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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, November 24, 2011

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Rebecca MacKinnon do not seem to have a lot in common: one is a young, blonde woman born in 1960s America and focused on internet freedom; the other is an older, grayed man born in pre-war Poland who might not really know what a blog is let alone a “microblog.”

But at last week’s China Town Hall event – sponsored by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCR) and hosted by Fordham Law School – the general gist of each speaker’s message boiled down to the same point: don’t expect China to follow historical trends; this is a different time, a different place, a different beast and the U.S. needs to quickly recognize this reality.

Brzezinski on China: China is Not Nazi Germany

Brzezinski started the live webcast portion (watch the webcast here) with a very brief synopsis of his role in helping to normalize relations with China during the Carter administration.  The briefness of this interlude proved to be a pity and not just because the question and answer portion ended up being sort of lacking.

The history of U.S.-China relations after Nixon’s impeachment remains rather unknown to many.  In fact, I would venture to guess that few understand that Nixon’s 1972 visit to China did not normalize relations; normalization was left for another day, and as Brzezinski explained at the China Town Hall, President Ford didn’t believe that he had the mandate to transfer diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.  As a result of what appeared to be the U.S.’ waffling, relations between the U.S. and China worsened.  However, President Carter’s election in 1976 provided for a new chance at dialogue and with the help of Brzezinski, the U.S. and China eventually normalized relations in 1979 (Prof. Jerome Cohen wrote an interesting essay on the role of Ted Kennedy in normalizing relations – see here).

For the remainder of the webcast – the Q &A portion – Brzezinski proved to be more of a sphinx, giving short,

Deng Xiaoping and Jimmy Carter - 1979

somewhat cryptic answers to most of the questions.  As a result, there was plenty of time for question.  Perhaps it was a result of the fact that on the same day as the Town Hall – November 16 – President Obama was in Australia announcing the establishment of the U.S. base in that country or perhaps it is what is on most people’s mind, but most of the questions of the night focused upon China’s military ambitions and the U.S.’ appropriate military role in Asia.

For Brzezinski, the U.S.’ current posture toward Beijing – one where China is viewed as a threat – is troubling.  According to Brzezinski the U.S. is “pre-judging” the relationship: the U.S. has already determined that China will be an aggressive power and we must develop and deepen our alliances with other countries.  But we don’t know if that is true – we don’t know that China is or will be a Nazi Germany; while our guard should be up, we should be open to maintaining a good relationship with China and not isolate it from the rest of Asia.

Brzezinski made an interesting point and supported his argument that China is not as much of threat as we think it is with evidence – China’s military is light years away from being able to compete with ours and China maintains an ambivalent relationship with both Russia and Iran.

But Brzezinski didn’t address some of the very real pressures on the Chinese government to increase its saber-rattling: the military still maintains an extremely powerful role in running the Chinese government and to a large extent, often runs itself; China has become more bellicose in terms of its ability to control portions of the South China Sea; and the lack of communication between the U.S. and Chinese militaries can allow for a small incident to rapidly escalate into a full-blown international one.

In response to one question about rising nationalism in China, Brzezinski pretty much brushed it off (although he did make the important point that the U.S. is guilty of it too vis-à-vis China).  While he recognized that it could be a legitimate concern, this nationalism has not been accompanied by anti-American sentiment.  This just seemed shocking to me. And, as someone who was in China soon after the U.S.’ accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, plain wrong.  Anti-American sentiment at that time was running high, enflamed by the Chinese media and communicated by many of the Chinese students I met on the Peking University campus that summer and early fall.  The anti-American sentiment quickly died down after the U.S. agreed to China’s accession to the W.T.O. in November 1999 but there have been other flare-ups since then.

While Brzezinski is right to state that our approach to China shouldn’t necessarily be guided by outdated models of Nazi Germany or even the Cold War, there are some aspects of China’s rise that precisely because they are different from what we have seen in the past, should cause us to be more on guard.

Rebecca MacKinnon – China’s Internet is Not Egypt’s Internet; It’s A Lot Worse

Sites That Don't Make it Through the Great Firewall

Certainly for Rebecca MacKinnon, the live local speaker at the Fordham Law School event, China’s increased nationalism is something on her mind, especially as it pertains to the internet.

It’s Not All About the Great Fire Wall

MacKinnon started her extremely enlightening talk on internet freedom in China by tearing down some American misconceptions.  For most Americans, there is this belief that the “Great Fire Wall” of China is what is preventing internet freedom in China.  It is this firewall that completely blocks out websites like Facebook, Twitter, and although not mentioned by MacKinnon herself, China Law & Policy, from being accessible in China.  U.S. policy toward internet freedom in China, and the money spent on such efforts, has largely – and mistakenly in MacKinnon’s view – been exclusively directed toward tearing down this firewall; finding ways for activists to circumvent the wall by accessing the internet through a non-China based virtual private network (VPN).

But the Great Fire Wall of China is only one layer in the Chinese government’s web of online censorship.  What are more damaging to internet freedom are the vast layers of censorship that occur on the Chinese side of the Great Fire Wall.

Internet Companies Do the Government’s Censoring

Because of the Great Fire Wall, social networking, blogging and microblogging is dominated exclusively by Chinese companies.  Like in America, Chinese citizens can post their thoughts to the internet and communicate with other citizens.  But unlike in America, anything that gets too political will be taken down by the hosting company.  Through various cyber laws and regulations it is these internet companies – like Baidu and Alibaba – that carry out the government’s censorship of the internet.

If these companies don’t follow the weekly guidance on what content must be taken down, their licenses to run an

Not Just the Police Watching You....

internet company could be revoked, putting them out of business.  Thus, under Chinese law, the government outsources its censorship: it issues directives but the internet companies are the ones that are liable if specific content makes it through.

Those companies who do their job well don’t just stay in business, but are rewarded for their vigilant censorship.  Every year, the Chinese government awards those internet companies who did the best job censoring a “Self Discipline Award.”  And the government is not being ironic.

Because censorship does take time and because the guidance on what content must be removed is an ever moving target, some things do make it past the censors.  MacKinnon provided a recent example: the July 2011 Wenzhou train collision.  Immediately after the crash, the government issued a statement saying that a train in Wenzhou was struck by lightning.  However, with smart phones, many bystanders quickly posted pictures of a train on its side, people obviously injured by something other than lightening, quickly debunking the government’s initial response.  That use of the internet but the general public resulted in the government being held accountable and having to report the truth.

But for MacKinnon, these types of opportunities are largely reserved for natural disasters or sudden accidents – things that happen so suddenly that the government hasn’t issued an order to the internet companies about whether such content should be removed.

What’s Not Censored?  Nationalism and the 50 Cent Party

MacKinnon also made an interesting point about the inequities of censorship in China.  It would be one thing if all political speech was censored in China, but it is not.  Instead, only that speech that could potentially harm the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is censored; speech glorifying the CCP is provided free reign.

In fact, pro-Chinese government and pro-CCP speech is often ghost-written by the 50 Cent Party, government-hired internet commentators who get paid to post positive content about the Chinese government and the CCP.  So while the government is able to stamp out anti-CCP thoughts, it is also able to bolster its own image on the internet.

Make No Mistake, China is Not Egypt

For those who think that the Arab Spring is coming to a city in China sometime soon, MacKinnon’s message was clear: oh hell no.  With such tight controls over the internet, there is no way that a dinner party, let alone a revolution, could be organized through social media like it partially was in Tunisia and Egypt.  In the Middle East, there is enough space on the internet to meet like minded people and organize events.  In China, that space does not exist as the government maintains a tight grip on speech.

MacKinnon offered one example of the danger in organizing events through the internet or related to free speech on the internet.  In 2005, a group of Chinese bloggers organized a national conference in China about blogging – sort of like a NetRoots Nation here in the United States.  It gives a chance for bloggers who have communicated virtually to meet each other and provides an opportunity to learn to become a better blogger.

The conference was held again in 2006 and started to become an annual event.  Many bloggers began to wonder, is the internet a “special political zone” in the way that Shenzhen was a “special economic zone” in the 1980s?  The answer turned out to be no.  The last conference was held in 2009; in 2010, authorities went to the leaders of the conference and instructed them not to hold another conference.

Will The Chinese Internet Ever Be Free?

For MacKinnon change rests almost exclusively in the hands of the CEOs of China’s internet companies.  Right now, they have a good deal.  They have an exclusive monopoly on the internet.  Weibo, the Chinese microblogging site, doesn’t have to worry about competition from Twitter, and Renren, the major social networking site, doesn’t have to ever think about losing costumers to Facebook.  In exchange for such exclusivity, what’s a little censorship between friends?

But MacKinnon wonders if there will come a point where censorship becomes economically too costly for these companies.  If it does, then there could be a change.  What would cause that change?  That seems unclear.  In 2009, because of rioting in the predominately Muslim autonomous region of Xinjiang, the Chinese government took the drastic step of completely shutting down the internet in Xinjiang.  That shutdown didn’t last for a few days or a week.  That shutdown lasted for almost a year.  This wasn’t just an inconvenience; it harmed the local and regional economy.  But even this type of drastic action still hasn’t changed any of the internet companies’ approaches to censorship.  But perhaps if more of these outages happen or happen in a more populous location, Chinese internet companies might start wondering if aligning themselves with the Chinese government is really worth it.

As of right now, MacKinnon believes that the Chinese government has found a way to maintain its “Networked Authoritarianism.”   Chinese leaders at all levels use the internet to get their message out and there are efforts to have broadband reach all areas of China; this is not a government necessarily afraid of the internet; on some level, it has established the structure in place that allows it to use it to its advantages without any of the danger of dissent.  On some level, the Chinese government makes a mockery of the generally accepted idea that the internet is perhaps one of the most democratizing tools every created.

Instead, the Chinese government provides a model for other countries on how authoritarianism can in fact survive the internet.  The stories of Tunisia and Egypt do not hold true for China.

But as MacKinnon closed out her talk, just when you think you know what will happen in China, something surprises you.

Those interested in learning more about internet freedom should check out MacKinnon’s amazing blog RConversation or pick up her forthcoming book – Consent of the Networked – when it hits stores at the end of January 2012.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, September 27, 2011

Last week, Seton Hall University School of Law featured an interesting and timely panel discussion on the role of China in UN peace operations.  As China rises, what role does it envision in such operations?  With its new global capacity has China moved away from a policy of non-intervention?  China’s reaction to the humanitarian intervention in Libya is indeed instructive.  Below, Zachary Kelman and Desiree Sedehi, two third-year law students at Seton Hall, report on last week’s fascinating discussion.

Steven Hill on a New Beijing Consensus in UN Peace Operations

By Zachary Kelman and Desiree Sedehi*

Steven Hill on China's role in UN peace operations

Steven Hill, Visiting Professor from 2010-2011 at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in Nanjing, China, visited Seton Hall Law School on September 22, 2011, and spoke in a personal capacity about the research he conducted there on the subject of Chinese participation in UN peace operations. At an event hosted by Professor Margaret K. Lewis, a Public Intellectuals Program Fellow with the National Committee on US-China Relations, and Professor Kristen E. Boon, Director of Seton Hall Law’s International Programs, he posed the following questions: How has China’s approach to international relations changed since assuming its role on the UN Security Council in the 1970s? And is China’s approach to the humanitarian intervention in Libya the harbinger of a new “Beijing Consensus”?

In his presentation, Mr. Hill discussed the evolution of China’s approach to foreign relations, from the “Molotov cocktail-throwing revolutionaries” of the early 70s to the top contributor to peacekeeping missions among the five permanent members of the Security Council. According to Mr. Hill, this movement signals a shift from “non-intervention” to “tolerance, maybe even some enthusiasm and engagement.”

Mr. Hill recounted for his audience how, from when the People’s Republic of China regained China’s seat in the UN in 1971 until the 1990s, China had been largely detached from UN peacemaking activities.

Mr. Hill noted that China’s “traditional approach” to UN peacekeeping privileges stressed the importance of non-intervention. While China’s position has evolved considerably as it applies to UN peace operations, shades of it can be seen, for example, in Ambassador Li Baodong’s 2011 statement that the international community should “respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity” of Libya.

Hill further noted, importantly, that in spite of this rhetorical deference to sovereignty, China abstained from voting on UNSCR 1973—an abstention which was instrumental in authorizing the largely European-led intervention in Libya. China’s rhetoric led many commentators to believe that it would vote against the resolution. However, China’s ultimate abstention has been seen by many to symbolize its larger shift from a non-aligned power to a global power that has a substantial stake in the international community.

According to Mr. Hill, that China felt it necessary to evacuate 36,000 workers from Libya due to this humanitarian crisis featured prominently in its decision on how to vote on the Libya resolutions. Moreover, China’s growing stake in the international community means increased interest in avoiding catastrophic scenarios, and hence likely a more active China on the global scene.

That being said, Mr. Hill cautioned against unbridled optimism with respect to China’s “new role.”  He noted that China made every effort to defer to traditional notions of national—and then regional—self-determination. This position was evidenced by China’s acknowledgment of Arab League and African Union positions.  In addition, China reserved abstention as a “special circumstance” and was careful not to set precedent. This cautiousness, said Mr. Hill, exemplifies China’s broader attitude toward UN peacekeeping—the possible emerging “Beijing Consensus”—to promote a limited “blue helmet” approach within the general understanding of military procedure, but to avoid “nation building” and other more interventionist forms of intervention. Whether this approach will change to a more progressive humanitarian attitude, as held by some of China’s Western counterparts on the Security Council, remains to be seen.

After Mr. Hill’s presentation, both Professors Lewis and Boon offered commentary to the audience. Professor Lewis,

Steven Hill & Margaret Lewis discuss the Beijing Consensus at Seton Hall Law School

who recently appeared before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China in a roundtable discussion on the “Current Conditions for Human Rights Defenders and Lawyers in China, and Implications for U.S. Policy,” raised China’s need for global stability for the safety of its investments as an impetus for its increased role in UN peace operations. Professor Lewis further emphasized that China’s increased participation in UN peacekeeping efforts may be improving its reputation in the eyes of the international community. Such positive reputational benefits could encourage China’s future involvement.

Professor Boon, who has written extensively on the UN and the Security Council, suggested it might be wise for the US to rethink its skepticism towards international institutions, given the growing influence of China.  The United Kingdom took the approach in the 20^th century of placing greater emphasis on international institutions. As its national power waned relative to the rising US, it has maintained a far more powerful seat in global affairs than it would have if it had not actively engaged in international institutions. The US has an opportunity to solidify its interests in the current international legal and political order, which could serve it well in the future. Professor Boon also highlighted the importance of the new Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, and suggested that these could affect the willingness of permanent Security Council members to engage in new endeavors as much as a new “Beijing Consensus.”

Following their commentary, both Professors Lewis and Boon invited the audience to ask questions and provide comments. Professor Michael Ambrosio of Seton Hall Law School asked Mr. Hill to comment on the success and efficiency of China’s participation in UN peacekeeping, and to rate China’s involvement. Mr. Hill responded that he would rate China’s increased participation quite high, and noted that China has provided crucial assistance in terms of medical and engineering troops, police units, and military observers to UN missions around the world. Mr. Hill emphasized the dire need for police units and explained that China’s assistance in this capacity was especially successful because it was so necessary.

* The authors are both third-year Juris Doctor students at Seton Hall University School of Law. Mr. Kelman is also a Deborah T. Poritz Fellow and Ms. Sedehi is the former president of Seton Hall’s International Law Society.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, September 15, 2011

China's UN Peacekeepers - Expect to See More

As China emerges as a global power, the question arises: what role will it play in the UN, especially in peacekeeping operations?  Since first re-emerging on the world stage in 1978, China has maintained a philosophy of noninterference in other countries’ domestic affairs, making China’s involvement in peacekeeping operations limited.

But more recently, China has begun to step up to the plate in UN peacekeeping operations, sending non-combat PLA soldiers to assist with such effort.  In March 2011, Beijing issued a white paper on the matter, commending its troops for serving in UN peacekeeping operations and stating that such a role is important for a “responsible party.”

So why the change?  And how will China move forward?  Noted China law professor Margaret K. Lewis will examine these developments and discuss China’s future role with Steven Hill, Counselor for Legal Affairs at the United States Mission to the United Nations, at an event next Thursday at Seton Hall Law School.   All are welcomed to attend; RSVPs (to get a sense of numbers) are very much appreciated; for lawyers in the house, the event will provide 2.0 hr NJ/NY CLE.

***RSVP HERE: http://law.shu.edu/About/News_Events/new-beijing-rsvp.cfm ***

A New Beijing Consensus in UN Peacekeeping Operations
Featuring Steven Hill, Counselor for Legal Affairs at the United States Mission to the United Nations
with Comments by Prof. Margaret K. Lewis, Seton Hall Law School

Thursday, September 22, 2011
4 pm – 6pm
Seton Hall Law School, 5^th Floor Faculty Library
1 Newark Center
Newark, NJ 07102
(2 minute walk from Newark Penn Station which has the Path & NJ Transit)

INVITATION TO BLOG – China Law & Policy’s staff will be out of town next week; anyone interested in blogging about the event please contact me at elynch@chinalawandpolicy.com This is an interesting event and should provide for a stimulating blog post.  Thank you in advance.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, May 19, 2011

Ted Kennedy and his family visit China in December 1977

Timing is everything and Prof. Jerome Cohen seems to have a particular knack for it. As various book reviews of Henry Kissinger’s On China revisit the role Kissinger and Nixon played in opening China, Prof. Cohen offers a different – and too often ignored – narrative of Nixon’s 1972 visit: the importance of the late Senator Ted Kennedy in pushing the U.S. into a policy of detente with China and eventual normalization of relations between the two countries.

For Cohen, who first began advising Sen. Ted Kennedy on China issues in 1966, it was neither Nixon nor Kissinger who had the courage to first push the country toward normalizing relations with China. Instead, it was Sen. Kennedy. By 1969, Kennedy had formulated a sound and forceful China policy, urging the U.S. government to seek recognition of the mainland while maintaining its commitment to protecting Taiwan. It was his speech at the inaugural meeting of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in March 1969 that forced President Nixon to re-evaluate his own position on China. Fearful that Kennedy might win the 1972 presidential election on his increasingly popular China stance, Nixon quickly urged his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, to get him to China. Kissinger’s success in planning Nixon’s February 1972 trip to China is one of the factors that caused Nixon to win the election that fall.

Cohen’s eight-page essay on his experience of advising Ted Kennedy and working with him on China offers a startling perspective on the late Senator. Best known for his domestic policy and legislation, Kennedy’s contribution to foreign policy, particularly as it pertains to China, is not often discussed. Cohen points out that even Kennedy himself failed to recognize his importance to opening China – in his own memoir, Kennedy spends less than a page discussing his involvement with China in the late 60s and early 70s.

The Late Senator Ted Kennedy

Cohen ends his essay with a more familiar Kennedy – one who understood the art of diplomacy and that politics, no matter the culture, is an important factor.  As the Carter Administration continuous hit road block after road block in dealing with China, it was Kennedy’s December 1977 trip to Beijing that altered the course and allowed the two countries to normalize relations. A year later, Carter basically adopted the Kennedy plan of recognizing the mainland as the “one China” but maintaining the policy of defense of Taiwan.

To read the full essay, click here.

Jerome Cohen’s “Ted Kennedy’s Role in Restoring Diplomatic Relations with China” is featured in NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, Volume 14, Issue 2, commemorating the work of Senator Edward Kennedy

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, October 19, 2010

Steve Orlins of the National Committee on U.S. China Relations interviews Amb. Jon Huntsman

Last night’s China Town Hall, a live webcast sponsored by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and hosted by various educational institutions throughout the United States, fell short of expectations.   Featuring U.S. Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, the conversation was anything but a frank discussion on the current difficulties in U.S.-China relations.  Instead, the evening had the stale air of political-speak and left one wondering, who exactly was the audience for this event?  But although Ambassador Huntsman’s comments were largely staged, a few key highlights emerged.

Interestingly, the audience was not the American public.  From Ambassador Huntsman’s answers, it appeared to be the Chinese leadership.  Many, if not most of his substantive comments responded to some of the Chinese leadership’s issues in U.S.-China relations, notably their fears on human rights and currency. Ambassador Huntsman began his comments by focusing on the importance of dialogue in the U.S.-China relation and the very real need of greater understanding of each other’s countries and their particularities.  It’s true that most Americans’ views of China are not the most informed and the culture is a bit of an enigma to many but, as the Ambassador pointed out, the same holds true for most Chinese on their views of American culture.

Ambassador Huntsman continued with his plea for greater understanding between the two nations by raising the issue of human rights.  According to Ambassador Huntsman, the Chinese need to understand that human rights is an important issue to Americans; it is a part of who we are, and that is why we always raise it in bi-lateral discussions.  This is certainly the conciliatory route to take in addressing the very prickly issue of human rights in China and it appears to be the strategy purposefully chosen by the Obama Administration.  President Obama took this approach in his Shanghai Town Hall address last November and the same rhetoric emerged after the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue this past spring.

But one wonders – is this effective?  Or by claiming that human rights is a part

June 1989 - Tank Man

of our – e.g. the American or the Western culture – does this rhetoric cheapen the call for universal human rights?  If human rights is universal, then why must we couch the call for it in cultural terms?  And why is there never a reminder from the Obama Administration about China’s commitment, both on the government and individual levels, to human rights?  China has signed various international human rights treaties and many of her people clamor for greater human rights.  Back in June 1989, many died for it.

For now at least, this cultural contexting of human rights appears to be the strategy in dealing with the call for greater human rights in China.  So don’t expect to see any developments on this front with the current Administration; instead, expect human rights to painted as a peculiar particularity of the American culture; something the Chinese will just have to understand about us, sort of like how we like baseball while the rest of the world is crazy for soccer.

But on a more positive note, Ambassador Huntsman used the China Town Hall to signal to the Chinese leadership that it needs to do something about its currency, and quickly.  Although initially complementing the Chinese leadership on allowing the currency to float, Ambassador Huntsman continuously stressed the need for China to allow it to float more rapidly, heavily implying that retaliation from any angry Senate would be sure to follow.  While the Treasury Department has again delayed its report that determines which country is a currency manipulator, the Ambassador’s veiled comments seemed to hint that the U.S. government might be getting closer to taking action on currency.

Ambassador Huntsman shone though on the final question of the night from an audience member in China (likely at the American Chamber of Commerce which was the only organization hosting a webcast within China) about China as a hot-button campaign issue.  Instead of referring to some of the recent campaign ads as mere “anti-China rhetoric,” Ambassador Huntsman noted

Sen. Sherrod Brown

that many of the issues raised recently during the election cycle are important issues and should be addressed.  Interestingly, the New York Times ran two op-eds on Monday intelligently discussing the issues (Paul Krugman and Sherrod Brown); each noting that what is good for American business interests in China is not necessarily what’s good for America.  But Ambassador Huntsman did note that the danger is relegating China issues to a 15 second ad and hoped that once people are elected, that Congress should have a deeper conversation about China.  Evidently Ambassador Huntsman has been out of the country too long; Congress, on both sides of the aisle, appears incapable to discuss any issues deeply, if at all.  And it doesn’t appear that the U.S. government – including Congressmembers and Senators – ever have an interest in hiring staff that actually knows anything about China.  While Ambassador Huntsman is right that these issues do need to be discussed intelligently and sincerely, good luck with resting your hope with Congress.

Although the message from the China Town Hall was less than frank, it was still good that the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations sponsored this event – it provides insight into the U.S.’ relationship with China.  Additionally, the sponsoring educational institutions each hosted a talk, either before or after the Ambassador, discussing more recent developments in China.  At Seton Hall School of Law’s China Town Hall, organized by Prof. Margaret K. Lewis, Prof. Carl Minzner gave the keynote speech.  An expert on legal and political reform in China, Prof. Minzner spoke much more frankly about China’s future course, especially as it pertains to greater rights protection of its citizens.  Prof. Minzner’s speech will be analyzed in a future blog post.  Stay tuned!

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, May 24, 2010

Only a handful of the 200 U..S. officials at today's Strategic & Economic Dialogue in Beijing

The second U.S-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) is off to an interesting start in Beijing.  The U.S.’ agenda for the talks – agreement on Iran sanctions, change in China’s currency policy, and greater openness of China’s procurement market for foreign companies – was largely overshadowed this morning by South Korea’s announcement that it will hold North Korea responsible for the torpedo attack on a South Korean war ship, the Cheonan, in March 2010 which resulted in the death of 46 sailors.

As the S&ED was set to open in Beijing, South Korea’s president, Lee

Chinese President Hu Jintao greets U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at Monday's opening of the S&ED

Myung-Bok, issued the strongest statement against North Korea in decades and announced that all trade between the Koreas would be suspended, investment would be stopped, and North Koreans would not be permitted to visit South Korea.  Additionally, South Korea will also reinstall megaphones at the border between the two countries and resume anti-North Korean broadcasting, a practiced it stopped in 2004 when tensions were easing between the two Koreas.  Previously, North Korea stated that any retaliation by South Korea in response to the Cheonam incident would be seen as an act of war; today it announced planned attacks on any South Korean megaphones at the border.

In her remarks during the S&ED’s opening ceremony, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who is accompanied by 200 U.S. officials on this trip, brought up the issue of North Korea’s increasing “belligerent” actions and the need for the U.S. and China to work together in regards to North Korea.  Chinese President Hu Jintao did not mention North Korea in his speech.

But President Hu did bring up the currency issue in his remarks, to the surprise of most.  In his speech, President Hu promised that China would continue to reform its currency policy, but noted it would be on China’s terms and such reform would be gradual.

With the delay of the Treasury Department’s report on China’s currency policy and recent op-eds in the state-controlled Chinese press regarding the need to give more flexibility to China’s currency — the yuan — it appeared that China would make some sort of concession on the currency issue.  However, the recent crisis in Greece and the European Union, which has resulted in a 20% drop in the value of the Euro against the dollar, changed that opinion.  By effectively tying the yuan to the dollar, as the dollar gets stronger against the Euro, Chinese goods become more expensive in the European Union, China’s largest export market.  So President Hu’s promise to do something about China’s currency policy was a bit of a surprise.  And the public nature of the comment was even more surprising since the revaluation of the yuan is a hot-button issue for the Chinese domestically: Beijing does not want to appear to be placating to U.S. demands.

But what remains to be seen is when: when will China adjust its currency policy.  Don’t expect that question to be answered at the S&ED which concludes Tuesday afternoon.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, April 14, 2010

World leaders met this week in Washington, DC to discuss the danger of nuclear war.  But as the world becomes increasingly reliant on the internet and increasingly connected through it, another threat is beginning to loom large – cyberwar.  When noted technology giant Google is susceptible to cyber-attacks, that does not bode well for the rest of us.  How safe is the U.S. from a large-scale cyber-attack?  Today Chinese hackers attack Google’s servers, but what about tomorrow?  Will the next attack be on something more critical, like a U.S. power grid?

Dr. Adam Segal, Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

To understand the complex issues underlying the world of hacking and cyber-espionage, and how it relates to U.S.-China relations, China Law & Policy sat down with a noted expert on both China and cyber-security, Dr. Adam Segal, the Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.   In this exclusive interview, Dr. Segal discusses the nature of the attacks on Google, the involvement of the Chinese government in the hacking world and the danger China poses to the U.S.’ cyber-security.  But as Dr. Segal makes clear, it is not a one-sided affair; the U.S. also plays a very active role in hacking and cyber-espionage, making it difficult to challenge China when something like the Google incident arises.  Dr. Segal also explores the need for international cooperation on these issues and the role that international law can play in containing the threat.  Unfortunately, as he points out, the world community is far from reaching any sort of agreement, leaving all nations susceptible.

Click here to listen to the interview with Dr. Adam Segal (read below for transcript)

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EL:  Can you just give our listeners a little bit of background on the hacking which lead to Google’s announcement in January that it was looking to leave China?  How widespread and sophisticated was the attack and what was the theft that Google referenced in its press release if you know at all?

AS: Google announced that it was going to be shutting down its business in China.  And what they said drove them to that decision was a hacking incident which seems to have two main components.  The first was, as you said, a kind of attack on Google’s intellectual property, its corporate knowledge and corporate property.  And the second was attacks on the G-mail accounts of human rights dissents.  Google said it traced those attacks back to China; it didn’t implicate the Chinese government.  Others, like the New York Times have traced it back to Shanghai Jiaotong University and a computer training institute but the source of it still remains a bit of a mystery.

There is some debate about how sophisticated the attacks actually were.  They were referred to as the Aurora attacks.  Google has consistently said that they were extremely sophisticated but a number of other security analysts have said that in fact they were fairly basic, that much of the code used has been floating around for a long time.  What the IPR that the Chinese got or were trying to get is unclear, Google hasn’t specifically said.  Some people seem to believe that it was basically that it was the data and databases that Google collects on its own users.  So basically the kind of core knowledge that Google extracts from what Google users do, how they do it, when they do it, which would be one of the most important kind of assets that Google has.

EL:  In tracing back, or Google saying that the attacks were traced back to China, why is that difficult to ascertain?  To what degree…Can you put a percentage on how accurate you can trace back an attack?

AS:  The problem is that you can continually trace back the attacks to certain computers or to certain networks or IP addresses, but often once you get there, some more poking around leads you to another computer behind that.  And the other thing is the hackers themselves can spoof the address that they are using.  I think there becomes a fairly high degree of certainty about where the attack might have come within a national network.  In some cases, even down to specific IP addresses.  But even then you don’t know who the hacker was that was involved and you don’t know the hackers relationship to any state organization or anybody else for that matter.

EL:  And in terms of China specifically, the cyber-hacking, how prevalent is cyber-hacking from China compared to other countries like Russia or even the United States?  Is China being singled out here?

AS:  I think China is being singled out in a sense.  I mean given that it was a high profile attack on a company like Google, but also given the state of U.S.-China relations right now, that it fed into a worsening tenor in the bilateral relationship.  But in raw numbers, for criminal activity, clearly Russia is very high up there and we saw the political uses of cyber-hacking in the case of the Georgian war and Estonia and some other high profile political cases.  And there is a large amount of hacking that comes from the United States and that’s actually one of the big complaints on the Chinese side – is that the Chinese are being scapegoated and they themselves are often victims of attacks and many of those attacks come from servers in the United States.  When you look at the number of bad ISP – Internet Service Providers – that are hosting botnets and other kind of zombies that are attacking, there are a large number of them that are in the United States.  So, China is also a victim.

EL:  Just focusing on just China and the hacking there, can you explain maybe a little bit more what the hacker community is like in China.  Is it an organized community?  And what motivates the hackers – do they do this just for fun or are they ever “hired” for their skills?  And also how do they determine targets – how was Google determined?  Was that just something for fun or for profit?

AS:  I think the community itself is incredibly hard to characterize.  It’s very diverse, it’s, I think, very decentralized.  The community represents kind of the similar community that there is in the United States and Russia.  There are what they called script-kiddies – people, teenagers who are doing it for fun or to show off or to see what they can actually accomplish.  There are criminals – people that are just hacking for financial gains.  There are what are called patriotic hackers – people that hack websites out of a kind of nationalistic feeling.  Then there are hackers that are probably employed by the Chinese government, probably by the military and the security agencies that are used to attack specific targets for political reasons.  And then there are hackers in the military that are thinking about how cyber would be used in an actual military conflict.

Of course, the important question is the relationship about all of these people and I don’t think we really have a very good idea.  Clearly, there is some blurring of boundaries of patriotic hackers and criminal hackers.  The system itself seems to be in many ways a kind of mirror of the system that has made China such a power in the global manufacturing which is that there are kind of contracts and subcontracts and subcontracts of what people do.  Somebody might be in charge of writing a very low-level code and that code is then packaged up and used by people above them, who may then might contract for a specific project or may sell it on the open market.  Certain things are just put out there on hacker websites and you can just download them and buy them just for your own thing.

Why Google was targeted.  If, as Google says that they were part of an attack that seems to have included at least 30 other technology companies, there does seem to be a push from Chinese intelligence community, from its espionage community, to try and get advanced technology from foreign companies.  So we have seen for at least five years, if not longer, pretty concentrated, focused attacks on defense contractors and other U.S. technology providers.  And then, once you add the attack on the dissidents as well, then that also seems to be one of the interests of the attacks.  But who was, who within the Chinese government organized it or put it in a larger strategy, I think that we really have no idea. 

EL:  I guess that raises kind of the other issue that has been floating around there with the Google incident and cyber-hacking in general, is to what degree is the Chinese government involved in some of these incidences?  I know Northrop Grumman issued a report last year to the US-China Economic and Security Commission analyzing the link between, hacking for military purposes, but this general hacking of corporations, could it be that the Chinese government is behind it?  And also, when you make this distinction of political hackers, would that be motivated by the Chinese government or is it just a by-product of the nationalism that seems very active in China right now?

AS:  I don’t think we know.  I think the most we can say is on the espionage side, it just matches, or it pushes in the same direction of a general concern we know that China has about technological dependence and wanting to gain as much technology from the West as possible.  That strategy I think has been in place for fifteen, twenty years.  That includes perfectly harmless, normal technology policy about how China is going to increase its own technological capabilities, goes from that to espionage and theft.  You would expect that that would include the normal type of espionage or bribing, stealing, theft of secrets from corporations, to now including cyber-espionage and attacks and those things.  So I would say that the government has a role in the sense that it has set this general direction of the policy and these concerns about technology and China’s desire for it.

Clearly the intelligence agencies probably have a sense of specific technology that they are concerned about and want to know more about.  So the hacking of the F-35 and the F-22 and those kind of things, those are clearly probably driven by government agencies who are looking at a potential conflict with the United States and want to know what those capabilities are.

But once you get to the level of Google – is there a government official that says, well if we hack Google, then we can give that information to Baidu [the popular Chinese search engine] and we can have a competitor, I don’t think we can know.  That clearly is a possibility but at this point, it may just be criminal.  It may be a criminal that turns around and says to Baidu – we can sell this to you.

On the dissident side, I think it is probably very similar also.  I think in some cases the security agencies may have….are targeting specific individuals who are using those capabilities.  In other cases criminal hackers go after people and then turn around and say to the intelligence agencies – we’ve got this person so either do something for us or pay us for the information.

EL:  In the press it has often been the Chinese government attached to this cyber-hacking, but does the Chinese government ever see this cyber-hacking as a threat to its own rule either from domestic hackers or from hackers in the U.S.?  Are the government agencies ever a victim of the cyber-hacking and cyber-espionage either domestically or from abroad?

AS: Yeah, I would think all of the time. I think, from the international perspective the Chinese basically assume that the United States is engaged in cyber-espionage all of the time.  And that given our capabilities, in particular the capabilities that exist in the NSA – the National Security Agency – that they are….we are probably getting more from them then they are getting from us, in the Chinese perspective, and that we are constantly hacking them.  So they point to that as well as to the discussions in the United States about creating a cyber-command in the military and discussions about controlling the commons and all these other things as kind of a representation of American hypocrisy.  We are talking about militarizing cyber-space while they are being hacked.  So I think yes, that’s clearly and issue from outside of China.

On the domestic front I think yes, that Chinese government agencies and corporations are being hacked.  There’s been a number of prominent cases of Chinese hackers spreading malware to try and steal identity numbers and virtual money from these multiple player games.  Very prominent hackers have been arrested and eventually imprisoned.  So I think that is part of the threat.

The other threat is of course is that, dealing with these patriotic hackers is a double-edged sword for the Chinese government.  There is a fear that while they are focusing externally, U.S. corporations or U.S. government websites, in the case of the Olympics on French websites and things like that.  But if their ire is turned inward then those people could hack Chinese government websites.   I think the Chinese government is very concerned and you can see that in discussions about their own cyber-security but also trying to develop new types of software.  The problem is that the Chinese is hyper-reliant in Microsoft, something like 90% of Chinese government offices use Windows.  A lot of that is pirated which means that it is not updated regularly for security patches.  So there is a lot of vulnerability.

EL:  You make this distinction between patriotic hacking, criminal hacking, commercial hacking, but under Chinese law itself, is hacking in general illegal?

AS:  It is.  There are laws on the books against hacking, criminal hacking, privacy laws.  Those were strengthened in

Cute & Cuddly until he infests your computer

December 2008 and then again in February of this year I think.  The Chinese announced that they were going again to try to strengthen anti-hacking laws, in particular the kind of punishment for hackers.  Also on-line privacy issues and some tort issues about privacy and defamation.  Like I said, there are prominent cases of hackers who have been arrested and fined.  This guy who wrote this malware called Panda malware I think it was, and was sentenced to I think 3 years and fined $18,000.  So there are domestic laws against it.

EL:  And do you think the domestic laws are sufficient in dealing with this?  And also how do Chinese laws compare to laws in the United States against hacking?

AS:  I think they’re comparable.  I think the issue is with all laws in China has to do with implementation.  Clearly the issue for the United States or other countries, investigating hacking requires more cooperation from the Chinese about, who’s behind the attacks and actually following up on prosecution.  But I think within China, I suspect the issue is not the law per se but expertise….all the things we have in the United States about how do you prosecute cyber-crimes – expertise at the local level, resources, enough people staffing these kinds of issues.  From the Chinese perspective also, the U.S. hasn’t been all that helpful either.  I have heard a number of cases where the Chinese have turned around to the FBI and said –we think this hacking is coming from the United States.  And the United States has not been all that responsive from what I’ve heard.

EL: I guess cyber-hacking, it’s definitely a crime more without borders.  So how do you see international law or treaties coming into play here to battle the threat of cyber-espionage?

AS:  I don’t think there’s much to be done about espionage.  There’s no international treaties against espionage.  We engage in it, they engage in it, our allies engage in it.  I think that is likely to happen.  I think espionage we have to figure out how we are going to defend ourselves against.  The problem with espionage of course though is that it is hard to differentiate espionage from what could become vandalism or an attack.  So I think what we want to kind of agree on with the Chinese is that we know espionage is going to go on, but things like probing electricity grids, that should not be occurring or other kind of critical infrastructure.  We should be working on how do we declare those off limits.

On the criminal front there is a…the Council on Europe has this convention on cyber-crime.  I can’t remember how many countries have signed it now, it’s about I think 20 or 40, I can’t remember exactly.  But part of the problem is that most of the major players haven’t signed it; the U.S. has signed it, Japan has signed it but Russia hasn’t signed it.  Which goes a long way in defining consistent standards across national borders about what a cyber-crime is, how do you punish hacking, create a deterrent.  The problem with Russia, China things that we see as freedom of speech they see as a cyber-crime so that has been a problem in the case of Russia.  But the Chinese seem to be at least studying the Council on Europe convention which often kind of the first sign that the Chinese are moving toward international standards.  So I think that is a way to move forward.  And within Asia itself, ASEAN has had a couple of discussion about creating a similar kind of convention on cyber-crime in the region.

And then the other issue is this international convention on arms control, on cyber-war.  The United States has entered into discussions with the Russians about it.  That I think is very difficult and I think unlikely to be very useful because in the kind of traditional terms of arms control verification, inspection, those are all impossible with cyber-weapons.  So, that I think is useful just for talking for talking’s sake but will not result in any kind of concrete agreements.

EL: Just to follow-up on the convention on cyber-crime, you said that one of the problems is definition of terms.  Is that the only thing that would hold back a country like China or Russia from signing on to this kind of convention?  Or are there other factors?

AS: I think that’s a big one but I do think also that right now at least China and Russia find it politically and strategically useful to kind of have this arms-length relationship with hackers.  As we talked about earlier, this ties the government’s willingness to directly use or indirectly use hackers for their own political purposes makes it….right now that’s a reason for them not to crackdown too hard on criminal hacking.  So that is I think another reason why it has been hard to create a common ground.

EL:  Do you think that there is any space for having maybe a bi-lateral agreement between U.S. and China or a tri-lateral agreement between U.S., China and Russia about issues of cyber-espionage like not probing electricity grids or things like that?  Or do you think it would have to be global?

AS:  Well I think any convention would have to be global.  But I think there is a benefit for having these bi-lateral discussions only if because this area is newly emerging and policymakers I don’t think are particularly cognizant of all the risks and problems involved in any of these issues.  So just having a discussion with the Russians and the Chinese and others about what the potential rules of the road might I think are probably pretty useful.

EL: Absent any kind of global agreement, how best should the U.S. government and U.S. corporations deal with this issue of their own?  How can they better prevent it from happening?  Or can they?

Howard Schmidt - Cyber Czar

AS: That’s what we are struggling with now.  The United States finally has the cyber-czar in place, Harry Schmidt.  I think one of the big things that is still occurring in the United States is kind of a debate about what the best metaphor for this is, how do you think about this cyber-issue.  You have those like, the op-ed in the Washington Post several weeks ago by the former head of NSA, McConnell, about basically cyber-war and we’re losing it and his response was very much a militarization of cyber-space.  In fact he calls for something like the re-engineering of the internet so we can basically see where any attack is coming from.

And then you have Schmidt at a conference a couple of weeks ago saying – I don’t believe in cyber-war, I don’t think cyber-war is the right metaphor.  And you have those people talking about resilience and more of a public health model for how you respond to these things – you have to defend, you have to respond, you have to quarantine.

So I think we have this broad outline, we have this debate to settle in the States.  But the way we are moving is probably closer to the public health, well actually probably both tracks at the same time.  From the defense side I think you are beginning to see more traction on private-public cooperation, about definitions of standards – what does secure actually mean and how should it be implemented, more spending on R&D for cyber-security, more training of people and that’s a major issue is about getting people trained, more public awareness.  These are all domestic issues.

EL: And just a final question.  Since President Hu Jintao is in the United States, in Washington today, do you think in his side talks with President Obama, the issue of cyber-hacking and cyber-espionage will be coming up?  How important do you think the Administration views this issues especially in light of the fact that Secretary of State Clinton has openly talked about it?

AS:  I suspect it wasn’t brought up in these meetings if only because over the last two and a half weeks it has been a clear effort on both sides to try to get the relationship back on track.  Clearly the Administration’s major strategic concern right now is Iran and then with the currency being the second concern.  So those are the two issues, from what I’ve heard, were discussed in the meeting.  I suspect there were no reasons to bring up the cyber-issues because there are no solutions or discussion that is helpful to both sides at this point.  So other than just poking them in the eye with it, I don’t see why they would bring it up.  So I suspect it was not discussed.

EL: Thank you very much.  This was very interesting and I appreciate your time.

AS:  Thank you.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, April 2, 2010

In just a day, it appears that the bad blood that seemed to be spill between the U.S. and China is behind us.  Yesterday morning, China announced that it will participate in talks about sanctions against Iran, by late afternoon, President Hu Jintao of China announced that he will be visiting Wasnhington DC at the end of April, and this evening, the White House just issue a press release summarizing President Obama’s call with President Hu (text below).  Interesting turn events.  Does this signal a changed attitude between the two countries or perhaps just the natural ups and downs in a relationship between two powerful countries?

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, March 31, 2010

Almost three months ago, the world witnessed an agonizing tragedy in Haiti: an earthquake killing hundreds of thousands and displacing millions in one of the world’s poorest countries.  Other countries were quick to respond, offering aid and assistance.  But how did the world’s emerging superpower respond?  In this informative essay, Marcy Nicks Moody examines China’s response to the Haiti earthquake, arguably China’s first chance to show the world that it is a responsible global leader.

In the Aftermath of Haiti’s Earthquake: Where is China?

By Marcy Nicks Moody

Though Haiti’s plight no longer appears above the fold of our daily newspapers, it remains one of the world’s most dire. At least 230,000 lives were lost in the earthquake of January 12. More than 300,000 people were injured, and at least 1.3 million were left homeless. This would be a catastrophe anywhere, but for a country of some 10 million, the proportion is gargantuan. More than two months following the magnitude 7.0 quake, shelter, security, and sanitation remain inadequate, and people live in camps of tents and tarpaulins, unlikely to move to more permanent dwellings any time soon.

The international community has responded to the tragedy in Haiti with laudable humanitarian assistance as well as more extended commitments to help “build [Haiti] back better,” and just today, the United Nations and United States co-hosted an International Donors Conference to mobilize support as Haiti lays the foundation for its long-term reconstruction and development. The financial resources necessary for this undertaking are huge: $11.5 billion now, $34.4 billion over the next decade, or five years to Haiti’s current GDP.

Chinese Aid Workers in Haiti

For China watchers, this conference—and, more importantly, the commitments made at it—may provide further insight into the status of China’s global influence. There has been much ado about China’s arrival on the world stage since its apparent and early exit from the nadir of the economic crisis. And over the last several months, Beijing has increasingly comported itself in such a way as to suggest that it believes in the veracity and longevity of this arrival. Largely, this has taken the form of vitriolic verbiage on issues ranging from Copenhagen to Tibet to its exchange rate. But there are better metrics for global influence than causticity. One of these is a country’s response to other countries in times of need.

Haiti is a particularly interesting case in that it is one of fewer than twenty-five countries left in the world that maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan in lieu of the People’s Republic. Beijing’s traditional response to such countries—often poor ones in Africa and the Caribbean—has generally been a deep-pocketed charm offensive, with preferential loans and big investments. Cynical though it may sound, Haiti’s crisis could be seen as China’s opportunity to curry favor with—or extract a quid pro quo from—a country with which it would like to have diplomatic relations.

Indeed, China has already taken a number of steps to wean countries in the Caribbean and Latin America from Taiwan.

Sichuan Earthquake

China is a non-borrowing member of both the Caribbean Development Bank as well as the much larger Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), meaning it provides capital but takes no money in return. Though in the latter case, IADB procurement contracts for Chinese firms was also an important motivation for joining, it was not the only one. Moreover, Chinese—in Beijing and elsewhere—understand the tragedy an earthquake can wreak better than many, or perhaps most. On May 12, 2008, a magnitude 7.5 earthquake struck Sichuan Province, killing almost 90,000, injuring 360,000, and leaving 5 million homeless. Like Haiti, poor building construction contributed to the scale of human loss. The outpouring of emotion and assistance was immense. With such a horrible tragedy in China’s recent past, one might think that China might sympathize with Haiti’s plight.

But China’s response to the Haitian earthquake has not been as generous as either of these arguments would suggest. Beijing has donated $1 million to the emergency aid efforts, and does not yet appear to have made longer term commitments. It is not among the ranks of the largest donors, which include the United States, Brazil, Canada, and the European Union. The United States, for example, immediately pledged $100 million for the relief effort, and Congress is considering an additional aid package of $2.8 billion. That said, a 125 member search-and-rescue team, medics, and aid supplies coming from China were the first to reach Haiti. The tragedy has not gone unnoticed in China.

So why has China done so little? To be sure, Beijing does not tend to view its assistance activities as ‘foreign aid,’ but rather frames them as offering help to brother or sister countries in times of need. With a quasi-colonial history of its own, China tends to avoid activities that may smack of imperialism or appear to encroach upon a country’s sovereignty. This may be why China avoids national-level coordination efforts and refrains from coordinating donor activities. However, avoiding international coordination now, which may be part of China’s reasons for remaining relatively inactive, will do Haiti no good.

Moreover, Haiti’s relatively small size and vast humanitarian tragedy, coupled with China’s phenomenal ability to execute construction and public works projects in minimal time, present an extraordinary opportunity to showcase China’s arrival and its ‘harmonious’ foreign policy, not just in Haiti or Latin America, but to the world. As Beijing continues to be roiled by the public relations disaster that is its dispute with Google, Haiti is a place in which China could do well. It might actually do some good, too.

Marcy writes about China. In 2007-08, she was a Fulbright Scholar in China, where she was also a Research Fellow with the U.S.-Asia Law Institute. She received an M.A. in East Asian Studies from Columbia University and graduated from Brown University.

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By Elizabeth M. Lynch, February 2, 2010

In yesterday’s New York Times, Helene Cooper argued that the Obama Administration’s recent announcement of over $6 billion in arms sales to Taiwan shows a “new toughness” toward Beijing and perhaps even a “fundamentally new direction” in the Administration’s China policy.  But, by focusing on the arms sales, Ms. Cooper overemphasizes the event.  U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are far from novel or tough, and some may argue, periodically required under U.S. law.

Similarly, Beijing’s angry reaction was predictable.  In fact, for each prior Administration’s arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese government has responded in much the same way: postponement of military-to-military meetings, issue formal protests with U.S. officials, and saber-rattling for the domestic consumption.  However, Beijing’s recent threat of sanctions against U.S. companies involved with the arms sales is new and serious.  But this is more a reflection of China’s growing confidence and less a reflection of a changed or “tough” U.S. policy toward China.

Why Does China Care so Much about Taiwan?  Isn’t it a Separate Country?

Nope, scrap that vision from your mind.  Taiwan is not a separate country, at least not in the eyes of the Chinese, Taiwanese or U.S. governments.   The People’s Republic of China (a.k.a. the mainland) views Taiwan (a.k.a. “The Republic of China”) as a renegade province and any relations between Taiwan and other countries is viewed as interference in the mainland’s domestic affairs.  While Taiwan has largely developed as an independent society, it agrees with the mainland’s assessment that there is only “one China.”  The Taiwanese government has never called for independence and the Kuo Min Tang party (pronounced Gwo min-dang and a.k.a. “the Nationalists” or KMT), which has ruled Taiwan for most of Taiwan’s separate existence, also espouses the view of “one China” and that eventually, the mainland and Taiwan will reunite.  The difference is who rules this reunited China.  For Taiwan, it’s the KMT; for the mainland, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

All of this stems from World War II.  After the War ended in 1945, the KMT and the CCP resumed their civil war, a civil war that was put on hold to fight the Japanese invasion from 1937 to 1945.  By 1949, the CCP’s victory was certain and the KMT government fled to the province of Taiwan to continue the Republic of China.

Thus began the baffling existence of two Chinas – the communist People’s Republic of China on the mainland and the KMT’s Republic of China on Taiwan.  Each China claimed that it was the “official” and “rightful” China and the other a mere province; each forced the international community to recognize only one China – either China on the mainland or China on Taiwan – hence the birth of the “one China” policy.

The U.S. continued to ally itself with the KMT and the Republic of China, recognizing Taiwan as the official China and all but denying the existence of the mainland.  But starting in 1972, with President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to the mainland, relations between the U.S. and the PRC began to improve and in 1979, the U.S. switched recognition of China from Taiwan to the mainland.

Obama’s Arms Sales to Taiwan Is Par for the Course in U.S.-China Relations

The Obama Administration’s recent announcement of arms sales to Taiwan follows a long line of arms sales by the U.S.  Almost every president since 1978 has sold arms to Taiwan.  In fact, the U.S., under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), is required to sell defensive arms to Taiwan.  In 1979, after changing recognition to mainland China, the U.S. did not want to leave its former ally completely open to attack or takeover.  As a result, Congress passed the TRA.

The TRA authorizes quasi-diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Taiwan.  For example, instead of having an official embassy on Taiwan, the TRA allows for the “American Institute in Taiwan.”  Additionally, and more importantly, the TRA established the U.S.’ responsibility toward Taiwan if it is threatened.  At issue here is the TRA’s requirement that the U.S. periodically sell defensive arms to Taiwan.

In announcing arms sales to Taiwan, the Obama Administration is merely following its obligations under the TRA.  Additionally, the Obama Administration has not acquiesced to Taiwan’s request for F-16s.  During the George W. Bush Administration, Taiwan repeatedly requested the purchase of F-16s.  Similarly, Taiwan put out feelers with the Obama Administration to see if there was a possibility that they could purchase F-16s.  Again, Taiwan was told not to put in a formal request for F-16s.

The F-16s are a big issue since they are not “defensive” arms; Beijing would very much view a sale of F-16s to Taiwan as going a bit too far.  But Obama’s package to Taiwan merely includes the usual: Patriot missiles, Black Hawk helicopters, mine-hunting ships and information technology.

If the Obama Administration wanted to use the Taiwan arms sales requirement to “toughen” its stance to Beijing as the New York Times claims it has, the Administration would have acquiesced to Taiwan’s request for F-16s.  Instead, it merely sold similar arms to Taiwan that President George W. Bush sold in 2008.

This is not to say that the Obama Administration does not have a strong China policy.  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent policy speech on internet freedom was a robust critique of countries like China that censor their internet and partake in cyberhacking.  This follows President Obama’s strong and public criticism of internet censorship while in China this past November.  The New York Times would have done better to focus its argument on the Administration’s novel and forceful rhetoric on internet freedom vis-à-vis China.