World leaders met this week in Washington, DC to discuss the danger of nuclear war.  But as the world becomes increasingly reliant on the internet and increasingly connected through it, another threat is beginning to loom large – cyberwar.  When noted technology giant Google is susceptible to cyber-attacks, that does not bode well for the rest of us.  How safe is the U.S. from a large-scale cyber-attack?  Today Chinese hackers attack Google’s servers, but what about tomorrow?  Will the next attack be on something more critical, like a U.S. power grid?

To understand the complex issues underlying the world of hacking and cyber-espionage, and how it relates to U.S.-China relations, China Law & Policy sat down with a noted expert on both China and cyber-security, Dr. Adam Segal, the Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.   In this exclusive interview, Dr. Segal discusses the nature of the attacks on Google, the involvement of the Chinese government in the hacking world and the danger China poses to the U.S.’ cyber-security.  But as Dr. Segal makes clear, it is not a one-sided affair; the U.S. also plays a very active role in hacking and cyber-espionage, making it difficult to challenge China when something like the Google incident arises.  Dr. Segal also explores the need for international cooperation on these issues and the role that international law can play in containing the threat.  Unfortunately, as he points out, the world community is far from reaching any sort of agreement, leaving all nations susceptible.

Click here to listen to the interview with Dr. Adam Segal (read below for transcript)

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EL:  Can you just give our listeners a little bit of background on the hacking which lead to Google’s announcement in January that it was looking to leave China?  How widespread and sophisticated was the attack and what was the theft that Google referenced in its press release if you know at all?

AS: Google announced that it was going to be shutting down its business in China.  And what they said drove them to that decision was a hacking incident which seems to have two main components.  The first was, as you said, a kind of attack on Google’s intellectual property, its corporate knowledge and corporate property.  And the second was attacks on the G-mail accounts of human rights dissents.  Google said it traced those attacks back to China; it didn’t implicate the Chinese government.  Others, like the New York Times have traced it back to Shanghai Jiaotong University and a computer training institute but the source of it still remains a bit of a mystery.

There is some debate about how sophisticated the attacks actually were.  They were referred to as the Aurora attacks.  Google has consistently said that they were extremely sophisticated but a number of other security analysts have said that in fact they were fairly basic, that much of the code used has been floating around for a long time.  What the IPR that the Chinese got or were trying to get is unclear, Google hasn’t specifically said.  Some people seem to believe that it was basically that it was the data and databases that Google collects on its own users.  So basically the kind of core knowledge that Google extracts from what Google users do, how they do it, when they do it, which would be one of the most important kind of assets that Google has.

EL:  In tracing back, or Google saying that the attacks were traced back to China, why is that difficult to ascertain?  To what degree…Can you put a percentage on how accurate you can trace back an attack?

AS:  The problem is that you can continually trace back the attacks to certain computers or to certain networks or IP addresses, but often once you get there, some more poking around leads you to another computer behind that.  And the other thing is the hackers themselves can spoof the address that they are using.  I think there becomes a fairly high degree of certainty about where the attack might have come within a national network.  In some cases, even down to specific IP addresses.  But even then you don’t know who the hacker was that was involved and you don’t know the hackers relationship to any state organization or anybody else for that matter.

EL:  And in terms of China specifically, the cyber-hacking, how prevalent is cyber-hacking from China compared to other countries like Russia or even the United States?  Is China being singled out here?

AS:  I think China is being singled out in a sense.  I mean given that it was a high profile attack on a company like Google, but also given the state of U.S.-China relations right now, that it fed into a worsening tenor in the bilateral relationship.  But in raw numbers, for criminal activity, clearly Russia is very high up there and we saw the political uses of cyber-hacking in the case of the Georgian war and Estonia and some other high profile political cases.  And there is a large amount of hacking that comes from the United States and that’s actually one of the big complaints on the Chinese side – is that the Chinese are being scapegoated and they themselves are often victims of attacks and many of those attacks come from servers in the United States.  When you look at the number of bad ISP – Internet Service Providers – that are hosting botnets and other kind of zombies that are attacking, there are a large number of them that are in the United States.  So, China is also a victim.

EL:  Just focusing on just China and the hacking there, can you explain maybe a little bit more what the hacker community is like in China.  Is it an organized community?  And what motivates the hackers – do they do this just for fun or are they ever “hired” for their skills?  And also how do they determine targets – how was Google determined?  Was that just something for fun or for profit?

AS:  I think the community itself is incredibly hard to characterize.  It’s very diverse, it’s, I think, very decentralized.  The community represents kind of the similar community that there is in the United States and Russia.  There are what they called script-kiddies – people, teenagers who are doing it for fun or to show off or to see what they can actually accomplish.  There are criminals – people that are just hacking for financial gains.  There are what are called patriotic hackers – people that hack websites out of a kind of nationalistic feeling.  Then there are hackers that are probably employed by the Chinese government, probably by the military and the security agencies that are used to attack specific targets for political reasons.  And then there are hackers in the military that are thinking about how cyber would be used in an actual military conflict.

Of course, the important question is the relationship about all of these people and I don’t think we really have a very good idea.  Clearly, there is some blurring of boundaries of patriotic hackers and criminal hackers.  The system itself seems to be in many ways a kind of mirror of the system that has made China such a power in the global manufacturing which is that there are kind of contracts and subcontracts and subcontracts of what people do.  Somebody might be in charge of writing a very low-level code and that code is then packaged up and used by people above them, who may then might contract for a specific project or may sell it on the open market.  Certain things are just put out there on hacker websites and you can just download them and buy them just for your own thing.

Why Google was targeted.  If, as Google says that they were part of an attack that seems to have included at least 30 other technology companies, there does seem to be a push from Chinese intelligence community, from its espionage community, to try and get advanced technology from foreign companies.  So we have seen for at least five years, if not longer, pretty concentrated, focused attacks on defense contractors and other U.S. technology providers.  And then, once you add the attack on the dissidents as well, then that also seems to be one of the interests of the attacks.  But who was, who within the Chinese government organized it or put it in a larger strategy, I think that we really have no idea. 

EL:  I guess that raises kind of the other issue that has been floating around there with the Google incident and cyber-hacking in general, is to what degree is the Chinese government involved in some of these incidences?  I know Northrop Grumman issued a report last year to the US-China Economic and Security Commission analyzing the link between, hacking for military purposes, but this general hacking of corporations, could it be that the Chinese government is behind it?  And also, when you make this distinction of political hackers, would that be motivated by the Chinese government or is it just a by-product of the nationalism that seems very active in China right now?

AS:  I don’t think we know.  I think the most we can say is on the espionage side, it just matches, or it pushes in the same direction of a general concern we know that China has about technological dependence and wanting to gain as much technology from the West as possible.  That strategy I think has been in place for fifteen, twenty years.  That includes perfectly harmless, normal technology policy about how China is going to increase its own technological capabilities, goes from that to espionage and theft.  You would expect that that would include the normal type of espionage or bribing, stealing, theft of secrets from corporations, to now including cyber-espionage and attacks and those things.  So I would say that the government has a role in the sense that it has set this general direction of the policy and these concerns about technology and China’s desire for it.

Clearly the intelligence agencies probably have a sense of specific technology that they are concerned about and want to know more about.  So the hacking of the F-35 and the F-22 and those kind of things, those are clearly probably driven by government agencies who are looking at a potential conflict with the United States and want to know what those capabilities are.

But once you get to the level of Google – is there a government official that says, well if we hack Google, then we can give that information to Baidu [the popular Chinese search engine] and we can have a competitor, I don’t think we can know.  That clearly is a possibility but at this point, it may just be criminal.  It may be a criminal that turns around and says to Baidu – we can sell this to you.

On the dissident side, I think it is probably very similar also.  I think in some cases the security agencies may have….are targeting specific individuals who are using those capabilities.  In other cases criminal hackers go after people and then turn around and say to the intelligence agencies – we’ve got this person so either do something for us or pay us for the information.

EL:  In the press it has often been the Chinese government attached to this cyber-hacking, but does the Chinese government ever see this cyber-hacking as a threat to its own rule either from domestic hackers or from hackers in the U.S.?  Are the government agencies ever a victim of the cyber-hacking and cyber-espionage either domestically or from abroad?

AS: Yeah, I would think all of the time. I think, from the international perspective the Chinese basically assume that the United States is engaged in cyber-espionage all of the time.  And that given our capabilities, in particular the capabilities that exist in the NSA – the National Security Agency – that they are….we are probably getting more from them then they are getting from us, in the Chinese perspective, and that we are constantly hacking them.  So they point to that as well as to the discussions in the United States about creating a cyber-command in the military and discussions about controlling the commons and all these other things as kind of a representation of American hypocrisy.  We are talking about militarizing cyber-space while they are being hacked.  So I think yes, that’s clearly and issue from outside of China.

On the domestic front I think yes, that Chinese government agencies and corporations are being hacked.  There’s been a number of prominent cases of Chinese hackers spreading malware to try and steal identity numbers and virtual money from these multiple player games.  Very prominent hackers have been arrested and eventually imprisoned.  So I think that is part of the threat.

The other threat is of course is that, dealing with these patriotic hackers is a double-edged sword for the Chinese government.  There is a fear that while they are focusing externally, U.S. corporations or U.S. government websites, in the case of the Olympics on French websites and things like that.  But if their ire is turned inward then those people could hack Chinese government websites.   I think the Chinese government is very concerned and you can see that in discussions about their own cyber-security but also trying to develop new types of software.  The problem is that the Chinese is hyper-reliant in Microsoft, something like 90% of Chinese government offices use Windows.  A lot of that is pirated which means that it is not updated regularly for security patches.  So there is a lot of vulnerability.

EL:  You make this distinction between patriotic hacking, criminal hacking, commercial hacking, but under Chinese law itself, is hacking in general illegal?

AS:  It is.  There are laws on the books against hacking, criminal hacking, privacy laws.  Those were strengthened in

December 2008 and then again in February of this year I think.  The Chinese announced that they were going again to try to strengthen anti-hacking laws, in particular the kind of punishment for hackers.  Also on-line privacy issues and some tort issues about privacy and defamation.  Like I said, there are prominent cases of hackers who have been arrested and fined.  This guy who wrote this malware called Panda malware I think it was, and was sentenced to I think 3 years and fined $18,000.  So there are domestic laws against it.

EL:  And do you think the domestic laws are sufficient in dealing with this?  And also how do Chinese laws compare to laws in the United States against hacking?

AS:  I think they’re comparable.  I think the issue is with all laws in China has to do with implementation.  Clearly the issue for the United States or other countries, investigating hacking requires more cooperation from the Chinese about, who’s behind the attacks and actually following up on prosecution.  But I think within China, I suspect the issue is not the law per se but expertise….all the things we have in the United States about how do you prosecute cyber-crimes – expertise at the local level, resources, enough people staffing these kinds of issues.  From the Chinese perspective also, the U.S. hasn’t been all that helpful either.  I have heard a number of cases where the Chinese have turned around to the FBI and said –we think this hacking is coming from the United States.  And the United States has not been all that responsive from what I’ve heard.

EL: I guess cyber-hacking, it’s definitely a crime more without borders.  So how do you see international law or treaties coming into play here to battle the threat of cyber-espionage?

AS:  I don’t think there’s much to be done about espionage.  There’s no international treaties against espionage.  We engage in it, they engage in it, our allies engage in it.  I think that is likely to happen.  I think espionage we have to figure out how we are going to defend ourselves against.  The problem with espionage of course though is that it is hard to differentiate espionage from what could become vandalism or an attack.  So I think what we want to kind of agree on with the Chinese is that we know espionage is going to go on, but things like probing electricity grids, that should not be occurring or other kind of critical infrastructure.  We should be working on how do we declare those off limits.

On the criminal front there is a…the Council on Europe has this convention on cyber-crime.  I can’t remember how many countries have signed it now, it’s about I think 20 or 40, I can’t remember exactly.  But part of the problem is that most of the major players haven’t signed it; the U.S. has signed it, Japan has signed it but Russia hasn’t signed it.  Which goes a long way in defining consistent standards across national borders about what a cyber-crime is, how do you punish hacking, create a deterrent.  The problem with Russia, China things that we see as freedom of speech they see as a cyber-crime so that has been a problem in the case of Russia.  But the Chinese seem to be at least studying the Council on Europe convention which often kind of the first sign that the Chinese are moving toward international standards.  So I think that is a way to move forward.  And within Asia itself, ASEAN has had a couple of discussion about creating a similar kind of convention on cyber-crime in the region.

And then the other issue is this international convention on arms control, on cyber-war.  The United States has entered into discussions with the Russians about it.  That I think is very difficult and I think unlikely to be very useful because in the kind of traditional terms of arms control verification, inspection, those are all impossible with cyber-weapons.  So, that I think is useful just for talking for talking’s sake but will not result in any kind of concrete agreements.

EL: Just to follow-up on the convention on cyber-crime, you said that one of the problems is definition of terms.  Is that the only thing that would hold back a country like China or Russia from signing on to this kind of convention?  Or are there other factors?

AS: I think that’s a big one but I do think also that right now at least China and Russia find it politically and strategically useful to kind of have this arms-length relationship with hackers.  As we talked about earlier, this ties the government’s willingness to directly use or indirectly use hackers for their own political purposes makes it….right now that’s a reason for them not to crackdown too hard on criminal hacking.  So that is I think another reason why it has been hard to create a common ground.

EL:  Do you think that there is any space for having maybe a bi-lateral agreement between U.S. and China or a tri-lateral agreement between U.S., China and Russia about issues of cyber-espionage like not probing electricity grids or things like that?  Or do you think it would have to be global?

AS:  Well I think any convention would have to be global.  But I think there is a benefit for having these bi-lateral discussions only if because this area is newly emerging and policymakers I don’t think are particularly cognizant of all the risks and problems involved in any of these issues.  So just having a discussion with the Russians and the Chinese and others about what the potential rules of the road might I think are probably pretty useful.

EL: Absent any kind of global agreement, how best should the U.S. government and U.S. corporations deal with this issue of their own?  How can they better prevent it from happening?  Or can they?

AS: That’s what we are struggling with now.  The United States finally has the cyber-czar in place, Harry Schmidt.  I think one of the big things that is still occurring in the United States is kind of a debate about what the best metaphor for this is, how do you think about this cyber-issue.  You have those like, the op-ed in the Washington Post several weeks ago by the former head of NSA, McConnell, about basically cyber-war and we’re losing it and his response was very much a militarization of cyber-space.  In fact he calls for something like the re-engineering of the internet so we can basically see where any attack is coming from.

And then you have Schmidt at a conference a couple of weeks ago saying – I don’t believe in cyber-war, I don’t think cyber-war is the right metaphor.  And you have those people talking about resilience and more of a public health model for how you respond to these things – you have to defend, you have to respond, you have to quarantine.

So I think we have this broad outline, we have this debate to settle in the States.  But the way we are moving is probably closer to the public health, well actually probably both tracks at the same time.  From the defense side I think you are beginning to see more traction on private-public cooperation, about definitions of standards – what does secure actually mean and how should it be implemented, more spending on R&D for cyber-security, more training of people and that’s a major issue is about getting people trained, more public awareness.  These are all domestic issues.

EL: And just a final question.  Since President Hu Jintao is in the United States, in Washington today, do you think in his side talks with President Obama, the issue of cyber-hacking and cyber-espionage will be coming up?  How important do you think the Administration views this issues especially in light of the fact that Secretary of State Clinton has openly talked about it?

AS:  I suspect it wasn’t brought up in these meetings if only because over the last two and a half weeks it has been a clear effort on both sides to try to get the relationship back on track.  Clearly the Administration’s major strategic concern right now is Iran and then with the currency being the second concern.  So those are the two issues, from what I’ve heard, were discussed in the meeting.  I suspect there were no reasons to bring up the cyber-issues because there are no solutions or discussion that is helpful to both sides at this point.  So other than just poking them in the eye with it, I don’t see why they would bring it up.  So I suspect it was not discussed.

EL: Thank you very much.  This was very interesting and I appreciate your time.

AS:  Thank you.

In creating this blog, I never thought I would have the opportunity to write about my two favorite things in a single post.  But the two forces that have likely most influenced my life have now finally converged

Bob Dylan is banned in China.

In perhaps one of the most bizarre moves of censorship in recent memory, China’s Ministry of Culture denied Dylan permission to play in Shanghai and Beijing later this month.  It would be his first concert on the Mainland.  Jeffrey Wu of Brokers Brothers Herald, Dylan’s Asia promoters, speculated that the refusal is likely a result of the Chinese government’s fear that Dylan would say something controversial at his concert.  Ever since Icelandic singer Bjork screamed “Tibet!  Tibet!” after singing a song entitled “Declare Independence” during a concert in Beijing in 2008, Chinese government officials have been leery of singers that might be too political Wu told the Guardian.  Evidently, no one in the Chinese Ministry of Culture has been to a Dylan concert lately.  Because if they had, they would realize that even if Dylan said something controversial, no one would be able to understand it.

While the Chinese government’s fear of Dylan largely reflects the fact that

they are 40 years behind the times, I actually find their refusal sort of quaint.  To say I am a Dylan fan is a bit of an understatement; disciple might be a more apt term.  But I came to Dylan late, the early 90s, a point where Bob Dylan no longer signified the counter-culture which he sings about in his pre-1972 works.  Today, Dylan has become synonymous with the American mainstream culture, winning an Oscar (which he proceeded to bring with him to every show), singing for the Pope (no other than “Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door”), releasing a Christmas album, and selling the rights to some of his most memorable songs to various corporations for their commercial use.  I’ve never known first-hand the fiery, irreverent Dylan of my parent’s generation; instead I’ve only experienced it vicariously through the music.

Until today.  With the Chinese government’s belief that Dylan is too subversive for the Chinese audience I finally feel vindicated – I am listening to true a rebellious musician; not a 68 year old man who no longer articulates very clearly and sort of wears funny-looking clothes.  So although I don’t think Dylan is really a threat to the Chinese government –  many Chinese people are not that into Dylan (every time I have enthusiastically given a Dylan mix to a Chinese friend, the response is the polite mention that his voice isn’t very melodic) and it has been a while since any of Dylan’s thought-dreams if seen would likely cause him to end up in a guillotine – I think it’s great that the Chinese government still sees Dylan as a protest singer able to undermine its rule.  It’s so 1960s.

Almost three months ago, the world witnessed an agonizing tragedy in Haiti: an earthquake killing hundreds of thousands and displacing millions in one of the world’s poorest countries.  Other countries were quick to respond, offering aid and assistance.  But how did the world’s emerging superpower respond?  In this informative essay, Marcy Nicks Moody examines China’s response to the Haiti earthquake, arguably China’s first chance to show the world that it is a responsible global leader.

Google’s prolonged departure from China was finally completed on Monday with Google moving both its Chinese servers and search engine to Hong Kong.  Since first announcing that Chinese hackers attacked its computer systems and stole some of its source code back in January, Google has left the world in suspense, avowing to leave mainland China unless the Chinese government allowed it to operate an unfiltered search engine.

But asking the Chinese government to stop censoring the internet is like asking the human race to give up oxygen.  Internet censorship is the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) lifeline.  Spending vast amounts of resources on policing the internet, China has one of the world’s largest and most sophisticated internet filtering systems and has no intention of weakening this system.  If anything, 2009 – with its many politically-charged anniversaries including the 50^th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s departure from Tibet, the 20^th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, and the 60^th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – has only seen increased internet censorship. For the CCP, an uncensored internet could undermine its control and disrupt the fragile social stability that it works so hard to maintain.

Given the CCP’s fear and its desire to maintain its monopoly on power, it should come as no surprise that Google was not able to negotiate any kind of compromise on internet censorship.  On Monday, Google issued a statement saying that over the past two and a half months, in its discussion with the Chinese government, it has come to realize that “self-censorship is a non-negotiable legal requirement” for the Chinese government.

Google’s Move Changes Nothing in Terms of Internet Censorship

So with its announcement on Monday, Google moved its Chinese search engine operations to Hong Kong.  Its Chinese

search engine, google.cn, now directs users to its new Chinese website, google.com.hk; additionally, Google moved its servers from the mainland to Hong Kong.[1]

So given all the hoopla surrounding Google’s departure from the mainland, the constant news reports and the heralding of Google as the David to China’s Goliath, Google now offers  uncensored search results on the mainland, right?

Wrong.  Little has changed in terms of censorship.

In order to understand how little Google’s move changes anything, it’s important to understand the two levels of censorship in China. A 2006 New York Times Magazine report on this issue gives a good background and is summarized below.

Chinese Law & Required Self-Censorship

Under Chinese law, any private company offering internet services in China must sign a licensing agreement that it will not circulate content on certain taboo subjects.  While the list of these subjects changes on a regular basis, usually included is information on the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the banned religious group Falun Gong, and any positive discussions of the Dalai Lama (negative ones are usually okay).

Restricting access to these sensitive subjects is the responsibility of the internet company, and often, to make sure that it is capturing everything and is not in violation of the Chinese government’s vague directives, the companies’ filtering is usually more inclusive than it needs to be.  Through this system, the Chinese government basically outsources its censorship responsibilities to entities that are doing a better job than they likely ever could.

In January 2006, Google, by setting up its Chinese search engine google.cn within China’s borders, became subject to Chinese law and thus signed a licensing agreement agreeing to self-censor.  Any searches performed on google.cn led to censored results.  For example, a search of “Tiananmen” on google.cn only pulled up tourist pictures of the Tiananmen Square; a search on google.com (the U.S.-based search engine) and conducted in the U.S. pulled up multiple images from the 1989 crackdown (see Prof. Don Clarke’s China Law Prof blog for a visual comparison).  This censorship was performed by Google.

The Great Firewall

But self-censoring only works on those companies that set up a server within China.  What about search engines with servers located outside of mainland China and thus not subject to its laws?

That’s where the Great Firewall comes into play.  The Great Firewall is essentially a protective shield that filters search results before they enter China.  Let’s say a Chinese citizen sitting in front of his computer in Beijing wants to read an article in the L.A. Times about the Academy Awards.  His computer reaches out to a server in L.A. to pull this information, but before it can show up on his computer screen in Beijing, it first must be filtered through the Chinese routers that control all information coming into China over the internet.

These routers are like custom officials – only websites permissible under Chinese law will be allowed entry into China and will show up on our Chinese friend’s computer screen.  The router goes through a series of steps.  First, it reads the address of the website – is this website a blacked out site that Chinese citizens can have no access to?  If yes, then the router does not allow our Chinese friend to access any portion of the L.A. Times and it is completely blocked.  Overtly political websites like Human Rights in China, Amnesty International, are completely blocked sites in China; type in the web address and nothing appears.  Also completely blocked are many social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter.

But if the site isn’t completely blacked out (and I don’t think the L.A. Times is a completely blocked site in China), then

the router reviews the article that our Chinese friend wants to read to see if it contains any blacklisted words.  If it does, the article will not be displayed on our friend’s computer in Beijing.  If it doesn’t contain any no-no terms, it will finally appear on his screen and our friend will be able to read the article.  For example, an article about Sandra Bullock winning the Academy Award will likely make it through the Great Firewall (no matter how offensive that might be to fans of Meryl Streep), but an article about the Academy nomination of the Chinese documentary about the Sichuan earthquake, China’s Unnatural Disaster: The Tears of Sichuan Province, will be blocked.

This is the situation that currently exists for google.com (the U.S.-based search engine) in China.  Google.com is an accessible site in China and can be used to run searches.  However, the searches, which access information on the servers located outside of China, must go through the Great Firewall.  Depending on the web addresses and the content of the web pages requested, some information will make it through the Great Firewall and some will not.  For example, a search of “Tiananmen” on google.com within China, will not produce the same results as a search of Tiananmen on google.com within the U.S.  The China search will pull up little to no information on the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.  To the extent that websites discussing the Tiananmen Square protests appears in the search results, these sites are usually not accessible, and clicking on the result will likely produce an error message.

The Great Firewall is not perfect and sometimes information can sneak in.  To the extent that the Chinese government can have private internet companies conduct self-censorship, that is usually a more effective method as well as cheaper (for the Chinese government at least).

Is Google.com.hk Subject to the Great Firewall?

The Great Firewall applies to information coming from Hong Kong.  By directing people in China to its new website google.com.hk, with servers located in Hong Kong, all information attempting to come into China will be subject to the Great Firewall.  The results will still be censored.  It’s just that Google is no longer performing the censorship, instead the Great Firewall is.

Articles heralding that “google goes uncensored” are just plain inaccurate.  Google is uncensored to the extent that a search is performed outside of China; but that was the case before Google had its tiff with Beijing.  Any searches conducted on google.com.hk within China, will be filtered and it will likely produce the same filtered results that a search on google.com would produce if performed in China.  Anecdotal information currently coming from China confirms this.

So basically, the situation is the same; nothing has changed.  Perhaps Google’s culpability is less, but censored results in China are still par for the course.  And don’t expect that to change anytime soon.

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[1] While a part of China, Hong Kong is not subject to PRC laws, at least in terms of political freedoms.  Instead, Hong Kong, under the arrangement of “One Country, Two Systems,” is governed by its own Basic Law which affords greater protection to freedom of speech

Not a day goes by without mention of China and its currency: “China’s manipulating its currency, injuring the U.S.” “No it’s not, and if it were, it only hurts the Chinese people.”  Guest blogger Marcy Nicks Moody tries to make sense of it all and examines the mechanics underlying the Treasury Department’s pending decision to either designate China a currency manipulator or not.

A true test of any criminal justice system is how it treats its most vulnerable and perhaps one of the most vulnerable groups in any society is the mentally ill.  Shunned by many in the world and often incapable of asserting their rights when questioned by police, the mentally ill are often left unprotected.  In its almost 250-year existence, the United States has come a long way in protecting the rights of the mentally ill but not without a struggle.  While the insanity defense and competency to stand trial have long been a part of Anglo-American jurisprudence, the requisite procedures to evaluate mental illness are of more recent provenance.

Given our difficulty, how does country like China, with a criminal justice system that has only been around for 32 years, handle mentally ill suspects and defendants?  Prof. GUO Zhiyuan (pronounced Gwo Zhir-yooan), Associate Professor of Law at the China University of Political Science and Law, has answered that question in her recent article “Approaching Visible Justice: Procedural Safeguards for Mental Examinations in China’s Capital Cases (Hastings Int’l. and Comp. L. Rev., Winter 2009).

With the first candid examination (at least in English) of the interplay between the Chinese Criminal Law and the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law, Prof. Guo shows us that while the law ostensibly protects the mentally ill, there is a lack of procedural protections.  If the defense attorney doesn’t have the right to call for a mental examination of his or her client, what good is an insanity defense?  Prof. Guo examines these issues and offers potential reforms in Approaching Visible Justice.  From our own experience, protecting the mentally ill is not an easy task, but with scholars like Prof. Guo working on this issue, there is the possibility that China is not far from offering similar protections.  Below is an interview with Prof. Guo discussing her recent article and the plight of the mentally ill in the Chinese criminal justice system

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EL: Does the Chinese criminal law have special protections for the mentally ill?  Is there an insanity defense like there is in the U.S.?  In what other ways does mental illness come into play under China’s criminal law?

GZY:  Yes, Chinese criminal law does have special protections for the mentally ill.  Article 18 of the Criminal Law of the PRC [People’s Republic of China]states:

“If a mental patient causes harmful consequences at a time when he is unable to recognize or control his own conduct, upon verification and confirmation through legal procedure, he shall not bear criminal responsibility. . . . If a mental patient who has not completely lost the ability of recognizing or controlling his own conduct commits a crime, he shall bear criminal responsibility; however, he may be given a lighter or mitigated punishment.”

Although defendants with mental illness do not bear criminal responsibility, Article 18 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that:

“his family members or guardian shall be ordered to keep him under strict watch and control and arrange for his medical treatment. When necessary, the government may compel him to receive medical treatment.”

Article 18 also emphasizes:

“[a]ny person whose mental illness is of an intermittent nature shall bear criminal responsibility if he commits a crime when he is in a normal mental state.”

This is the same as in the American model, where the mental status at the time of crime is relevant in determining criminal responsibility.

EL: How does a defendant or his lawyer, make a claim that he is mentally ill and thus subject to the laws protections?   Does the defendant or his lawyer call for a mental examination?  Who pays for the mental examination?

GZY: In China, only the police, the prosecution or the court can decide to conduct a mental examination. Neither the defendant nor his lawyer can  initiate an evaluation; they also cannot apply to the judicial agencies for one; they can only apply for supplementary evaluations or re-evaluations after an officially-initiated examination has produced results. To my knowledge, both the officially-initiated mental examinations and the supplementary evaluations are conducted at the State’s expense, but when the defendant or his lawyer successfully initiates a re-evaluation, they retain mental health experts at their own expense.

EL: If you could redesign China’s criminal law and criminal procedure law, what would you change so that China best protects the mentally ill when they interact with the criminal justice system?  In other words, what would the ideal system look like?

GZY: I don’t see anything inappropriate in the provision in China’s Criminal Law, but it’s necessary to reform the Criminal Procedure Law of China. To be exact, procedural safeguards should be added to the current Criminal Procedure Law in order to put Article 18 of China’s Criminal Law into practice. It seems to me that the ideal system should, at the very least, adopt the following seven proposed reforms: First, for all capital cases, a mandatory pretrial examination of defendants’ mental status should be required at the State’s expense.  Second, the defense should be entitled to retain its own mental heath professionals who are allowed to witness and participate in this proposed mandatory mental examination or any other mental examinations initiated by the prosecution. Third, the defense’s right to initiate its own examination should be granted and respected.  This would be the most important change if it does occur.  Fourth, both parties should have a right — not just the defense — to confront the opposing side’s psychiatrist or other mental health examiner; this right should be guaranteed. Fifth, the indigent defendant should be entitled to psychiatric assistance at the State expense; this would ensure equal treatment among defendants with different financial means. Sixth, to address the problem of conflicting expert testimony, an additional impartial psychiatrist should be appointed by the court to perform another independent assessment.  This would aid the court in determining the mental condition of the defendant. Finally, effective assistance of counsel should be emphasized in those capital cases involving mentally disabled defendants.

EL: In China, sometimes a lawyer is held liable for the acts of his client (e.g. when a client perjures himself his attorney could be held liable).  Does a defense lawyer get into trouble if his client pleads “not guilty for reasons of insanity” and is found not to be insane?  Will the lawyer be censured?

GZY: Although it’s very easy for a defense lawyer  to get into trouble if his client withdraws a confession he made to the police, cases are very rare in which a lawyer gets into trouble because his client was found sane after pleading “not guilty for reasons of insanity.”

EL: In the U.S., mentally ill defendants don’t often receive the public’s sympathy.  But in your article, you discuss the

case of Yang Jia, a man who stormed a Shanghai police station and killed six police officers after he had been harassed by the police.  The Chinese public was largely sympathetic toward him – do you think this was because people felt sorry for him because he was mentally ill?

GZY:  No. Although many thought that Yang Jia was insane, whether he was actually mentally ill or not would have depended upon further serious assessment by qualified and impartial professionals.  In Yang Jia’s case, the Chinese public was largely sympathetic towards him for the following reasons. First, with the public’s increasing awareness of their legal rights, police misconduct – which, of course, is not a uniquely Chinese problem – has met with unprecedented condemnation, and the call for judicial fairness has become more and more intense in these cases. The motive behind Yang Jia’s attack  –avenging past police misconduct – played directly to this sentiment. Second, there were a number of procedural flaws in Yang Jia’s case, such as lack of transparency, conflict of interest, and serious problems regarding  the mental examinations. The general public just seized on Yang Jia’s case as an opportunity to express their anger at police violence and to voice their demands for a more fair criminal justice system.

EL: Do you think there is increasing sympathy toward mentally ill defendants in China?  Are attitudes changing?  How are attitudes changing?

GZY: Yes, more and more attention is paid to mentally ill defendants in China, especially after a series of relevant high-profile cases such as Qiu Xinghua’s, Yang Jia’s, and Akmal Shaikh’s cases.  The general public has being changing their indifferent attitudes towards mentally ill offenders; more and more people have realized it’s essential to establish a fair judicial system to prevent the state from punishing the mentally ill.  For this transformation, open information has played an important role.

EL: Thank you Prof. Guo for your time and your insights on a very important issue in every criminal justice system.

On February 19, 2010, George Washington School of Law and Georgetown University Law Center hosted an academic conference in honor of noted Chinese legal scholar Prof. Jerome A. Cohen.  Consisting of four separate panel discussions on current legal issues in China, the afternoon conference, and it’s participants (all of whom were students of Prof. Cohen’s) was a testament to the continued importance of Prof. Cohen’s work in the field.

Panel 1 – Google & Freedom of Online Information
(7:20 start) Rebecca MacKinnon, Visiting Fellow, Center for Information Tech. Policy, Princeton
(19:35 start) Lawrence Liu, Senior Counsel, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(28:49 start) Sharon Hom, Executive Director, Human Rights in China
Click here for video of this panel.

Panel 2 – Business Law
(1:43 start)Donald Clarke, Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School
(10:25 start) Nicholas C. Howson, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School
(19:22start) James Feinerman, Co-Director/Prof. of Law, Law-Asia Leadership, Georgetown Law
Click here for video of this panel.

Panel 3 – Human Rights, Civil Society & Criminal Law
(1:07 start) Xiaorong Li, Research Scholar, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland
(9:18 start)Karla Simon, Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America
(21:25 start)Eva Pils, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
(33:38 start) Scot Tanner, China Security Analyst, The CNA Corporation
Click here for video of this panel.

Panel 4 – International Law
(1:32 start) Julia Qin, Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School
(10:35 start) Michael Schlesinger, Of Counsel, Greenberg Traurig, LLP
(20:00 start) Timothy Stratford, Former Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. for China Affairs, USTR
(28:15 start) Alex Wang, Senior Attorney & Director, China Environmental Law Project, NRDC
Click here for video of this panel.

CLOSING REMARKS BY PROF. JEROME COHEN – Click Here

Thank you to Prof. Don Clarke of George Washington School of Law for making the videos of the conference available.

Lies, cheats and suicides.  It sounds like the plot of a daytime soap opera.  But unfortunately, it is the reality that is academia in China.  Chinese lawyer CAO Xinglong discusses the underbelly of faculty promotion in China and the abdication of the courts in enforcing the law in this area.  Without some sort of legal recourse, it is not just individual professors that are being hurt; as Mr. Cao argues, it is the integrity, reliability and prestige of the Chinese university system that will ultimately suffer the most.

Because of the sensitivity of the issues, names of universities and professors have been removed from this article.  However, China Law & Policy has confirmed the factual details of these incidents.  If you would like more information about the cases mentioned in the article below, please email Mr. Cao directly: xinglongcao@yahoo.com

The Lancet just recently published an article about academic fraud in China and the need to take action. You can link to the article here (free login required).

Also, for those who read Chinese, “Academic Criticism” contains many examples of academic misconduct.  Please click here to get to the site.

Thank you David Cowhig for bringing these links to our attention.

On Thursday, immediately following President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, the White House issued the below press release and photo:

Official White House Photo of President Obama and Dalai Lama

Statement from the Press Secretary on the President’ s Meeting with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama

“The President met this morning at the White House with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama.  The President stated his strong support for the preservation of Tibet’s unique religious, cultural and linguistic identity and the protection of human rights for Tibetans in the People’s Republic of China. The President commended the Dalai Lama’s “Middle Way” approach, his commitment to nonviolence and his pursuit of dialogue with the Chinese government.  The President stressed that he has consistently encouraged both sides to engage in direct dialogue to resolve differences and was pleased to hear about the recent resumption of talks.  The President and the Dalai Lama agreed on the importance of a positive and cooperative relationship between the United States and China.”

Meanwhile, in China, the state-run news agency Xinhua, issued what appears to be a fairly tepid response given the Chinese government’s prior saber rattling:

China urges concrete U.S. actions to maintain healthy ties after Obama-Dalai meeting

BEIJING, Feb. 19 (Xinhua) — China urged the United States early Friday morning to take concrete actions for healthy development of bilateral ties after U.S. President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said in a statement it was regardless of China’s repeated solemn representations for the U.S. to obstinately arrange the meeting between Obama and the Dalai Lama.

“The U.S. act grossly violated the norms governing the international relations, and ran counter to the principles set forth in the three China-U.S. joint communiques and the China-U.S. joint statement,” he said.

President Obama welcomes the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual leader, to the White House today. With this visit come renewed fears that U.S.-China relations are in a downward spiral.

Obama’s Meeting with the Dalai Lama will Not Harm U.S.-China Relations

The U.S. press has been adamant that President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama will strain U.S.-China relations.  But this fear is misplaced.  Similar to the inevitability of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese government knows that a meeting with the Dalai Lama is a done deal – a U.S. president, at some point during his term, will invite the Dalai Lama to the White House.

Since 1990, every U.S. president has met with the Dalai Lama.  Obama’s meeting today is far from a surprise to Beijing; it’s what U.S. presidents do.  The topic even came up during President Obama’s visit to Beijing in November.  And the Obama Administration was fully aware that any contact with the Dalai Lama would elicit an angry response from Beijing.  It always does.

These recent events – the decision to meet with the Dalai Lama and China’s vocal response – in no way reflect a change in policy; it’s not a reflection of China flexing its muscles nor is it a reflection of a more hard-line approach by the U.S.  It’s merely just par for the course in U.S.-China relations; a rite of passage of sorts.

This isn’t to say that there has not been a change in the relationship.  The U.S.’ vocal critique of China’s internet censorship and the increasingly belligerent tone regarding China’s currency could show a stronger stance toward China.  Additionally, if China votes against sanctions against Iran or decides to abstain from Six-Party talks with North Korea, this could symbolize a China feeling stronger in the world.  But the rhetoric surrounding the Dalai Lama’s visit in no way represents a changed policy.

Beijing is Actually Happy about Obama’s Meeting with the Dalai Lama

Well, “happy” might be a bit of a stretch, but Beijing is, at the very least, satisfied with the concessions that President Obama has already made.  Beijing knows things could be much worse (for them at least).  In 2007, President George W. Bush welcomed the Dalai Lama to the White House, and in a public ceremony, awarded him the Congressional Gold Medal.  Never before had a U.S. president met the Dalai Lama in public; and to award him with one of the highest civilian awards, just added insult to China’s injury.

Needless to say, this enraged the Chinese government, and post 2007, Beijing went on a global rampage to end foreign governments’ meetings with the Dalai Lama.  According to an interview with Tibetan scholar Robert J. Barnett, China has been largely successful with its strategy: “[l]ast year, only two national leaders met the Dalai Lama….compared to twenty-one in the previous four years.”

Comparatively, President Obama’s meeting tomorrow is much less confrontational than his predecessor’s.  President Obama will meet the Dalai Lama in private, and while the meeting will be held in the West Wing of the White House (not in the private residence as President Bill Clinton did and what the Chinese government would prefer), it will not be held in the Oval Office.  Instead, President Obama will meet the Dalai Lama in the less prestigious Map Room.  While this seems inconsequential to the American audience, this distinction is of high significance to China and is likely sufficient to placate the country.

So Why all the Hoopla?

In an interview with NPR, China historian Jeffery Wasserstrom explained the problem succinctly – both countries use this meeting to play toward their domestic audiences. If the U.S. president did not meet with the Dalai Lama, he would receive censure from Congress, human rights groups, and the public at large.  Last fall, prior to his trip to China, President Obama postponed a meeting with the Dalai Lama and received a lot of heat for it; the move was portrayed as a way to gain favor with China prior to his visit to Beijing.

Similarly, the Chinese government must cater to its domestic audience; part of that catering is to use angry rhetoric

against any government leader who meets with the Dalai Lama.  To its people, the Chinese government portrays the Dalai Lama as a separatist intent on splitting Tibet from China.  Mix this with the Chinese government’s emphasis on nationalism, sovereignty and Tibet as an integral part of China, and you have a dangerous game.  The Chinese government has created a self-fulfilling prophecy – by encouraging strong feelings of nationalism, the people then demand that the Chinese government act upon any perceived slights to this nationalism.  In the case of Tibet, even though much of the people’s feelings are manufactured by the government, if the Chinese government does not respond with sharp attacks against anyone who meets with the Dalai Lama, then the people will begin to question its legitimacy.

The End Result for Tibet

So the dance continues.  But the third wheel here is the Tibetan people.  For the U.S. and China, this is a symbolic game to placate their respective domestic audiences; but for the Tibetans, this is about survival.  With each new U.S. president and with each new meeting with the Dalai Lama, there is a hope that the situation in Tibet can be resolved.

The Dalai Lama has not been allowed to return to his homeland and minister to his people, and the with an influx of ethnically Han Chinese into Tibet and laws that limit the Tibetan’s religious practices, it is questionable if the religion, the culture, and the people will be able to survive.  At the same time, negotiations between Beijing and envoys of the Dalai Lama have been at a standstill for over 15 years now, with the Tibetan side refusing to budge on its demand for greater autonomy, not just for the land mass of Tibet, but for all areas in China where there is a large population of Tibetans (this would be a little like Puerto Rico asking for greater autonomy for the island of Puerto Rico and also the South Bronx, Spanish Harlem and other areas of the U.S. with large Puerto Rican populations).  The Dalai Lama’s envoys met with officials in Beijing last month, but again the talks proved fruitless.

For the past 20 years, the U.S. has relied on symbolic gestures in its dealings with Tibet and has done little to actually move the dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Beijing forward (see Melyvn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama).  There’s a lot of focus on the Dalai Lama’s visit to the White House, but there is never a discussion as to why.  What does this do?  Where does this get the Dalai Lama?

What’s at stake here is more than just a popularity contest and the time for symbolic gestures has long passed.  Both China and the Dalai Lama are entrenched in their positions and neither is going to budge, but to move forward, a compromise is needed.  And each side does want to move forward; the Dalai Lama wants to return to Tibet and provide for greater religious freedom for Tibetans, and the Chinese government doesn’t want to live with the constant threat of riots and protests in the region.  But at this stage, a third-party, like the U.S., needs to step up to the plate to help negotiate a compromise – symbolic meetings won’t do the job.  Without the role of a third-party, there will never be progress.