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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, September 29, 2009

Originally posted on the Huffington Post

President Obama, with President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Gordon Brown on Friday, Sept 25 at the G-20 Summit

China remained noticeably mum on Friday as other member nations of the U.N. Security Council stood before the world and accused Iran of developing a secret nuclear enrichment site.  Flanked by Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the U.K. and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, President Obama promised to take strong action against Iran if the country did not fully disclose its nuclear ambitions and open all sites to international inspectors.   Such strong action would include crippling sanctions on all trade to and from Iran.  Even Russia appeared willing to consider sanctions if Iran failed to cooperate, breaking with Russia’s long opposition to such action.

China, on the other hand, prefers a different route.  Stressing the need for diplomacy and negotiations, China announced that “sanctions and pressure should not be an option” in dealing with Iran.  Although not completely ruling out sanctions, China desperately hopes that the upcoming talks with Iran scheduled to begin this Thursday satisfy the U.S. and obviate the need for sanctions.

Why is China so hesitant to support sanctions against a country that is secretly developing nuclear capabilities?  History, geo-politics and economic ties are what set China apart from its Security Council brethren in dealing with Iran.  But China’s growth as a world power has caused it to become a stakeholder in the current system.  With this new-found power, China has begun to realize its actions, or lack of action, does in fact shape the world’s future course and as a result, its own global prospects.

History, History, History

China has long been an outsider to the western world order.  Even after mainland China’s return to the U.N. Security Council in 1971, China was still largely considered a pariah state, a Communist country with severe human rights violations.  China’s violent crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen protests rolled back any international good will it was amassing and subjected China to crippling economic sanctions.  It has only been in the past few years that China has become a significant voice in the international arena and respected by Western powers.

But for China, its past is far from forgotten.  While it has significantly benefited from the current world order, China understands that other countries, either rightly or wrongly, are marginalized because of alleged human rights violations or nuclear development.  As a result, China has developed a philosophy of “non-interference” in other country’s domestic affairs and has largely stuck to that attitude in dealing with countries that the U.N. or the U.S. might consider rogue.  This is not to say that China condones such behavior; in fact China has been an ardent supporter of various global nuclear non-proliferation efforts and supported sanctions against North Korea for its nuclear development.  However, with its sense of history, China will be slow to agree to sanctions against Iran, even if sanctions are in its long-term self-interest.

Geo-strategic Considerations

Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at last week's U.N. Security Council

Iran plays an important role in China’s aspiration to become a regional power.  With its rise, China has sought to create political alliances and economic ties with other countries in Asia and reduce the influence of the U.S. in the region.  One such effort is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  China leads the organization which has created greater economic interdependence among Russia, China and the Central Asian states.  Iran, although not a member, currently holds observer status.  China, along with Russia, has used the SCO to reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia when in July 2005, its members signed an agreement to push the U.S. to set a deadline for troop withdrawal from the region (Library of Congress Report, p. 68).

The SCO is beginning to function as a multilateral alliance system allowing China to exert its influence in a region where western powers are largely absent.  To move too quickly in calling for sanctions against Iran, a country within the SCO’s domain, China could jeopardize its current leadership role in the region.

Economic Ties

China’s strongest reason to oppose sanctions against Iran lies with its current economic ties to the country.    In 2008, 12% of China’s crude oil imports were from Iran; the first five months of 2009 have seen an increase and China is on target to import 15% from Iran (Energy Information Administration Country Analysis Brief) .  Furthermore, Chinese oil companies have invested heavily in Iranian oil fields.  In December 2007, China’s Sinopec signed a $2 bn contract with Iran to develop the Yadavaran oil fields; in January 2009, CNPC, China’s largest oil and gas company signed a $1.7bn oil contract to develop the Azadegan oil fields.  Although these investments are large, many question whether the Chinese companies have in fact moved forward with developing these fields.  In the past, Chinese oil companies have signed deals with countries but have waited, even as much as ten years, for geopolitical issues to settle (According to the Brookings Institute, CNPC signed a contract with Iraq in 1997 but did not begin to the develop the oil fields until 2008, after threats of sanctions were over).

Similarly, China has looked to Iran for its large quantities of natural gas.  In March 2009, the L.A. Times reported that Iran and China signed a $3.2 bn deal for natural gas development. But like the oil contracts, it is unclear if China intends to follow through with this agreement given the current politically-sensitive climate.

More real though is Chinese oil companies’ sale of gasoline to Iran.  Although Iran has the second largest crude oil reserves in the world, it has little capacity to refine that oil and make it into usable gasoline.  In fact, Iran imports 40% of its gasoline, mostly from European countries but also from China.  Because of China’s increasing economic ties with Iran, sanctions that impact all trade with Iran could be particularly damaging to China.

China’s Countervailing Interests

On Sunday, it seemed as though everyone on the political talk shows called for China to join the U.S., France, Britain and Russia in condemning Iran and agreeing to join sanctions if need be.  But China has not wavered on its stance of trying diplomacy first.  At the same time, it has also not stated that it will oppose sanctions if the October 1 talks fail.  And while political pundits, the media and elected officials in the West are currently criticizing China for not throwing its weight behind sanctions, it is China’s current silence on the issue that gives the October 1 talks the best chance of success.  Without China’s commitment for or against sanctions, Iran is left guessing what its trading partner will do, and could acquiesce to U.S. demands to show blueprints of the new nuclear site and open its country to inspectors.

But if the October 1 talks fail, expect China to agree to sanctions, but likely not the ones that will be proposed by the U.S., France and Britain.  In December 2006 and March 2007, in response to Iran’s nuclear development, the U.N. Security Council unanimously agreed to sanctions.  However, through China and Russia’s insistence, these sanctions were substantially watered down and merely limited the sale of nuclear equipment and technologies to Iran and froze the assets of key individuals involved in Iran’s nuclear development.

The Obama Administration has already realized that a total embargo on gasoline shipments is not in the cards.  Not only would Chinese companies be negatively impacted, but so would European oil companies that sell gasoline to Iran.  Many E.U. countries have already come out against a total embargo.

But other measures, such as eliminating investments in Iran, might have more traction with China and could be something it agrees to in this round of sanctions.  China has a lot to lose if Iran becomes a nuclear power or appears to be a nuclear power.  First, while 12% of China’s crude oil imports are from Iran, 20% are from Saudi Arabia, a country that has already reprimanded Iran for its nuclear aspirations.  Will China jeopardize that relationship by opposing sanctions?

Second, Israel’s response to an unchecked Iran could potentially lead to such instability in the region cutting off not only oil from the Middle East, but also key shipping lanes for China’s oil imports from other countries.  China cannot afford to be cut off from any oil shipments since currently it only has 25 days worth of oil reserves.

Third, a nuclear Iran threatens the Central Asian strategic alliances that China has worked hard to create through the SCO.  Arguably, the other Central Asian countries might begin to take their cues from Iran, dissipating China’s leadership role in the region.

Fourth, it remains unclear if China’s investments in Iranian gas and oil fields actually exist.  If not, then China could easily agree to stop its investments in Iran.  Even if China has already begun to develop these oil and gas fields, it is only at the start of these investments and under its contracts with Iran, China does not receive a return on the investment until development is completed.  Any of China’s current contracts have a long way to go before completion.

Finally, China does want to become a responsible world player.  It has actively sought membership in various international organizations and largely abides by their rules.  Last year, during the North Korean missile crisis, China was on board in issuing a harsh reprimand of Kim Jung-Il’s actions.

If the situation with Iran further disintegrates and sanctions become necessary, the Obama Administration should push China to agree to sanctions that include a cut-off of investments in Iran.  China might hesitate at first, but for the reasons stated above, they could agree to such measures.  Getting China to stop importing crude from Iran could prove harder.  Although interestingly enough, Iran’s largest importer of its crude is Japan, a strong U.S. ally, and Japan might actually be the strongest opponent of such measures.  Including an embargo on sales of gasoline to Iran would be impossible.  But asking China to join sanctions that limit investment in the region, is doable.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, September 11, 2009

France's President, Nicolas Sarkozy

Does France’s president Nicolas Sarkozy read China Law & Policy?  Sure looks that way.  In an effort to promote carbon caps domestically, Sarkozy also called for any international climate change agreement to include a carbon tax on imports into Europe from countries that do not impose carbon emission caps.

In response, many economists argued that Sarkozy’s push for a carbon tax on imports could lead to alienating China from agreeing to any sort of emission caps in Copenhagen.  This is the same criticism lodged against the tariff provisions in the U.S. House of Representatives’ Climate Change Bill.

There is a real risk that these economists are right; China will begin to feel bullied and, for its domestic audience’s consumption, walk away from an international climate change agreement.  Although the Chinese government enjoys one-party rule in an authoritarian state, it is still susceptible to domestic public opinion, especially given the fact that nationalism runs very high.

But at least our European allies realize that any international agreement is a give and take; there are carrots and sticks.  On the same day that Sarkozy called for carbon tariffs, the European Union’s (E.U.) environment chief, Stavros Dimas, announced that the European Commission would pledge $3 billion per year to developing countries, including China, to assist with capping emissions and developing clean technologies.

A key issue for China in its lead up to Copenhagen has been financial and technological assistance from developed countries in implementing carbon emission caps or clean technology.  China has repeatedly stated that they will not be able to meet the requirements of an international treaty unless there is assistance from developed countries.

The E.U.’s pledge is the carrot in this situation.  It is agreeing to a term that China has said is necessary for it to consent to any international climate change treaty.   So even in light of Sarkozy’s call for carbon tariffs, the Chinese government can turn to its people and show that it was not bullied.  Instead, China received the one element that it considered indispensible.

The U.S. unfortunately has only been providing sticks.  There is evidence that the tariff provisions provide some leverage against a country like China, but without providing some sort of bargaining chip, China will likely not respond positively to the U.S.’ hard-line tariff provisions.  Instead, the U.S. should learn for the E.U. and look to see where it can find common ground with China.  Without this common ground, it starts to look a lot like bullying.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, September 7, 2009

Originally posted on the Huffington Post.

Health care will not be the only derisive issue on the Senate’s calendar when it returns to Congress on September 8.

Rep. Ed Markey Announces Climate Change Passage, June 26, 2009

This past June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (the “Climate Change Bill”).  Far-reaching in its impact on the U.S. economy and particularly detrimental to certain energy-intensive sectors, debate in the Senate will become increasingly cantankerous as special interests and certain states lobby for protection.

And while the Bill, through a series of complicated cap-and trade equations and a plethora of subsidies to renewable energy, has the potential to completely alter the domestic market, debate thus far has been about its global impact.  With fear that countries like China will not pass legislation to cap their domestic industries’ carbon output, the House added two provisions to protect U.S. industries from companies in countries that are not similarly restrained.  Out of a 1,400 page bill, these two provisions have become the center of the debate, some calling these provisions much needed protection and others calling them tariffs.

But conspicuously absent from these discussions is an analysis of what is really going on here.  How exactly do these provisions work?  Will they have the intended effect of maintaining the competitiveness of U.S. industries or are they attempts by certain industries to protect their profits?  Will these provisions bring countries like China to the table in Copenhagen or will they ultimately produce a tariff war?  Can they withstand a challenge under global trade rules?

To answer these questions, China Law & Policy sat down with Jake Caldwell, director of Policy for Agriculture, Trade & Energy at the Center for American Progress.  Click here to listen to the interview with Jake Caldwell.

The Trade Provisions

Applicable Only to Energy-Intensive and Trade-Sensitive Industries
In our interview, Jake stressed that the two trade provisions in the Climate Change Bill will only apply to those U.S. industries that are both energy-intensive and trade-sensitive, making these provisions applicable in fact to only about five U.S. industries: ferrous metals (iron and steel), nonferrous metals (aluminum and copper), non-metal minerals (cement and glass), paper and pulp, and basic chemicals (World Resources Institute (WRI) report, p. xvi).

Under the Bill, these industries will initially be given a two-year waiver from compliance to the Bill’s cap-and-trade regulations.  However, after the two years, these industries can seek protection from foreign competition through the following two trade provisions.

Provision 1: Recovery of Some Cost of Compliance
The first of these provisions is less controversial.  Found in Title IV, Part F, subpart 1 of the Bill, it establishes an emissions allowance rebate program.  As Jake explained, this will allow companies in energy-intensive, trade-sensitive manufacturing industries to be compensated in other ways for the cost of complying with the Bill’s cap-and-trade program.  The rebate program will reduce the threat that these companies will lose business to companies from countries that do not impose equally as rigorous caps on greenhouse gas emissions. The rebate program will be phased

Click on image for a PDF of the Trade Provisions in the Climate Change Bill

out by 2035.

Provision 2: Border Adjustment Measures (a.k.a. Tariffs)
It is the second trade provision, found in Title VI, Part F, subpart 2, that is the most contentious; this is the provision that establishes unilateral border adjustment measures – a.k.a. tariffs –  on imports from countries that do not have similar emissions reduction policies.  Under this provision, if by 2018 there is no international climate change treaty in force, the President, starting in 2020, is required to impose a border adjustment measure on imports from sectors in countries that have not capped their emissions or reduced their energy-intensity to comparable levels.  The U.S. importer of the competing foreign product will have to purchase an “international reserve allowance” through a carbon market.  This in effect establishes a tariff on imports from that foreign country.

As Jake pointed out, the President can grant a waiver to certain countries if he or she deems that there is an important national economic or environmental reason that takes precedence.  But the Presidential waiver is subject to Congressional approval through a joint resolution of Congress. In effect, Congress has to “second” the President’s decision, making for a cumbersome procedure.   If either house of Congress does not agree with the President’s reasoning, the waiver is denied.  Given the already politically-sensitive as well as politically-expedient nature of the U.S.-China relationship, it is difficult to imagine that any waiver to a Chinese industry could make its way through Congress without a fight.

Effectiveness of the Trade Provisions

As Jake explained in our interview, the trade provisions were adopted for three reasons: (1) to prevent carbon leakage (the transfer of production and jobs from industries in the U.S. subject to cap-and-trade rules to companies in foreign countries that do not have such rules in place), (2) to keep U.S. manufacturing industries competitive in a potentially unequal carbon-restricted world, and (3) to be used as leverage against other countries that have yet to set emission reduction targets.  But will these provisions achieve their stated goals?  Or are they protectionist responses to pressure from a few select industries?

Carbon Leakage
If a goal is to prevent carbon leakage and promote emission caps in other countries, the trade provisions, especially the border adjustment provisions, are not tailored narrowly enough to achieve these goals.  Congress was largely targeting China with the trade provisions.  However, out of the five U.S. industries that would be able to use the tariff provisions (steel, aluminum, chemicals, paper and cement), only one industry imports more than 10% of its product from China: the cement sector (WRI report, p. xviii).  For the other industries, the majority of foreign imports are from Canada and other developed nations, many of which already have emissions standards that surpass the U.S’.  While there will inevitably be some carbon leakage, it’s questionable just how dramatic it will be.  Currently, the majority of U.S. imports in these sectors come from countries with less-carbon intense production methods than China or even the U.S.  Just because U.S. companies will bare the cost of meeting more rigorous emission standards does not necessarily mean that production will be shifted to countries with less rigorous standards.  Currently, China’s production of aluminum is carbon-intensive and uses a tremendous amount of energy.  However, China’s production is more expensive than Canada’s or the U.S.’ and can barely remain competitive in the global market.  Thus, lower carbon emissions and greater energy efficiency do not always equate with higher costs.

Furthermore, if the goal is to prevent carbon leakage, the trade provisions offer no recourse to individual companies from foreign, carbon-heavy countries that are meeting their own private emission caps.  For example, Baosteel, China’s largest steel producer, is relatively energy-efficient (WRI report, p. 35).  However, under the current Climate Change Bill, even though Baosteel may voluntarily subject itself to carbon targets similar to those that will be imposed on steelmakers in the U.S., Baosteel will still be penalized.  The Bill’s trade provisions evaluate imports on a sector-wide basis and not an individual company one.  Arguably, if the goal is to prevent carbon leakage, the U.S. has a better chance of influencing a Chinese company’s behavior than an entire sector in China.  Thus, the trade provisions should establish a secondary track where certain companies, if they are able to show that they are compliant with U.S. standards, are exempted from the border provisions applied to their country and sector.

Finally, the question remains – how do you measure the carbon footprint of an imported product?  These provisions rely heavily upon the assumptions that monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions from the country of origin is (a) an easy task and (b) accurate.  While these assumptions might hold true in countries like Canada or Japan, for China, where implementation and enforcement on the local level is a perpetual struggle, any form of data collection is a challenge and results are often less than reliable.  Thus, in a world where carbon measurement is problematic, the actual ability to implement the trade provisions remains questionable.

Competitiveness
As mentioned above, imports from China in the energy-intensive, trade-sensitive industries are very small (14% of cement, 7 % of steel, 3% of aluminum, 4% of paper, and less than 1% of chemicals).  These five industries also make up a small portion of the U.S. economy, accounting for 3% of economic output and less than 2% of U.S. employment.  While these industries will inevitability be negatively affected by the Climate Change Bill, the impact on the greater U.S. economy is relatively small.  Additionally, over-protection of these industries loses sight of the broader U.S. economy and the other goal of the Climate Change Bill: to shift production and jobs to energy-efficient or renewable energy industries.

Furthermore, while the border adjustment measures protect these raw material industries, it potentially could hurt those industries that use the raw materials for production of “downstream” products.  For example, the border adjustment measures are only applicable to the importation of sheet steel, and not to products that are made out of steel, like cars or appliances (WRI report, p. 52).  U.S. car makers will still have to compete against foreign car manufacturers whose products could contain steel from countries without carbon regulations.  Without the benefit of border adjustment measures on cars, U.S. car makers would become less competitive.

Similarly, U.S. chemical manufacturing companies are fairly competitive globally.  These companies refine the carbon-intensive, raw material chemicals to make downstream, specialty concoctions (WRI report, p. 52).  However, by imposing a border adjustment measure on the raw material chemicals, any of these chemical manufacturing companies who import raw materials, would experience an increase in the cost of production, making their products less competitive abroad.  While the border adjustment measures will protect the five energy-intensive, trade-sensitive industries’ profits, they could likely hinder the competitiveness of industries that use these raw materials to manufacture downstream products.

Leverage
The jury is still out on whether border adjustment provisions do in fact bring countries to the table to discuss climate change.  The general assumption is that tariff threats rarely cause countries to act, especially countries as large as China.  However, after the U.S. backed out of the Kyoto Protocol, the European countries threatened similar types of tariffs, targeted precisely at energy-intensive U.S. industries.  Perhaps a mere coincidence, but it’s interesting to note that today, the U.S. is now close to passing climate change legislation.  Recently, South Korea voluntarily set a 2020 emissions reduction target; the South Korean government cited the fear of border tariffs as a reason to set targets.

But it is still questionable how far the threat of tariffs can go.  China has certainly taken notice of the border adjustment provisions in the U.S. Climate Change Bill, but that does not mean it will agree to carbon caps.  China’s exports to the U.S. that would likely be subject to the tariff provisions accounted for less than 0.2% of economic output in 2005, thus making the U.S.’ tariff threats of little consequence to China (WRI report, p. 57).  However, of greater consequence to the U.S. and to the rest of the world is if China, the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, walks away from climate change negotiations because it feels as though it needs to “act tough” for its domestic audience.  In looking at the current border adjustment provisions in the Bill and the tepid success they have had thus far, the Senate might want to ask itself if the risk is worth it.

Legality of the Trade Provisions

As Jake mentioned, World Trade Organization (WTO) rules require that countries pass nondiscriminatory trade provisions – that the provisions do not discriminate against foreign products in favor of domestic ones.  Arguably, the current Bill does discriminate.  As discussed earlier, individual companies that could be meeting similar carbon caps will be discriminated against if their home country has not agreed to carbon caps.  Without some sort of procedure that exempts foreign firms which individually meet carbon caps from the border tariffs, the current trade provisions may not withstand a WTO challenge.

There will certainly be a Senate showdown over the Climate Change Bill.  Already ten Democratic Senators have stated that the trade provisions need to be stronger.  But do they really?  If your singular goal is to protect 3% of the nation’s economic output and 2% of its jobs, then yes, the trade provisions will maintain the status quo, at least for the time being.  But if your goal is to increase innovation in new sectors like renewable energy, create clean jobs and limit global climate change, then the trade provisions, as they stand now do not achieve that goal.  There is a need to maintain U.S. competitiveness in the five effected industries, but in the current tariff provision, what is being maintained are corporate profits in a few select, and powerful, industries.  The Senate needs to take a good hard look at the current trade provisions and question if it is worth it.  Perhaps it is time to move away from defensive measures against China and begin to better engage China in agreeing to a climate change treaty.  Without China’s agreement, any legislation the Senate passes will have negligible effect in limiting climate change.

Click here to listen to the interview with Jake Caldwell

Click here to open a PDF of the transcript of the Jake Caldwell interview