CL&P – What to Read for the Week Ending 2011-01-16

By , January 16, 2011

Gary Locke’s Take on U.S.-China Relations – “Trenton Makes the World Takes”

By , January 13, 2011

I used to think I was the only one who noticed the huge, weird, angry sign “Trenton Makes the World Takes” plastered on the Delaware Bridge just outside the New Jersey city of Trenton.  So imagine my surprise when this slogan was featured in Commerce Secretary Gary Locke’s speech about U.S.-China relations before the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) on Thursday.  For Locke, the manufacturing center of Trenton during the early 20th Century is China today; it’s China that now makes and the world takes.

But the status quo must change Locke argued.  While noting some successful U.S.-China commercial relations, Locke raised the issue of market access in China, particularly in light of China’s indigenous innovation policies and its lax protection of intellectual property (which makes one wonder why didn’t he continue to play with the Trenton theme and say “China makes AND takes”; that would have elicited laughs from the USCBC for sure),  Between Locke’s speech, reprinted below, and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner’s speech Wednesday, there is some serious saber-rattling coming from the American delegation in preparation of President Hu Jintao’s State visit next week.

Commerce Secretary Gary Locke Delivers Policy Speech

on U.S.-China Commercial Relations

Thank you John, for that kind introduction.  And thank you for having me here today.

We are today less than a week away from an important State visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao.

More than two decades ago, on my first trip to mainland China, I could not imagine that the U.S.-China relationship would eventually become so consequential.

Nor could I have imagined a scene like we witnessed a few days ago: Defense Secretary Gates joining together with his Chinese counterpart to stress the need for stronger military ties between China and the United States.

In 1989, I came in from Shanghai’s airport on a rickety, Russian-made bus, and stepped into that city’s dimly lit streets into a world very different than the one I left in the U.S.

There were swarms of bicycles – young men with their dates balanced on handlebars, grandparents pedaling to the market, boys and girls with white-knuckle grips on their parents’ shoulders. Bikes everywhere.

Shanghai then was a gritty, industrial city filled with low-rise buildings.

There were no skyscrapers. Few cars.

There was little sign of what was to come.

Today, Shanghai’s skyline is dotted by more than 400 skyscrapers.  Go to the Shanghai World Financial Center – one of the tallest buildings in the world – and you can stay at a Park Hyatt Hotel with a lobby on the 79th floor.

Those bike paths I saw on my first visit have been replaced by elevated freeways shuttling people and commerce at a frenetic pace.

To see it is to be awed, and I am every time I go back to China.

The explosive growth in places like Shanghai has helped lift almost 200 million people out of poverty.  In the years ahead, hundreds of millions more Chinese citizens will join the middle class.

The United States welcomes this growth, because it’s good for the people of China; it’s good for the global economy; and it’s important for U.S. companies who offer world-class products and service, products and services that can improve the quality of life for the Chinese, while providing jobs for American workers back home.

With the U.S.-China Business Council’s help, this has become perhaps the most important bilateral trading relationship in the world.

China is the top destination for American exports, behind just Canada and Mexico.  And America is the number one national market for Chinese exports.

In the past 20 years, U.S. exports to China have increased by a factor of 12; imports from China have increased more than 30-fold.

However, we are at a turning point in the U.S.-China economic partnership.  Last year, China became the second largest economy in the world.  And the policies and practices that have shaped our relations over the past few decades will not suffice over the next few decades.

So today, I’d like to talk a bit about how we can move forward and ensure that we can unlock the full potential of the U.S.-China commercial relationship in the early 21st century.

The gross trade imbalances between our countries are a good place to start, because they have the potential to threaten global stability and prosperity.

And I think a great illustration of that can be found in, of all places, Trenton, New Jersey.

Many of you have likely taken Amtrak up to New York, and when you pass by the Delaware River in New Jersey, you see that famous sign: Trenton Makes and the World Takes.

Well, replace Trenton with China, and you have a simplistic, but pretty accurate description of the global economy over the last few decades.

China and the United States benefited tremendously from this arrangement in recent years.

American consumers got an impressive array of low-cost goods.  And in its transition into one of the world’s top exporters, China was able to lift millions of its citizens into a fast-growing middle class.

But it’s not sustainable.  The debt-fueled consumption binge in developed countries like America is over.

And countries like China are beginning to realize that there are limits to purely export-driven growth.

That’s why we need a more equitable commercial relationship.  And it is within our reach.

The United States is doing its part to facilitate global adjustments by increasing private savings and exports, as well as taking steps to bring down its long-term fiscal deficits to a sustainable level.

And the Chinese leadership is making the rebalancing of its economy one of the cornerstones of its forthcoming five-year plan.

China is aiming to promote domestic consumption through a variety of measures, such as boosting the minimum wage for its workers and building an improved social safety net. Changes like these will hasten the rise of a middle class that wants the same cars, appliances, fashion, medical care and other amenities that have long been enjoyed by consumers in the Western world.

The Chinese government is also putting an intensive focus on strategic emerging industries, with more high-value work in areas like healthcare, energy and high technology.

And the Chinese have signaled that they want foreign businesses to help develop these sectors by entering joint ventures and by conducting more research and development in China.

This is assistance that U.S. companies are eager to provide, so long as China deals meaningfully with concerns about intellectual property protection, as well as a variety of other issues I will talk about later.

Such cooperative projects can serve as the foundation for a stronger economic relationship between China and the U.S.

But China’s long-term success at addressing the concerns of international businesses will help determine whether it realizes its economic vision – a vision in which China is a leader in innovation and a producer of higher-value goods and services.

Here’s the good news: we are already seeing examples of just how this future could play out, as our businesses and our governments collaborate to tackle some of the world’s greatest challenges.

Just look at what’s happening with the new Energy Cooperation Program that Secretary Chu and I announced while in China in October 2009 to promote more collaboration between Chinese and American companies on energy issues.  One of the founding corporate members of the program, Boeing, is partnering with Air China and Petro China to research a new generation of aviation biofuels that don’t rely on food crops.

If this venture is successful, it could reduce the carbon footprint of airplane travel, and avoid the negative impact that other biofuels have on the global food supply.

Or look at what’s happening with Duke Energy, one of America’s leading utilities, which has signed an agreement for joint research with China’s largest energy company, Huaneng, and with the Chinese government’s Thermal Power Research Institute.

Today, there are scientists and researchers shuttling between the companies and the research institute, working to develop cutting-edge solutions for cleaner-burning coal and carbon sequestration.

The Chinese and American governments are also working together on a variety of transportation issues, including how to spur the deployment of more high-speed rail.  China has embraced high-speed rail and has developed its infrastructure at a tremendous rate.  Starting from scratch, China has constructed and put into service over 4,000 miles of high-speed routes in the last decade – making China’s the longest high-speed rail network in the world.

In meetings last year, officials and experts from the Department of Transportation and China’s Railway Ministry met in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to share information on the development of high-speed rail standards.  And at the state level, the Chinese government has signed cooperation agreements with the State of California on its high-speed rail project to link Anaheim and San Francisco.

There is, however, a sobering side to U.S.-China commercial relations: For every story like Duke Energy’s or Boeing’s, there are many more that are never written.

When I talk to business leaders across America, they continue to express significant concerns – shared by business around the world –about the commercial environment in China – especially China’s lax intellectual property protection and enforcement, lack of transparency in government decision-making and numerous indigenous innovation policies that often preclude foreign companies from vying for Chinese government contracts.  These policies mandate that products must be made, conceived and designed in China.

It’s important to note that since China formally joined the WTO nine years ago, it has made important progress opening its market.  Tariffs have come down, private property rights are steadily evolving and great strides have been made to free the flow of commerce across China’s borders.

On balance, the competitive playing field in China is fairer to foreign firms that it was a decade ago.  And we commend the Chinese for that.

It is also not lost on countries in the West that on our march towards industrialization, we sometimes protected native industries with policies that today would mobilize an army of WTO lawyers in opposition.

But those policies were folly then, and they are surely folly now.  After World War II, the United States and a growing community of nations painstakingly built a global trading system based on the freer flow of goods, ideas and services across borders.

And the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995 ensured that countries would be held accountable for their commitments to open markets and lower barriers.

China has benefited tremendously from this international trading system, especially since it joined the WTO in 2001.  The United States and other foreign nations have every right to seek more meaningful commitment and progress from China in implementing the market-opening policies it agreed to when it joined the WTO.

From our experience, there are usually five things that need to happen to turn these promises into reality.

It starts with the easiest step: a statement of principle from Chinese officials that action will be taken to solve a market access issue.

Next, that agreement has to be codified into binding law or regulations.

Third, the law or regulation needs to be faithfully implemented by the central government.

And fourth, it needs to be implemented at the local and provincial levels.

Only after all these things have happened can you arrive at the fifth, final and most important step, which is where this new law or regulation becomes a norm – an accepted way of doing business in China’s commercial culture.

When it comes to indigenous innovation, intellectual property or a variety of other market-access issues, an enduring frustration is that in too many cases only the earliest steps are taken, but not all five.

Perhaps an agreement is made, but it never becomes binding.  Or perhaps there’s a well-written law or regulation at the national level, but there’s lax enforcement at the provincial or city level.

A few weeks ago, the Commerce Department and the office of the U.S. Trade Representative welcomed Vice Premier Wang Qishan and other leading Chinese officials for the 21st Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, where we worked through a variety of specific trade issues.

It was a productive meeting.  Vice Premier Wang and his team were responsive to our concerns and they pledged action in a variety of areas critical to American businesses.

They agreed to remove administrative and regulatory barriers discriminating against American companies selling everything from industrial machinery and telecom devices; to those that restrict U.S. participation in the development of large-scale wind farms in China.

They also agreed to revise one of their major government procurement catalogues to ensure a level playing field for foreign suppliers and to reduce the use of counterfeit software in government offices and state-owned enterprises.

Additionally, Vice Premier Wang asked the Commerce Department and the U.S. Trade Representative to partner with him on a public campaign to reduce intellectual property rights violations in China, which he is leading.

The American government welcomes these commitments from China.

But to be clear, they are only a first step.  What was agreed to at the JCCT were important statements of principle and policy – but they must be turned into concrete action with results.

Take last year’s JCCT, when the Chinese agreed to remove a local content requirement for wind turbine suppliers – a positive step forward.

But soon after, China’s government employed a rule that required foreign businesses seeking to build large scale wind farms in China to have prior experience with such projects in China.  The rule might have been different than the local content requirement, but it had the same effect – making it tougher for foreign companies to compete with China’s domestic companies.

At this year’s JCCT, we persuaded the Chinese to modify that rule as well.

Or look at the issue of intellectual property. We have heard Chinese leaders condemn IP-theft in the strongest terms, and we’ve seen central government laws and regulations written or amended to reflect that sentiment.

But American and other foreign companies, in industries ranging from pharmaceuticals and biotechnology to entertainment, still lose billions of dollars from counterfeiting and IP-theft in China every year.

For example, in the United States, for every $1 in computer hardware sales there is about 88 cents in software sales.  But in China, for every dollar in hardware sales there is only eight cents in software sales.

According to the Business Software Alliance, that discrepancy is largely explained by the fact that nearly 80 percent of the software used on computers in China is counterfeit.

So America welcomes Vice Premier Wang’s pledge to accelerate China’s crackdown on intellectual property violations.  And China will have a very willing partner in this endeavor in the United States.  But we will be focused on meaningful outcomes.

I recognize I’m not the first foreign official to express concern over the commercial environment in China.  But it would be a mistake to portray this concern solely as U.S. self-interest masquerading as advice.

The Chinese economy is increasingly moving up the global economic value chain, where growth is created not just by the power of a country’s industrial might, but also by the power of its people’s ideas and their inventions.

In the long run, economies with poor intellectual property protections and inconsistent application of market access laws will lose out on generating great new ideas and technologies.  And they’ll lose out on the jobs that come with producing new products – jobs critical to an expanding middle class.

The damage won’t happen overnight.  I freely admit that companies and countries can gain short-term advantages from lax rules in the commercial space.

But over time, if innovators fear that their inventions or ideas will be stolen or discriminated against, one of two things will happen – they’ll either stop inventing, or they’ll decide to create or sell their inventions elsewhere.

Ultimately, all that the United States seeks is a level playing field for its companies, where the cost and quality of their products determines whether or not they win business.

That is the ideal we strive for in the United States.

And our commitment to open and competitive markets is a big reason why we remain the number one destination for foreign direct investment in the world.

We understand that China’s modernization and evolution towards a more market-oriented economy is a process that will take time.

China has 1.3 billion people.  Seven hundred million of them still live in rural areas; many with little electricity or running water.  It took the United States over 100 years to build the electrical transmission capacity it has today.

To meet the rising demands of its own consumers, China will have to build a similar amount of capacity in just 15 years.

These are enormous undertakings.  And it’s understandable if, in the past, China’s immediate development goals took precedence over other concerns.

With millions of Chinese coming in from the countryside looking for work, it isn’t necessarily an easy decision to close down a factory producing counterfeit goods, when that factory is providing badly needed jobs.

So what we’re discussing here are real and significant challenges. For market reforms to continue, it will take constant vigilance – not just from the United States, but from all countries and businesses around the world that benefit from rules-based trading.  And from Chinese business and government leaders, who themselves have a strong stake in ensuring that China is friendly to global innovation and international competition.

In front of us is the opportunity for China and the United States to lead the world economy in the early 21st century to create a new foundation for sustainable growth for years to come.

We can’t tell exactly what that future will look like.

But we can be certain that it will be a better future if the Chinese and American governments pursue cooperation over confrontation in the economic sphere.

Cooperation that will put millions of our people to work.

Cooperation that will develop technologies to solve the most pressing environmental, economic and social challenges facing the world today.

This is the great opportunity before China and the United States.  We just have to seize it.

Thank you.

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Treasury Secretary Geithner Speaks on China Relationship

By , January 13, 2011

Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner

In preparation for President Hu Jintao’s State visit next week, Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, provided his thoughts on the future of the U.S.-China economic relationship at John Hopkins School of Advance International Studies (SAIS) on Wednesday, January 12.  While the speech provided the usual platitudes of a shared economic future, the tone was at times cautionary about the current state of the economic relationship.  Geithner spoke frankly of China’s barriers to market access and concerns over currency.  With Commerce Secretary Gary Locke and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to each give their own speeches in the coming days, Hu’s State visit to the U.S. next week might not be the polite rhetoric of before.  See below for Geithner’s full comments.

Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner

“The Path Ahead for the U.S.-China Economic Relationship”

Remarks As Prepared for Delivery

It’s a pleasure to be here at SAIS.

SAIS is a leader in one of the most important challenges in public policy and education – that of helping Americans understand the world and the role we play in it.  This is important because we cannot effectively pursue our national interests unless we understand the objectives, the intentions, and the capabilities of other nations.

Next week, President Obama will host President Hu Jintao at the White House.

This State Visit takes place at a time of important transition for the world economy, the Chinese economy, and the U.S. economy.

The global economy is emerging from the financial crisis, but that crisis has left lasting scars that will take years to repair.  And it has left a growing gap between the growth trajectories of the large developed economies and the rapidly growing emerging economies.

While many of the major economies are still confronted with the challenge of rebuilding after crisis, many of the emerging economies are at the early stage of what should be a long period of very rapid economic growth, with rising incomes creating growing demand for resources and for investment capital.

The growth of the United States stands between these two divergent paths.  We are likely to grow at about half the rate of the major emerging economies, but about twice the rate of Europe and Japan.

These dynamics will fundamentally change the balance in the world economy, forcing changes in the architecture of the trade and financial systems.

In this new global context, China’s principal economic challenge is how it will manage the next stage in its transition from a state-dominated developing economy, dependent on external demand and technology, to a more market-oriented economy, with growth powered by domestic demand and innovation.

Today, I want to talk about the implications of these changes for our economic relationship with China and for U.S. economic policy.

China presents enormous economic opportunities for the United States and for the world, but its size, the speed of its ascent, and its policies are a growing source of concern in the United States and in many other countries.

To put those concerns in context, I’d like to begin by stating a few fundamental propositions about our economic relationship.

First, the economic relationship between the United States and China provides tremendous benefits to both our nations.  Even though we compete in many areas, our economic strengths are largely complementary.

Second, China faces a very complicated set of challenges as it transitions toward a more open, market oriented economy.  It is very much in our interest that the Chinese manage these challenges successfully.

Third, our priorities in our economic relationship with China – from its exchange rate to its treatment of intellectual property – reflect changes that are fundamentally in China’s interest.  Ultimately, China will need to make these changes in order to promote its own long-term prosperity.

Fourth, and finally, I want to emphasize that the prosperity of Americans depends overwhelmingly on the economic policies we pursue to strengthen American competitiveness. Even as we work to encourage further reforms in China, we need to understand that our strength as a nation will depend, not on choices made by China’s leaders, but on the choices we make here at home.

Now, over the last few decades, China has emerged as a major economic force.

That growth was unleashed by China’s economic reforms, a growing labor force, and one of history’s greatest economic migrations from farms to factories.

But China’s growth was also made possible by the access China enjoyed to the markets, the investments, and the technology of the United States and the other major economies.

The open, multilateral system of trade and investment, with its balance of rules and responsibilities, was built with the leadership of the United States decades before China opened up to the world.

The opportunities created by the system were fundamental to China’s economic ascent, and they remain vital to China’s ability to continue to grow.

China needs the United States, but the United States also benefits very substantially from our rapidly expanding economic relationship with China.

The benefits of this relationship are hard to capture in any one statistic, but remember this.

The United States is on track to export more than $100 billion of goods and services to China this year.  Our exports to China are growing at twice the rate of our exports to the rest of the world.

These exports are supporting hundreds of thousands of jobs across the nation in all sectors – from high technology to soybeans, aircraft to autos, and forklifts to financial services.

We have a great deal invested in each other’s success.

In our economic relationship with China we have focused on two principal objectives.

The first is to expand opportunities for U.S. companies to export and sell to the Chinese market.  This requires a more level playing field for U.S. companies that compete with Chinese companies in China, in the United States, and around the world.

Our second objective is to promote reforms that will reduce China’s reliance on export led growth and encourages a shift to domestic consumption and investment.  As part of this, China’s exchange rate needs to strengthen in response to market forces.

I want to provide a quick review of some of our concerns and the extent of progress, as we see it, in each of these areas.

First, on the broader competitive landscape in China and the opportunities and challenges we face competing in China:

The commanding heights of China’s economy and its financial system are still dominated by the government.

Chinese companies and workers are able to take advantage of a range of preferences and subsidies and operate behind trade barriers that give them a competitive advantage relative to U.S. and other foreign firms and workers.

They get access to low-cost finance, land, and energy.  They enjoy preferences in terms of access to government contracts.

Next, theft of intellectual property remains widespread in China, across many industries.

And the Chinese government has introduced a range of new policies to encourage innovation in China that are designed to favor Chinese technology over foreign technology, including in the enormous Chinese government procurement market.

Where these practices violate China’s international commitments, we are actively using the remedies available under U.S. and international trade laws to protect our interests.

And China has been gradually moving to address some of our concerns.

The government recently launched a new enforcement effort to combat the theft of intellectual property and to force Chinese companies to pay for the intellectual property they use.

The Chinese leadership has committed to expand opportunities for U.S. firms in access to procurement by government entities.

And the government has committed not to discriminate against U.S. companies that operate in China.

We welcome these commitments.  They don’t address all our concerns, but they are something we can build on.  And we will continue to press the Chinese to translate these commitments into further progress.

Doing so is in their interest.  Government domination limits competitiveness within the Chinese economy and prevents the private sector from contributing to growth at its full potential.  And you can’t promote innovation if you don’t protect intellectual property.

Alongside the reforms I’ve mentioned, we want to encourage China to move definitively away from the export driven growth model of the last few decades to a growth model driven by domestic consumption.

The Chinese leadership recognizes that China is now too large relative to the world economy for it to continue to rely on foreign demand to grow.  And the government has adopted a comprehensive program of reforms to rebalance the economy and shift growth to domestic demand.

This requires reforms to increase public spending on health and education, raise and enforce minimum wages, remove barriers to investment in services, expand access to financial products for individuals and entrepreneurs, and remove subsidies for investment in the sectors that drove the initial decades of growth.

This transition will take time, but it is already having a major impact on the shape of Chinese growth, and providing increased opportunities for American companies.  Domestic demand is contributing more to growth, and as a consequence, U.S. exports to China are growing more rapidly, and U.S. companies operating in China are seeing more opportunities.

Finally, and importantly, China still closely manages the level of its exchange rate and restricts the ability of capital to move in and out of the country.

These policies have the effect of keeping the Chinese currency substantially undervalued.

They also impose substantial costs on other emerging economies that run more flexible exchanges rates, and as a result have experienced a substantial loss of competitiveness against China.

This is not a tenable policy for China or for the world economy.

If China does not allow the currency to appreciate more rapidly, it will run the risk of seeing domestic inflation accelerate and face greater risk of a damaging rise in asset prices, both of which will threaten future growth.  And sustaining an undervalued currency will undermine China’s own efforts to rebalance growth toward domestic consumption and higher-value-added production.

Since June of 2010, when Chinese authorities announced they would resume moving toward a more flexible exchange rate, they have allowed the currency to appreciate only about 3 percent against the dollar.  This is a pace of about 6 percent a year in nominal terms, but significantly faster in real terms because inflation in China is much higher than in the United States.

We believe it is in China’s interest to allow the currency to appreciate more rapidly in response to market forces.  And we believe China will do so because the alternative would be too costly – for China and for China’s relations with the rest of the world.

These are our main priorities.  China’s objectives are focused on the following areas:

  • China wants more access to U.S. high technology products.
  • China to take greater advantage of investment opportunities in the United States.
  • China would like to be accorded the same terms of access that market economies enjoy.

We are willing to make progress on these issues, but our ability to move on these issues will depend of course on how much progress we see from China.

As China reduces the role of the state in the economy, reforms policies that discriminate against U.S. companies, removes subsidies and preferences for domestic firms and technology, and allows its exchange rate to reflect market forces, then we will be able to make more progress on China’s objectives.

In any discussion of China, I think it is important for Americans to understand the solutions to our challenges in the United States rest first and foremost in the policies of Washington, not of Beijing.

Fundamentally, how many jobs and how much wealth we create will be the result of the choices we make in the United States – not the choices of others.

In our efforts to rebuild and put Americans back to work, we have to make sure we are making the investments and reform that will be essential to our capacity to grow in the future.

As countries like China, India, Brazil and other emerging economies grow and expand, we want the American economy, American workers, and American companies to play a major role in – and gain substantial benefits from – that growth.

We want to see a substantial part of that growing demand outside of the United States met by goods and services that are created and produced in the United States, and fueled by investment in the United States.

If we are successful in doing that, we will be stronger as a nation.

But to be successful in meeting that challenge, there are things we must do.

We must invest more in research and development.

We must invest more in educational reforms.

We must invest more in public infrastructure.

We must create stronger incentives for investment in the United States, by both American and foreign companies.

We must be more forceful and effective in promoting American exports.

And we must restore fiscal responsibility.  This will require the government to spend less and spend more wisely, so that we can afford to make the investments that are critical to future growth.  And it will require tax reform that produces a system that is more simple and more fair, that encourages growth and investment, and that will help restore fiscal sustainability.

These are our challenges.  And they are not just an economic imperative, they are a national security imperative.  Our strength as a nation depends on the ability of our political system to move quickly enough to put in place solutions to our long-term problems.

Our great strengths as a country have been in our openness to ideas and talent, our capacity to innovate, our excellence in higher education, a willingness to invest public resources strategically in scientific research and discovery, and the political will to confront challenges with wisdom and force.

If we preserve and build on these strengths, and if China successfully continues on its path to a more open, market economy, then both our countries and the world economy will be in a much stronger position.

The President recently said, “We should feel confident about our ability to compete, but we are going to have to step up our game.”

China’s rise offers us the opportunity of dramatic growth in demand for things Americans create and produce.  But it also will force us to raise our game.

We should welcome both the opportunity and the challenge.

Thank you.

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Tom Friedman Admits to Not Understanding China…So Why Does He Write About It?

By , January 12, 2011

Orville Shcell (R), Asia Society's Oprah, Interviews Tom Friedman (L)

New York Times columnist Tom Friedman is not a China scholar and knows little of China; that was his mantra in response to questions about China’s development at Monday night’s “The U.S. and China: How Should Americans View the New Balance of Power?” sponsored by the Asia Society (watch full video here).  While statements admitting to an utter lack of knowledge on the subject matter are usually fatal to a key speaker’s effectiveness, for Friedman and the 90 minute event, at times it worked and gave one pause to think of the United State’s own future.

In an Oprah-like setting, Orville Schell, director of Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations and one of America’s preeminent China scholars, sat down with Friedman to muse about China’s rise vis-à-vis the United State’s current economic and political stagnation.  Friedman sees China’s rise as a result of its adoption of a “get-it-done” attitude, an attitude that the United States once had but seems to have lost.  For Friedman, it is this attitude that allows China to quickly build amazingly modern structures like the Tianjin Convention Center in just over eight months while the United States languishes with broken escalators in Penn Station for months at a time.  The fact that China has cheap, and sometimes unpaid, migrant labor and shoddy construction standards didn’t seem to register with Friedman, although Schell did raise the issue.

Throughout the evening, Friedman highlighted China’s achievements with scant regard to China’s drawbacks.  But at one point, Friedman acknowledged the one-sided nature of his analysis, arguing that it was necessary to examine China’s current success to see what it is we, the United States, need to improve.  Friedman’s hyperbolic analysis of China was at times irritating, but he did have a point.  China does appear to “get-things-done” – arguably it has not suffered the same economic setback as the U.S. and it is able to achieve certain goals, such as becoming a global power in green technology.

Yes, Freidman acknowledged, China does have an authoritarian regime that is easier to manage than a burly

Epitomizing the Get it Done Spirit - Rosie the Riveter

democracy; but as Friedman noted, what it is about China that we envy are the values it adopted that we once held.  It used to be the United States that could get things done, that could put a man on the moon, “not because they are easy but because they are hard.”  Friedman wondered –  where did that spirit go.  “We have nothing to learn from China” Friedman stated, we merely have to reclaim our traditional values.

While Friedman believed that the forces driving China today are the same forces that drove us to become a superpower many decades before, Schell had a more nuanced analysis of China’s rise.  In answering his own question as to where China’s energy to “get-things-done” comes from (which also elicited Friedman to open his laptop and take notes for his new book), Schell put China’s rise into its own historical context.

For Schell, China’s energy comes from its people’s own desire to be great.  In examining China’s modern history, Schell noted that China has been a failure – the 20th Century began with the collapse of the dynasty system; Sun Yat-sen’s short rule brought no great success, Chiang Kai-shek’s republican period provided less, and Mao’s reign merely created a larger and poorer population.  It was not until Deng Xiaoping’s presidency (1978-1997) that China started to become successful and regain the greatness of antiquity.  For Schell, this desire to be great is an important motivating factor and allows the Chinese people to forgive its government for many of its shortcomings.  Although Schell did not mention it, China is not alone in its desire to be great; arguably the United States belief in itself as a “beacon the hill” has had an equally motivating quality.

But the discussion soon returned back to the United States and its recent stagnation in light of China’s rise.  How did the U.S. lose its path Schell wondered.  For Friedman it is largely emblematic of our polarized politics – polarization about all the wrong things.  Instead of focusing on our failed education system or our deteriorating infrastructure, politics focuses on rhetoric and is unable to create the policies that will guide the U.S. in a new world in this new century.

How can we get that back?  For America, the future has yet to be written according to Friedman, but there will need to be a catalytic event for America to regain its focus.  Our democracy was designed as such; with its checks and balances, its multiple voices, only through a catalytic event can the United States purposefully move forward.

Monday night’s talk was interesting not for its China analysis but for its scrutiny of America’s current status.  Friedman certainly paints China with a wide brush and it’s easy to critique Friedman’s arguments pertaining to China. But it’s important to be open to his message about America.  China has become a global leader in green technology; the U.S. still has members of Congress who do not believe in climate change.  A green technology bill that likely would have created jobs and put the United States at the front of an nascent industry was unable to pass the Senate.

Americans feel anxious about China’s rise, but it is not necessarily China’s fault. For Friedman, America still has the goods to succeed, it just needs to push aside the white noise of today’s politics and reclaim its values.  And that is why he writes about China.  Whether that can be done has yet to be seen.  But Friedman remains hopeful; frustrated but hopeful.

Tom Friedman’s co-authored book is now available in stores: That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back, By Tom Friedman & Michael Mandelbaum (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, September 5, 2011), 400 pages.
 

CL&P – What to Read for the Week Ending 2011-01-09

By , January 9, 2011

Events in Preparation for Hu’s State Visit

By , January 7, 2011

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

______________________________________________________________________________

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                                                                     January 7, 2011

Guidance on Events leading into the China State Visit

In advance of President Hu’s state visit to Washington on January 19, several senior members of the Obama Administration will be addressing different aspects of our relationship with China.

This weekend, Secretary Gates will travel to China to advance military-to-military ties between our two countries.  After he travels to China, Secretary Gates will also be making stops in Japan and the Republic of Korea.

On Wednesday the 12th, Secretary Geithner will delivers remarks at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he will discuss our economic relationship with China, including our efforts to create balanced and sustainable global growth that supports jobs and opportunity for the American people.

On Thursday the 13th, Secretary Locke will be speaking to the U.S. – China Business Council, where he will discuss how leveling the playing field for U.S. businesses in the Chinese market will help spur global innovation and create jobs in America.

On Friday the 14th, Secretary Clinton will deliver a major address at the State Department that presents our broad vision of U.S. – China relations in the 21st century, including our efforts to make progress on a range of bilateral, regional and global issues.

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Changing Media, Changing China…Changing Me!

By , January 7, 2011

After following China for most of my adult life and intently analyzing its development these past three years, I find many China events to be rather staid affairs; it’s usually obvious where the conversation will go and most speakers hedge their bets on China’s future, committing to neither its success nor its failure.  But not Susan Shirk.  Last night, at an Asia Society event to promote her new book, Changing Media, Changing China, Susan Shirk was able to educate, entertain, and at times stun the audience on one of the least understood aspects of Chinese society: the media’s role in changing domestic politics in China.  But one would expect nothing less of a woman who dared to wear a fabulous red suit to the affair.

Shirk, who edits Changing Media, Changing China was joined by one of the contributors to the book, Prof. Benjamin Liebman of Columbia Law School, as well as sociologist Yang Guobin of Barnard College whose recent scholarship focuses on online activism in China.  Shirk began the night’s discussion by putting the role of the media into a historical context.  Comparing access to information in today’s China to the China of the 1980s, Shirk highlighted the fact that Chinese people today have much more access to information; during the 1980s the Chinese leadership had the monopoly on such access, but today, with a commercialized press and and the internet, there is a narrowing of this gap in access to information, putting the people’s access on par with their leaders’.  Shirk noted that it is this new style of media – with newspapers competing with each other for a story that sells papers and blogs spreading stories like wild-fire across China – that improves the Chinese government’s responsiveness to its people.  Although the central government is still ambivalent about the role of the media, it recognizes the media’s “watchdog” potential – through local newspapers, blogs and internet chat rooms, the central government is able to monitor and police the bad behavior of local officials.

Liebman on the other hand, offered a more cautionary view of the media, at least with respect to its role in the legal system.  When a case is picked up by the media – be it by blogs or newspapers – judges are under pressure, usually directly from Party officials, to decide the case in ways that will cool public passion, even if it means deciding the case irrespective of legal precepts.  Liebman went on to note that media coverage of a case only serves to reinforce the Party-State’s oversight of the courts; to guarantee a harmonious society, officials will demand that judges look to social stability as their primary goal, not the actual law.  But Liebman went on to note, it is not a one-sided game.  As the media has become more active in legal cases, the courts have fought back by liberally applying defamation laws.  Liebman noted that not only are plaintiffs overwhelmingly the victors in defamation cases in China (making media the losers), but in the past few years, Liebman has also noticed a surge in the number of criminal defamation cases.  Likely initiated by local officials after bad press coverage from the local media, the courts are caught in between this power struggle, making the establishment of a rule of law a more difficult task.

Yang had a more positive view.  Focusing on the internet and microblogging in China (microblogging is  a longer form of texting, allowing for conversations to develop), Yang has been amazed and impressed by the persistence of online activism in China.  While the Chinese government still maintains strategic control of the internet, Yang noted that there is only so much it can control.  People in China are communicating constantly over the internet, making it difficult for the government to monitor all conversations.  While many conversations are social, some eventually veer to the political, and the government is unaware to stop them.  Yang also noted that the number of online protests in the past year or so has increased substantially.  But Yang noted that the internet is still controlled; the government will erase postings and flood certain message boards with government-sanctioned comments.  Corporations have begun to steal a page from the government’s playbook.  Corporations also hire people to write positive reviews of their products, or negative ones of their competitors’.  Known as “water armies,” these hired guns make it more difficult to trust online information.  Similarly, the government’s control of chatrooms makes it difficult to use the internet in China as a barometer of public opinion.

Unfortunately each speaker was only given six to seven minutes to speak on such a huge topic.  The last hour of the program was dedicated to audience questions.  While the panel discussion offered a fascinating and thought-provoking analysis of arguably the most influential factor in China today, the audience’s questions veered off topic, with one woman – a self-proclaimed netizen – asking what the U.S. government can learn from the Chinese government’s promotion of the internet.  Fortunately Shirk felt no need to entertain the question, cutting it short with a resolute “nothing.”  Few of the questions were as nuanced as the initial discussion; Google’s “moral stance in China” was repeatedly referred to (making me realize that the Asia Society-set is not reading China Law & Policy’s Google analysis) and the ability of the internet to bring down the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In regards to the question of CCP downfall, Shirk offered a refreshingly frank answer: even without censorship or the propaganda department, Shirk believes the CCP would still be able to maintain its power.  For Shirk, the fact that the CCP can: (1) point to huge improvements in the people’s living standards, (2) perpetuate the belief amongst most Chinese that without the CCP, China would descend into chaos, and (3) highlight the fact that China is now an important international power, would likely mean that many CCP candidates could easily win elections if China ever had any.  Even if China was to have an economic setback, Shirk still believes that it could maintain the sincere support of the Chinese people.  Shirk suspects that censorship is allowed to continue not because the Chinese government as a whole wants to suppress freedom of information; likely many government officials realize that by having a way to gauge public anger and a means to respond to it, their legitimacy could ultimately be bolstered.  Instead, Shirk speculated that it could be the powerful Propaganda Department that doesn’t want to budge from its culture of censorship, perhaps causing a split in the upper echelons of the Chinese leadership.

Asia Society’s “China’s New Media Landscape” only scratched the surface of the role of the media in China.  The discussion left one wondering – who wags the dog here.  While I’m usually the quintessential free-rider at these events, for this one, I was so intrigued by the discussion that I did buy the book. 

Changing Media, Changing China, edited by Susan Shirk (Oxford University Press, December 14, 2010), 288 pages.
 

CL&P Weekly Twitter Digest – What to Read for the Week Ending 2011-01-02

By , January 2, 2011

Human Rights Lawyer Teng Biao Recounts Police Abuse

By , December 27, 2010

With President Hu Jintao set to make an official State visit to the U.S. next month, expect an increase in op-eds concerning violations of human rights in China and the demand that President Obama raise human rights issues with President Hu.  These op-eds usually name particular human rights activists, those who have been at it the longest and whose regular imprisonment and abuse make the international news.  Teng Biao is one such human rights lawyer who receives international attention whenever the Chinese police take him into custody, which, unfortunately, is a fairly regular occurrence.

In a recent essay translated in the Wall Street Journal, Prof. Teng recounts the wrongful detention and police brutality he suffered on December 23, 2010, when attempting to visit a colleague’s mother.  But what makes Prof. Teng’s essay particularly poignant is that he admits that because of his special status as an internationally-known human rights lawyer, the beatings he suffers at the hands of the police are much less severe than someone with less international name recognition.

The op-eds that will inevitably appear prior to President Hu’s visit to the U.S. should not just call for the freedom of a single human rights activist; rather it is important that these op-eds also look at the systemic problems with the culture of lawlessness that permeates the Chinese police and the lack of a rule of law.  Prof. Teng portrays a police force drunk on its own power and willing to cast aside the law to do as it pleases, including abusing its citizens.

‘A Hole to Bury You’
A first-hand account of how China’s police treats the citizens it’s supposed to serve and protect.

Human Rights lawyer, Teng Biao

By Teng Biao*

Beijing – On Dec. 23, the United Nations International Convention for the Protection of All Persons From Forced Disappearance came into force. China has declined to accede to this convention. My experience that same day is just one of many examples of how the authorities continue to falsely imprison Chinese citizens.

That evening, I was in the Xizhimen area of Beijing chatting with my colleagues Piao Xiang, Xu Zhiyong and Zhang Yongpan. Ms. Piao had been disappeared after she and I went to Dandong on Oct. 7 to argue the court case of Leng Guoquan, a man framed by the police for drug trafficking; she had only been released on Dec. 20. Her abductors had been officers from the state security squad of the Public Security Bureau. I asked her to narrate the entire process of her disappearance in detail.

Later, I suggested to Mr. Zhang, “Let’s go and see Fan Yafeng’s mom.” The day before, we had contacted fellow human rights lawyer Fan Yafeng and found out that he was under strict house arrest. But he had said that his mother was going to be alone at home in the evening and so I thought we should go see her.

Because I used to go there frequently I remembered clearly where she lived. As Mr. Zhang and I entered the block of flats and started walking up the staircase, I had a feeling that someone was following us. Observing that we went to the third floor, a young security guard asked us whom we were visiting. We said, “We’re seeing a friend.” Immediately, he called out for someone else to come up.

We knocked on the door and were greeted by Mr. Fan’s mother. But as we entered the flat, the security guard came with us, and a person in plainclothes stormed in just behind him. The man in plainclothes demanded to check our IDs in a very coarse manner. I asked him in a loud voice, “What sort of people are you? How can you enter a private residence without permission?”

The plainclothes man said, “I am a police officer. We want to check your ID cards.” “You’re a police officer? I want to see your police ID.” “If I am telling you I’m a police officer, then that’s what I am. What are you doing here?” “Is that your business? How can you prove you’re a police officer if you don’t show your police ID card?”

***Click here to Read More***

*Prof. Teng Biao is a lecturer of law at the Law School of the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL), one of China’s most prestigious law school.  After working with human rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong to successfully abolish the Custody and Repatriation system, Teng and Xu opened the public interest law firm, Open Constitution Initiative, which was shut down in summer 2009.  Teng has been repeatedly warned by administrators at CUPL that if he continues with his rights defense work, he could lose his job and even his personal freedom.

CL&P Weekly Twitter Digest – What to Read for the Week Ending 2010-12-26

By , December 26, 2010

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