crackdown on activists.

For the first few years after the Tiananmen massacre, the question was, how long will the Chinese government refuse to investigate the murder of hundreds of Chinese students. Twenty-three years later, now the question is, will the Chinese ever know their own history? As time passes, memories fade, Tiananmen mothers die, and the Chinese Communist Party remains in power, the answer seems to be leaning toward no.

That is why we must never forget June 4, 1989 and continue to memorialize and investigate the events. As censorship increases in China, the western world is ironically becoming the repository of China’s modern history. Eventually, the Chinese people will demand that they be allowed to learn their own history; eventually they will be free to decide for their own what aspects of their history that they want to commemorate and what they want to forget.  Eventually, the West’s repository of knowledge will be accessed by the Chinese.

Chan’s The Fat Years should not be read for its literary style. At many points the narrative really slows down and “near future Beijing” is actually 2013, making it difficult for the current English reader of translation to find it even slightly believable. It also appears to peter out toward the end with the main characters just fading from the page. But for the ideas that the book presents about modern day China and its potential future, it is an important read.  Especially today, on this anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre.

Rating:

The Fat Years: A Novel, by Chan Koonchung (Nan A. Talese, 2012), 336 pages.

A BBC news report from the early morning of June 4, 1989

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, May 18, 2012

Chen Guangcheng, entering a Beijing Hospital with US Ambassaor Gary Locke and State Dep't Legal Advisor Harold Koh

More often than not, I am my friends’ go-to China person; something in the news pops up with China, I get the questions.  So I wasn’t surprised on Saturday when over some carrot cake at the Chelsea Market a friend of mine had questions about Chen Guangcheng: if he cared so much about human rights in China, why would he leave?  What is up with the Chinese government, keeping a blind man trapped in his own home?  How did things get so messy between the U.S. government and Chen?

It’s been almost a month since Chen fled the home that illegally became his prison. So what exactly is up with Chen’s escape and to answer some questions – what does it all mean?

Chen’s Escape Has Propelled Human Rights to the Top of the US-China Agenda

My friend’s question on Saturday caught me off guard – does Chen really care about human rights in China if he fled to the protection of the U.S. Embassy, ostensibly to seek asylum and leave China.

To ask a man with a wife and two children to be a martyr for his cause is asking too much.  As this blog has recounted previously, since Chen’s release from prison (oddly convicted of a traffic disturbance) did not result in freedom.  Instead, for the past year and a half, Chen and his family have been subjected to illegal house arrest and at times, physical torture by his captures.

It is true that by departing China, Chen’s ability to change China’s current system will be much reduced if not extinguished.  But his heroic flight has perhaps done more to highlight the Chinese government’s recent illegal oppression of dissent than anything else.  Over the past year and a half, this blog has increasingly written about the Chinese government’s crackdown on China’s nascent rights defending (weiquan) lawyers. Aside from people already interested in the issues, these posts – and the acts of repression which they have focused on – have received little attention.

Chen’s escape and his subsequent stay at the U.S. Embassy  altered this focus. With Hillary Clinton arriving for the Strategic and Economic

Inspiring Architecture? The US Embassy in Beijing

Dialogue (S&ED), the focus of U.S.-China relations shifted to human rights.  For one week, as the world watched, the U.S. and China’s relationship was thrown back to a 1980s-Cold War paradigm, when ideology played a more governing role.  For one week, the Western media’s attention finally focused on the repression of rights defending lawyers, and the lip service the Chinese government gives “rule of law” when it comes to civil rights and civil liberties.

It is amazing that a single man’s act, that one blind man’s heroic act, can still change the dialogue in U.S.-China relations.  It is a hopeful reminder that in this globalized world, individuals still matter; that one man’s quest for freedom is still “news.”  And don’t think Chen’s act was not a heroic one.  Not only was a blind man able to find his way to Beijing, but imagine if he wasn’t; imagine if he was caught.  Likely his fate would match that of Gao Zhisheng, a rights defending lawyer who, while in government custody, remains missing.

The U.S. Government’s Actions Supported Human Rights

Some have criticized the U.S. government – or more aptly, the Obama Administration – for its dealings with the Chinese government over Chen.  Initially, the U.S. Embassy worked out a deal with the Chinese government whereby Chen would stay in China, study law at a university in a coastal city away from the thugs of his hometown, and be left alone with his family.  This was what Chen initially wanted.

But once he left the safety of the embassy for a Beijing hospital, Chen began to reconsider his options.  As Prof. Jerome A. Cohen recounted to CNN, the promised U.S. Embassy official was unable to stay with Chen at the hospital and once he began speaking other rights defending lawyers – friends he hadn’t been able to speak to for a year – he began to more clearly understand the increased oppression of rights defending lawyers in China.  Chen was scared; Chen realized that without full information, he misjudged the situation.  That’s when he vocally requested that he be able to leave China for the United States.

Were some in the U.S. Embassy a touch too naive to rely on the Chinese government’s promises?  Most likely.  But being naive is not the same as turning one’s back to human rights.  It was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s decision to allow Chen into the U.S. Embassy in the first place.  Chinese citizens cannot just willy-nilly enter the U.S. Embassy; even American citizens are allowed limited access to their embassy (which resembles a high-security prison).  As the N.Y. Times has recounted, embassy officials were notified of Chen’s flight to Beijing and on April 25, Secretary Clinton gave the authorization to sneak Chen into the embassy compound.  Secretary Clinton knew full well that by providing that approval, a throw-down with the Chinese government on the issue of human rights was certain and the ultimate outcome unclear. It is unfortunate – although not all together shocking given the current acrimonious status of politics – that Washington D.C. cannot view this moment as a proud one for America and its ideals; that the web of support that both parties have built for a human rights network in China over the years enabled Chen to come to our door.   Instead, it appears that what could otherwise be a proud moment for Americans, is becoming a political tug-of-war.

Who is Driving the Bus? The Chinese Central Government’s Lack of Control

Beep Beep! Who drives this bus??

What is perhaps the most shocking of all from this whole situation is the Chinese central government’s lack of control of local governments. Chen’s persecution has largely been conducted by the local government in his hometown, with local government officials still seething after his attempt to bring a lawsuit against them for forced abortions.  But even when Chen fled to Beijing, his safety could not be guaranteed, hence his changed desire to leave for the United States.  Many of his relatives left in their villages are being persecuted by local officials.  It makes one wonder – who really drives the bus in China?

Imagine a United States where Governor George Wallace could ignore federal law, have his way and continue segregation in his home state of Alabama.  Likely you can’t.  It’s unfathomable to think that a national government is unable to enforce its own laws, and in the case of China, that a supposed authoritarian dictatorship cannot control lower level party members.

Chen’s case reflects a center weaker than anyone previously thought.  And that is what is most frightening and should give people pause.  Does China really have the power to become a rising superpower or will it revert to its warlord past, where each city is governed by its own power broker and the central government remains impotent?

While China’s weakness appears to manifest itself often in human rights issues, it should not be just a concern for human rights advocates.  Anyone working in or with China – business people, government officials – should be troubled.  A weak center, especially as China undergoes an important leadership transition this year, does not bode well for China.

Prof. Jerome Cohen – The Fixer

On a final note, I want to focus on Prof. Jerome Cohen and his role in all of this.  As a research fellow for two years, I had the privilege of working

Prof. Jerome A. Cohen

with Prof. Cohen at NYU’s U.S.-Asia Law Institute.  In that time, I got to know a kind, brilliant man who never ceased to amaze me.  It was Prof. Cohen who first identified the ingenuity and necessity of Chen’s unschooled, “barefoot lawyer” approach in 2003 and deservedly catapulted him to the world stage.

While my two years with Prof. Cohen were filled with inspiring moments, I have never been more proud of him than I was with his handling of the Chen Guangcheng situation.  While this is all purely based on hearsay, it appears that it was Prof.  Cohen who got the U.S. and China out of what was becoming a crisis situation.  Prof. Cohen’s lifetime of experience with China, including high-level delegations soon after Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, allowed him to realize that all that was needed was a practical solution where everyone could save face: a scholarship for Chen to study law at NYU’s U.S.-Asia Law Institute and invitation for his wife and children to join him.

Now we wait and see.  The United States has approved Chen’s visa application and just yesterday he applied for his Chinese passport.  Although the Chinese government could renege on the deal, that looks increasingly less likely and ultimately not in their best interest.  It’s never a satisfying moment when one of your citizens essentially seeks protection from a foreign government for human rights abuses, but on some level, the Chinese government is likely happy that Chen, who has long been a rabble rouser and a cause célèbre for other Chinese rights defenders and foreign friends, is leaving the country.  Unfortunately for Chen and his family, he will likely never be able to return to his home country.